1979 Supreme(Bom) 237
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Pratap S.C. and Sharad Manohar JJ.
Yeshonathu Mahajan and another.... Appellant.
Versus
Stateof maharashtra and others.... Respondents.
Spl. C. A. No. 3216/75, decided on 11-10-1979.
Advocates appeared:
G.M. Bhokarikar, for petitioner.
R.D. Rane, Asstt. Govt. Pleader, for State.
The application of the urgency clause under the Land Acquisition Act is not justified unless there is a real and genuine urgency.
Headnote:
LAND ACQUISITION - URGENCY CLAUSE - SECTION 4, 5A, 6, 9, 17(4) - APPLICATION OF URGENCY CLAUSE WITHOUT GENUINE URGENCY IS NOT PERMISSIBLE - ACQUISITION WITHOUT HEARING THE AGGRIEVED PARTY IS NOT JUSTIFIED - URGENCY CLAUSE CANNOT BE INVOKED TO MAKE UP FOR THE DELAY CAUSED BY THE LETHARGY OF THE ADMINISTRATION.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioners challenged the validity of notifications issued under sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act for the acquisition of land for the purpose of providing house sites to landless workers and their families and for extension of gaothan. The petitioners contended that the application of the urgency clause was not justified as there was no genuine urgency and they were deprived of the opportunity of putting forth their objections before the acquiring authority.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the application of the urgency clause was not justified as there was no real and genuine urgency. The court observed that the purpose of providing house sites or extension of gaothan cannot be said to spring into existence overnight unless it is a result of some unexpected, exceptional, or extraordinary situation or development. The court further held that the State should act with considerable care and responsibility while applying the urgency clause and that the urgency clause cannot be invoked to make up for the delay caused by the lethargy of the administration.
Issues: Whether the application of the urgency clause was justified in the present case.
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on the following principles in reaching its decision: * The application of the urgency clause is not justified unless there is a real and genuine urgency. * The purpose of providing house sites or extension of gaothan cannot be said to spring into existence overnight unless it is a result of some unexpected, exceptional, or extraordinary situation or development. * The State should act with considerable care and responsibility while applying the urgency clause. * The urgency clause cannot be invoked to make up for the delay caused by the lethargy of the administration.
Final Decision: The court allowed the petition, set aside the impugned notifications, and deleted the urgency clause from the section 4 notification. The court directed the acquiring authority to proceed further with the acquisition proceedings without the urgency clause.
2. On 26th July 1971, the Grampanchayat of village Vaghode Budruk passed an unanimous resolution recommending acquisition of survey Nos. 133 and 134 for the purpose of providing house sites to house less persons. By another resolution dated 28th July 1972, also passed unanimously, the said Grampanchayat recommended acquisition(for the same purpose) of two additional lands survey Nos. 129/2/5 and 129/1/2/2. However, the State Government on 25th July 1975 issued notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, declaring that an altogether different property viz., part of petitioners land Gat No. 613 was needed or was likely to be needed for the said purpose viz., provision of house sites for landless workers and their families and for extension of gaothan. This notification further declared that the provisions of section 5A of the said Act shall not apply. This was followed on 7th October 1975 by section 6 notification under which urgency clause was applied. Next came section 9 notice. Hence this petition challenging the aforesaid incantations and the impugned acquisition thereunder.
3. In support of this petition, we have heard Mr. G. M. Bhokarikar, the learned Advocate for the petitioners. The State is represented by the learned Assistant Government Pleader, Mr. R. D. Rane.
4. Mr. Bhokarikar, the learned Advocate, contended that this was not at all a case where the application of urgency clause could be said to be in any way warranted. As a result thereof, the petitioners were deprived of the opportunity of putting forth their objections before the acquiring authority and the latter, in turn, was also correspondingly absolved of its duty to hear the petitioners. He further urged that the tests involved for the application of urgency clause do not stand fulfilled in the present case. Mr. R. D. Rane, the learned Assistant Government Pleader, countered these submissions contending that the State was entitled to apply the urgency clause to any given case and ip this particular case, according to him, the application was more than justified and this Court, therefore, should not interfere with the impugned acquisition. Considering the rival submissions of the respective Advocates in the light of the record, we are of the view that contentions raised .before us by the learned Advocate for the petitioners are sound and justified and accepting the same, this petition deserves to be allowed.
5. Now, none can dispute the position that acquisition of land for the purpose of providing house sites to landless workers and their families and for extension of gaothan would, indeed, be an acquisition pre-eminently for a public purpose nor can there be two opinions on the fact that this public purpose particularly providing house sites to landless workers and their families is, indeed, one which all would desire to be implemented efficiently and even expeditiously. But this, therefore, cannot per se justify stamping land acquisition notification in that behalf with the impress and insignia of an urgency clause. That a given purpose is laudable is not by itself sufficient to vindicate the application of urgency clause so as to obviate even the minimal requirement of a hearing. Purpose such as providing house sites or extension of gaothan cannot be said to spring into existence overnight unless, of course, it is a result of some unexpected, exceptional or extraordinary situation or development such as, for instance, an e