The court has the power to correct errors in statutes, including errors in drafting.

1. the present peritioner Jamnabai claims to be the successor of one Deokabai, who died on February 1. 1966, Said deokanai was the tenure holder of survey No. 121/1 and survey No. 122. of village Kandli, district Amarland was leased to Suryabhan, the present respondent, and further that the lease of Suryabhan was governed by the provisions of section 58(I) (c) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultutal Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 (hereafter called the Act).

2. Jamnabai gave notice on 16-5-1966 and applied for possession on spectmeber 30, 1967.

3. This application has been found to be barred by time, as having been filed after one year from the death of original landlady Deokabai, i.e., February 1, 1966. All the authorities under the provisions of the act have concurred in this view.

4. To find out limitiation so as to non-suit the present petitioner, provisions of sub-section (2) (B) of Section 38 of the Act have been applied. It is found that this sub-section and the provisions contained therein are very much mentioned in the notification issued by the State in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (3) of the section 38 of the Sct. It is plain ly written in clause 2 of the said notification that the provisions of sub-sections (2) to (7) of section 38 would govern the right of a lessor requiring any land for cultivating the same personally. Sub-section (2) being mentioned in that clause. all the authorities have construed the same as intending to require a person like the present petitioner, i.e., the successor of a widow. not only to give notice but also to apply within a year from the death of her predecessor in-title. That is plain enough and really no exception can be taken to the approach of the revenue authorities, for sub-section (2) is very much mentioned in the Notification.

5. By the present petition the complaining landloady contends that the notification has not been properly interpreted and there is basic error in reading sub-section (2) in his notification.

6. As it involved the interpretation of the notification issued by the State which may affect the structure notice was issued and the learned Government pleader was heard in that regard.

7. I may briefly refer to the approach of the contending parties to the matter in issue. For the petitioner it is contended by the learned counsel appearing for this widow that mention of sub-section (2) in the Notification is a plain error and a mistake while interpreting it. It is the primary duty of a court of law to find out the intention and if necessary to read the words used in a statute or even a notification giving it correct meaning so as to subserve the purpose and object for which the notification is issued. If so contrued, there is internal evidence available in the scheme of the Act, i.e., the provisions of section 38 itself, as well in the scheme of section 58, which permits the state Government to lay down by notification certain conditions, that mention of sub-section (2) was a patent error of drafting. What was really intended and therefore must be read is "sub-sections (3) to (7)" and not "(2) to (7)"

8. As against this, the approach of the learned Government pleader is that it is not permissible for a court of law to substitute the words upon mere notices of propriety or reasonableness. That is neither the field of interpretation, nor the court can assume jurisdiction in those matters, for it will be really a mode of legislating itself. Such a jurisdiction is not conceived unless there is patent absurdity or ambiguity available in the words of the statute. The learned Government pleader took great pains in analysing the scheme both of the notification as well as the present provisions and tried to submit that it may well be that sub-section (2) was very much intended to be applied in its full force. Once there could be such a possibility then it is beyound the pale of jurisdiction of this court to rewrite section or the clause in legislative notificat