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1979 Supreme(Bom) 239

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
(Nagpur bench)
Gadgil B.C. and Waikar M.R., JJ.
Vithaldas and others ….Petitioner.
Versus
Mansukhlal ….Respondents.
Order dated 14-11-1979 in Spl. C. A. No. 577, 578 and 579 of 1972.
Advocates appeared:
P.N. Deopujari, for petitioners.
A. Shelat, for respondents.

The respondent in a writ petition can invoke the provisions of Order 41, rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure to support the order passed by the Rent Controller even on findings which are pronounced against him.

Headnote:

RENT CONTROL - C. P. AND BERAR LETTING OF HOUSES AND RENT CONTROL ORDER, 1949 - CLAUSE 13(3), (V) - ALTERNATIVE ACCOMMODATION - INTERPRETATION - SUITABILITY - ORDER 41, RULE 22 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - RESPONDENT'S RIGHT TO SUPPORT DECREE - SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS.

Fact of the Case:

The dispute related to two godowns and one shop in occupation of tenant Vithaldas. The landlords initiated rent control proceedings against Vithaldas for eviction on several grounds under clause 13(3) of the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949. The Rent Controller granted permission on all counts but dismissed the applications holding that the tenancy itself was void. Both parties preferred appeals challenging the orders adverse to them. The Resident Deputy Collector granted permission to the landlords in respect of one godown and the shop on the ground of sub-letting and secured alternative accommodation. The tenant preferred three separate Special Civil Applications under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which came to be heard by the learned Single Judge.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the observations made by the learned Single Judge in Radhabais case to the effect that as soon as the landlord establishes that the tenant has secured an alternative accommodation he is entitled to terminate the tenancy is too wide and broad a proposition. A tenant would not be precluded from pointing out whether such an accommodation can really be termed as an “alternative” accommodation where he should be obliged to shift in substitution of the tenanted premises. An improper or unsuitable accommodation certainly cannot be called an alternative accommodation and in this view of the matter the element of suitability, convenience or otherwise is ingrained in the term “alternative”. Therefore, whether an accommodation is really an alternative accommodation or not would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of a case.

Issues: 1. Whether the respondent in a writ petition can invoke the provisions of Order 41, rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure? 2. Whether the respondent in a writ petition would be entitled to support the order passed by the Rent Controller even on findings which are pronounced against him?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that there are no rules which prohibit the respondent in a writ jurisdiction to exercise powers analogous to those conferred by Order 41, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. The Court held that the respondent in a writ petition would be entitled to support the order passed by the Rent Controller even on findings which are pronounced against him.

Final Decision: The Court answered the reference accordingly and directed that the matter be placed before the learned Single Judge.

JUDGMENT - WAIKAR M.R., J.: - The learned Single Judge(Padhye J.), who heard these Special Civil Applications No. 577, 578 and 579 all of 1972, referred two questions to the larger Bench which arose for his consideration under the following circumstances:-

2. The dispute related to two godowns and one shop which were in occupation of tenant Vithaldas,-petitioner No.l. One godown belonged to Mansukhlal, the other godown belonged to Ramniklal and the shop belonged to Ratilal who were all real brothers. These three brothers initiated three separate rent control proceedings against tenant Vithaldas for eviction on several grounds under clause 13(3) of the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949(hereinafter called the Rent Control Order). These three Rent Control proceedings were clubbed together by the Rent Controller as they were directed against a common tenant by the 3 landlords, who were brothers.

3. The Rent Controller granted permission on all the counts on which permission was sought against Vithaldas, but dismissed the applications holding that the tenancy itself was void.

4. Both the parties in all the three Rent Control proceedings, there-fore, preferred separate appeals challenging the orders that were adverse to them. A set of these appeals so preferred was dealt with by the Resident Deputy Collector in two groups. He disposed of a group of four appeals(that is, two preferred by the landlords and two by the tenant) relating to two godowns by one common judgment and a group of two appeals,(one by the landlords and the other by the tenant) relating to the shop by another common judgment.

5. The Resident Deputy Collector granted permission to the landlords in respect of one godown and the shop on the ground of sub-letting, a ground contemplated under clause 13(3), (iii) of the Rent Control Order. In respect of both the godowns permission was also granted by him on the ground that the tenant had secured an alternative accommodation, a ground contemplated by clause 13(3), (v) of the Rent Control Order.

6. Feeling aggrieved by this order, the tenant Vithaldas preferred three separated Special Civil Applications under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which came to be heard by the learned Single Judge.

7. The learned Single Judge set aside the finding of the Resident Deputy Collector that the premises were sub-let, as alleged. The learned counsel for the respondents(landlords) in the 3 petitions wanted to support the ultimate permission that had been granted by the Rent Control authorities even on the grounds which were held against them, even though they did not challenge the rejection of their application with respect to those grounds, either in appeal or by way of a writ petition. This, according to the learned Single Judge, is not permissible. In his opinion each ground was based on different set of facts and each had a different cause of action independent of the other. He observed that a landlord can combine all such claims in one application before the Rent Controller, or they could have been made subject matter of different applications as well. It was further observed that the consequences of different grounds are also different and rights either of a landlord or of a tenant under different grounds are also different. The learned Single Judge found that he was unable to agree with the observations made by a Division Bench decision of this Court in (Fakrvddin v. M/s. Hindusthan Stores Ltd., Akola)1, Special Civil Application No. 388 of 1960. decided on 1st September 1961 by Kotval and Shikhare JJ. upon which reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the respondents. The said decision in the opinion of the learned Single Judge requires reconsideration by a larger Bench. This is the first point on which reference had been made.

8. The second point of reference is in relation to clause 13(3), (v) with Explanation appended thereto of the Rent Control Order. The decision of the Single Judge of



























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