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1979 Supreme(Bom) 46

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
S.P. Bharucha, J.
Elora Construction Company.... Petitioner.
Versus
Municipal Corporation of Gr. Bombay others.... Respondents.
Miscellaneous Petition No. 1290 of 1975 (Original Side), decided on 22-2-1979.
Advocates appeared :
Makhijia and D. Malvi, for petitioner.
K.K. Singhvi and DMello, for respondents 1, 2 3.
N.H. Gursahani, G.P., with Shankar Narayan, for respondent No. 4.

The right to appeal is a creature of statute and can be regulated by the statute. Restrictions imposed on the right to appeal are valid if they are reasonable and in the public interest.

Headnote:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - BOMBAY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACT, 1888 - SECTION 217 - VALIDITY - RESTRICTIONS ON RIGHT TO APPEAL - REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS - ARTICLE 19(1)(F) AND 19(5) - ARTICLE 265 - LEGISLATIVE POWER - JUDICIAL DOMAIN.

Fact of the Case:

Petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of section 217 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, as amended, which imposed restrictions on the right to appeal against rateable value and tax fixed or charged under the Act. The petitioners argued that the amended section violated Articles 19, 31, and 265 of the Constitution and impinged upon the judicial sphere.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the amended section 217 was constitutionally valid. It held that the right to appeal is a creature of statute and can be regulated by the statute. The Court found that the restrictions imposed by the amended section were reasonable and in the public interest, as they were intended to ensure that the Corporation received the amounts concerned directly and indirectly until the appeal was heard and disposed of.

Issues: 1. Whether the amended section 217 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, violated Articles 19, 31, and 265 of the Constitution? 2. Whether the amended section impinged upon the judicial sphere?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the right to appeal is not inherent or fundamental but created by the Act. The restriction imposed is upon that right to appeal, that unless the amount claimed to be due is deposited the appeal will not be entertained. It is difficult to see how, in the circumstances, Article 19(1)(f) can be invoked. 2. The Court held that the amended section 217 made no provision for refund of the deposits in the event of the Chief Judge holding that the rateable value was less than the amount at which the corporation had assessed it and there was, thus, deprivation of property without due authority. As I read the section, it is implicit that. In that event, the Corporation must forthwith return to the appellant the excess amount. No money may be retained by the Corporation on this account nor can the petitioners maintain a Constitutional challenge to the section on this account. 3. The Court held that the payments which are sought as pre-conditions to the filing and hearing of an appeal under section 217 as amended are, in reality, the levy or collection of tax which the Corporation is not entitled to levy or collect under the provisions of Article 265. It was Mr. Makhijas contention that, under the provisions of section 219 of the Act, rateable value was finally assessed only after the Chief Judge had decided an appeal. To decide the merit of this argument it is necessary to inspect the Act in so far as it relates to the assessment of rateable value and the levy of property tax. The power of tax properties is contained in section 114 of the Act; sub-section (c) thereof provides for a tax upon the basis, therein stated, of the rateable value of the property. Section 154 lays down how the rateable value is to be determined. Section 156 requires the Commissioner to keep a book called the assessment book in which, inter alia, the rateable values of all properties are entered. After the rateable values have been entered in the assessment book public notice is to be given and complaints invited against the amounts entered. The complaints are to be heard and investigated and upon being disposed of the necessary amendments are to be made in the assessment book. Upon this, the Municipal Commissioner is to verify and authenticate the assessments entered in the book and this becomes conclusive evidence of the tax leviable on properties. Thereupon, under the provisions of section 200, bills are to be issued for the payment of property tax. Under the provisions of section 217 the aggrieved property holder has a right to appeal from the decision upon his complaint to the Chief Judge. From the Chief Judges decision, an appeal lies to the Court under the provisions of section 218(d). Section 219 provides that if no complaint is made against the rateable value, then the amount of the rateable value entered in the assessment book becomes final; that if an appeal is filed to the Chief Judge his decision is final, provided no appeal is filed in this Court; and that the Chief Judges decision is to be given effect to. I do not read section 219 as providing that the rateable value is assessed only upon the decision of the appeal to the Chief Judge. Therefore, even were I to construe the deposit required by section 217 as property tax it would be validly leviable and recoverable under the provisions of the Act at the time when the appeal is filed and the requirement of its payment would not contravene the provisions of Article 265. 4. The Court held that by enacting the amended section 217 the legislature has trespassed upon the judicial domain by providing that "the Chief Judge shall summarily dismiss the appeal of any appellant who has not deposited the required amount." He argued that the pending appeal to the Chief Judge must conclude with a judicial order; that the legislature, by requiring the Chief Judge to dismiss it in certain stated circumstances was intruding upon the domain of the Court and that this rendered the provisions invalid. Jealous as I am that the Courts powers should remain untampered with, I cannot accede to the argument. The legislatures right to legislate upon the right to appeal and to restrict it cannot be gain said. Even if the phraseology that Mr. Makhija considers offensive were not used the result would be the same; if the requisite deposit is not made the appeal has to be rejected.

Final Decision: The petition challenging the constitutional validity of section 217 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, as amended, was dismissed.

JUDGMENT - S.P. BARUCHA, J.:---The only question that must be determined in this petition is : is section 217 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888, as amended constitutionally valid?

2. The petitioners are the holders of immovable property situated at New Marinelines, Bombay. The petitioners received from the Municipal Corporation, the first respondent, notices fixing the rateable value of these aid property. The petitioners complained of the fixation of the rateable value and an order was passed upon that complaint. Being aggrieved thereby the petitioners preferred an appeal under the then unamended section 217 to the Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes at Bombay, who is the person designated under the provisions of the Act to hear such appeals. The appeal is pending and is part-head. 22nd September, 1975, during the pendency of the appeal, an Ordinance was issued, called the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Amendment Ordinance, 1975, which amended, inter alia, section 217. The Ordinance was replaced by an Act.

3. The amended section 217 is challenged in the petition on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of Articles 19, 31 and 265 of the Constitution of India and also on the ground that by enacting it the legislature impinged upon the judicial sphere. The petitioners also seek a writ of mandamus to fix at the figure mentioned in the petition the rateable value of the said property. The rateable value of the said property is the subject -matter of the pending appeal before the Chief Judge and it is agreed between the parties that it should be left to the determined in the appeal.

4. The relevant provisions of section 217, as unamended and as amended, need to be set out. Section 217(1)(2)(d), unamended :

"217(1). Subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, appeals against any rateable value of tax fixed or charged under this Act shall be heard and determined by the Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court.

(2) But no such appeal shall be heard by the said Chief Judge, unless---

(d) In the case of an appeal against a tax, or in the case of an appeal made against a rateable value after a bill for any property tax assessed upon such value has been served on the appellant, the amount claimed from the appellant has been deposited by him with the Commissioner."

Section 217(1), as amended :---

"217(1). Subject to the provisions hereinafter contained appeals against any rateable value or tax fixed or charged under this act shall be heard and determined by Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court.

(2) But no such appeal shall be entertained by the said Chief Judge, unless-

(d) in the case of an appeal against a tax, or in the case of an appeal made against a rateable value the amount of the disputed tax claimed from the appellant, or the amount of the tax chargeable on the basis of the disputed rateable value, up to the date of filing of the appeal, has been deposited by the appellant with the Commissioner.

(3) In the case of an appeal entertained by the Chief Judge, but not heard by him, before the date of Commencement if the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations (Amendment) Act, 1975 the Chief Judge shall not hear and decide such appeal, unless the amount of the disputed tax claimed from the appellant, or the amount of the tax chargeable on the basis of the disputed rateable value, as the case may be, up to the date of filing the appeal, has been deposited by the appellant with the Commissioner within thirty days from the date of publication of a general notice by the Commissioner in this behalf in local newspapers. The Commissioner shall simultaneously serve on each such appellant a notice under sections 484 and 485 and other relevant provisions of this Act, for intimating the amount to be deposited by the appellant with him.

(4) As far as possible within fifteen days from the expiry of the period of thirty days prescribed under sub-section (3), the Commissioner shall intimate to the Chief Judge the names and of the particulars

























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