In the case of adoption of a married person, the child born after the date of birth during the continuance of the wedlock is considered born in the adoptive family with all the rights and privileges in that family.

Headnote:
ADOPTION - INHERITANCE - DATE OF BIRTH - CONCEPTION - ADOPTED SON - MARRIED PERSON - HINDU LAW - SECTION 112 OF THE EVIDENCE ACT - LEGITIMACY - PARIMATERIA PRINCIPLE - ADOPTION OF MARRIED PERSON - SUBSTITUTION OF FAMILY TIES - LEGAL EFFECT OF ADOPTION - DATE OF BIRTH AS DECISIVE DATE FOR INHERITANCE IN ADOPTIVE FAMILY - DOCTRINE OF DEEMING PERSON BORN FROM DATE OF CONCEPTION - SPECIFIC APPLICATIVE VALUE - BIOLOGICAL EVENT OF BIRTH - TIME OF BIRTH DETERMINES DATE OF BIRTH - CONFLICTING PRINCIPLES - BALANCED SYNTHESIS.
Fact of the Case:

The plaintiffs, claiming to be the nearest heirs of Bhau Anna Patil, who died on August 13, 1958, filed a suit to recover property. The defendant, Babgonda, claimed to be the son of Bhau Anna Patil and entitled to inherit the property. The controversy centered around the date of birth of Babgonda, with the plaintiffs asserting that he was born prior to the adoption of Bhau Anna Patil on June 26, 1912, and thus not entitled to inherit, while the defendant claimed he was born on October 10, 1912, after the adoption.
Finding of the Court:

The courts below concurrently found that Babgonda was born on October 10, 1912, based on a certified copy of the birth register, and dismissed the suit, holding that Babgonda was entitled to inherit the property.
Issues: 1. Whether Babgonda was born prior to the adoption of Bhau Anna Patil, thus excluding him from the family and inheritance rights. 2. Whether the date of birth or the date of conception should be considered for determining inheritance rights in the adoptive family. 3. Interpretation and application of Hindu law principles, including the doctrine of deeming a person born from the date of conception, and the parimateria principle under section 112 of the Evidence Act.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the question of whether a person was born prior to a particular date is a pure question of fact to be decided based on evidence. 2. The court emphasized that the date of birth is the decisive date for determining inheritance rights in the adoptive family, as adoption results in the substitution of all familial ties from one family to another. 3. The court interpreted the Hindu law principles, including the doctrine of deeming a person born from the date of conception, as having specific applicative value and not a general premise of the law. 4. The court applied the parimateria principle under section 112 of the Evidence Act, which confers legitimacy on children born during the continuance of valid marriages, to determine the legitimacy and inheritance rights of children born after adoption.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the judgments of the courts below and confirming Babgonda's entitlement to inherit the property of Bhau Anna Patil.

JUDGMENT - MASODKAR B.A., J.: - This is the original plaintiffs appeal that questions the concurrent judgments rendered by the Courts below in the suit initiated by them for the purpose of recovering property on the basis that upon the death of one Bhau Anna Patil on August 13, 1958, the plaintiffs inherited the same As the nearest heirs of the deceased. This entitlement was based on some undisputed facts and upon certain disputed controversy.

2. The claim to the nearest heirship to the deceased Bhau Anna Patil was based on the following genealogy.

Savanta

(Appa died in 1912) Laxman Ramgonda

Kausabai

Bhimgonda Ramgonda (pltff. 1) (Pltff. 2) Bhau Nemgonda (Adoption on (Died issueless). 26-6-1912)

(Died on

13-8-1958).

Babgonda

(Deft. 1)

The plaintiffs set up the claim that they are the only sons in the family claiming through Laxman and, upon the death of Bhau, would be entitled to inherit all the estate of Bhau. They sought to exclude defendent No. 1 Babgonda from the family on the basis that Babgonda was born prior to the date of adoption, that is, prior to June 26, 1912 and, therefore, Babgonda would not be entitled to succeed to Bhau, he being the member of the natural family prior to the adoption of Bhau.

3. On the controversy, both the Courts below found concurrently that Babgonda was born not prior to June 26, 1912 but on October 10, 1912, As is evidenced by the certified copy of the extract of the Birth Register produced at Ex. 172. However, they accepted that on the basis of this date of birth, Babgonda was conceived while the adopted Bhau was still the member of his natural family. Applying the decision of this Court in(Advibin Fakirappa v. Fakirappa Adveppa)1,(1918) I.L.R. 42 Bom 547. the two Courts below dismissed the suit holding that Babgonda was entitled to inherit the property left by Bhau Anna Patil.

4. On the Aspects of facts, Mr. Gole, has strenuously argued that the Courts below have committed errors of law in concluding the facts in this manner placing reliance on the certificated entry of the Birth Register produced at Ex. 172, particularly when it was shown by the plaintiffs that there was everything to doubt about its genuineness, and he has referred to the letters produced at Exs. 186 and 187 for contending that As the original was not produced, the entry at Ex. 172 could not have any probative value. In the submission of the learned counsel, this is An error of law and the judgments Are liable to be reversed. Secondly, it was submitted that defendant No. 1 did not enter the witness box and an adverse inference ought to have been drawn, particularly because on the earlier occAsion before the Revenue Authorities he had given an admission and unless that admission was explained, the Courts below were not right, firstly, in not drawing the adverse inference and, secondly, in not giving effect to the said admission. For this reason, according to the learned counsel, the judgments Are infirm. LAstly, it was contended that the judgment of this Court rendered in Advi bin Fakirappas case(supra) should be reconsidered, for it does not lay down the correct legal rule.

5. Now, As far As the first two Aspects Are concerned, in our considered judgment, they do not raise any question of law. Whether a particular person was born prior to a particular date is a pure question of fact. In this case, the issue of fact was As to whether prior to the date of adoption, that is June 26, 1912, defendant No. 1 Babgonda was born. Such a question has to be decided on the basis of the evidence tendered by the parties. No doubt, the drawing of an adverse inference against a party is a rule of

evidence, but, nonetheless, a rule for the purpose of appreciating and deciding the controversy. The plaintiffs having come to the Court with the case that defendant No. 1 Babgonda was born prior to June 26, 1912 has to discharge the onus in establishing that fact. The non-examination of defendant

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Judicial Analysis