Proceedings for payment of gratuity must be taken under the Payment of Gratuity Act and not under any other statute.

Headnote:
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 - The court analyzes the applicability of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 to the construction project in question and concludes that it applies. The court also determines that the retrenchment of the employee respondents falls within the scope of section 4(1) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, making them entitled to gratuity. The court further concludes that proceedings for payment of gratuity must be taken under the Payment of Gratuity Act and not under any other statute.
Fact of the Case:
The State of Punjab appeals against the judgment and order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana refusing to quash an order under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for payment of gratuity to the respondents under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.
Finding of the Court:
The court analyzes the applicability of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 to the construction project in question and concludes that it applies. The court also determines that the retrenchment of the employee respondents falls within the scope of section 4(1) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, making them entitled to gratuity. Additionally, the court finds that the employee respondents should have applied under the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, rather than under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The court concludes that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of the applications filed by the employee respondents.
Ratio Decidendi: The Payment of Gratuity Act applies to establishments involved in construction projects. Retrenchment falls within the scope of section 4(1) of the Payment of Gratuity Act. Proceedings for payment of gratuity must be taken under the Payment of Gratuity Act and not under any other statute. The Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of the applications filed by the employee respondents under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Result: The appeal is allowed, and the order of the Labour Court is quashed. The appellant is directed to pay the employee respondents their costs of the appeal and the amounts due to them within one month from today.

JUDGMENT - PATHAK R.S., J.: - In this appeal by special leave the State of Punjab appeals against the judgment and order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana refusing to quash an order under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for payment of gratuity to the respondents under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

2. The Hydel Department of the Government of Punjab had undertaken

a Project described as the “Hydel Upper Bari Doab Construction Project”. The respondents Nos. 2 to 8 were employed as work-charged employees. . On completion of the work assigned to them they were retrenched, and retrenchment compensation was paid to them. The employee respondents claimed that they were also entitled to gratuity, bonus and certain other allowances and benefits. The gratuity was claimed under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. The claim being disputed, the respondents applied under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the Labour Court, Jullundur. The Labour Court made an order dated April 30, 1975 that the employee respondents were entitled to the gratuity claimed by them but not to bonus and the other allowances and benefits. A writ petition filed by the appellant has been dismissed in limine by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.

3. In this appeal, the learned Additional Solicitor-General contends on behalf of the appellant that the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 cannot be invoked by the respondents because the Project does not fall within the scope of section 1(3) of that Act. Section 1(3) provides that the Act will apply to:

“(a) every factory, mine, oilfield, plantation, port and railway company;

(b) every shop or establishment within the meaning of any law for the time being in force in relation to shops and establishments in a State, in which ten or more persons are employed, or were employed, on any day of the preceding twelve months;

(c) such other establishments or class of establishments, in which ten or more employees are employed, or were employed, on any day of the preceding twelve months, as the Central Government may, by notification, specify in this behalf.”

According to the parties, it is clause(b) alone which needs to be considered

for deciding whether the Act applies to the Project. The Labour Court has held that the Project is an establishment within the meaning of the Payment of Wages Act, section 2(ii), (g) of whith defines an “industrial establishment” to mean any establishment in which any work relating to the construction, development or maintenance of buildings, roads, bridges or canals, or relating to operations connected with navigation, irrigation or the supply of water, or relating to the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity or any other form of power is being carried on.” It is urged for the appellant that the Payment of Wages Act is not an enactment contemplated by section I(3), (b) of the Payment of Gratuity Act. The Payment of Wages Act, it is pointed out, is a central enactment and section 1(3), (b), it is said, refers to a law enacted by the State Legislated. We are unable to accept the contention. Section 1(3), (b) speaks of “any law for the time being in force in relation to shops and establishments in a State.” There can be no dispute that the Payment of Wages Act is in force III the State of Punjab. Then, it is submitted, the Payment of Wages Act is not a law in relation to “shops and establishments”. As to that, the Payment of Wages Act is a statute which while it may not relate to shops, relates to a class of establishments, that is to say, industrial establishments. But, it is contended, the law referred to under section 1(3), (b) must be law which relates to both shops and establishments, such as the Punjab Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1958. It is difficult to accept that contention because there is no warrant for so limiting the meaning of the expression law in section 1(3), (b). The expression is comprehensive in its scope, and c

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