A subordinate Court cannot grant an injunction restraining any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought.

Headnote:
INJUNCTION - SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, 1963 - SECTION 41(B) - JURISDICTION - CITY CIVIL COURT - BOMBAY RENTS, HOTEL AND LODGING HOUSE RATES (CONTROL) ACT, 1947 - SECTION 28 - CONSENT DECREE - NULLITY - ENFORCEABILITY - BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE - TEMPORARY INJUNCTION - COURT RECEIVER - ORDER 23, RULE 3-A OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908 - MAINTAINABILITY OF SUIT - SECTION 47 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908 - EXECUTION PROCEEDING - JURISDICTION OF COURT - SECTION 19 OF THE BOMBAY RENTS, HOTEL AND LODGING HOUSE RATES (CONTROL) ACT, 1947 - SECTION 23 OF THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, 1872 - PUBLIC POLICY - ORDER 39, RULES 1 AND 2 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908 - DISCRETIONARY AND EQUITABLE JURISDICTION - CONTEMPT OF COURT - UNDERTAKING - BREACH - JURISDICTION OF SUBORDINATE COURT - RESTRAINING PROCEEDINGS IN HIGHER COURT - INTERPRETATION OF CONSENT DECREE - INTEGRATED WHOLE - SELF-CONTRADICTORY ORDER - EQUALLY EFFICACIOUS REMEDY - SECTION 41(H) OF THE SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, 1963.
Fact of the Case:

The plaintiff, Shri Merchant, filed a suit in the City Civil Court, Bombay, challenging a consent decree passed by the High Court in a suit filed by the defendant, Shri Sanghavi, against him. Shri Merchant contended that the consent decree was a nullity and/or unenforceable and/or inexecutable on the grounds that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the earlier suit, that the consent decree was void on the ground of public policy, and that he had contracted out of the protection given to him by the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947. Shri Sanghavi contended that the learned Judge of the City Civil Court had committed an error apparent on the face of the record in sitting in appeal over the consent decree passed by the High Court and virtually setting it aside. He also contended that the learned Judge further committed an error in reading the evidence and the allegations made in the written statement in the earlier suit for deciding the question as to whether the plaintiff Shri Merchant had made out a prima facie case for granting a temporary injunction.
Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining the defendant from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in the High Court, which is admittedly not a Court subordinate to the City Civil Court. The Court also held that the temporary injunction granted by the City Civil Court was wholly inconsistent and self-contradictory, as it restrained the defendant from instituting execution proceedings for execution of the same decree while it was open for the defendant to institute and proceed with the proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, for enforcing the undertaking incorporated in the consent decree. The Court further held that the plaintiff had an equally efficacious remedy in the execution proceeding itself, in view of the provisions of section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and hence he was not entitled to get a temporary injunction.
Issues: 1. Whether the City Civil Court had jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining the defendant from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in the High Court? 2. Whether the temporary injunction granted by the City Civil Court was wholly inconsistent and self-contradictory? 3. Whether the plaintiff had an equally efficacious remedy in the execution proceeding itself?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining the defendant from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in the High Court, which is admittedly not a Court subordinate to the City Civil Court, in view of the provisions of section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which lays down that an injunction cannot be granted to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought. 2. The Court held that the temporary injunction granted by the City Civil Court was wholly inconsistent and self-contradictory, as it restrained the defendant from instituting execution proceedings for execution of the same decree while it was open for the defendant to institute and proceed with the proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, for enforcing the undertaking incorporated in the consent decree. 3. The Court held that the plaintiff had an equally efficacious remedy in the execution proceeding itself, in view of the provisions of section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and hence he was not entitled to get a temporary injunction.
Final Decision: The appeal was allowed with costs. The impugned order passed by the City Civil Court dated 6th and 7th February, 1980 was set aside.

JUDGMENT - C.S. DHARMADHIKARI, J.:---This appeal from order is filed by the original defendant Suresh, D. Sanghavi against the order passed by the City Civil Court, Bombay dated 6th and 7th February, 1980 in Notice of Motion No. 5498 in S.C. Suit No. 6748 of 1979. The defendant Suresh Sanghavi initially filed a suit before this Court on the original side bearing Suit No. 601 of 1972 against the present respondent Mohasinali H. Merchant for possession of the flat bearing No. B-3, ground floor, 47 B. St. Monica Road, Bandra, Bombay. The said suit was initially hotly contested by the defendant Mohasinali H. Merchant. However, ultimately on 28th of January, 1977 the consent terms were drawn and the consent decree was passed in terms of the consent terms on 5th of November, 1979, which read as under :---

"Decree in terms of prayers (a) and (b)

2) The defendant declares and undertakes to this Honble Court that except himself and his wife Mesuris and children, there are no other persons in the suit flat and that he will not allow any person or persons other than the aforesaid persons to use, occupy and remain in the suit flat until he vacates and hands over, quiet, vacant and peaceful possession of the suit flat to the plaintiff or his representation or to the Court Receiver.

3) The plaintiff do pay to the defendant the sum o Rs. 75,000/- (seventy five thousand) on 31st December, 1979 in the form of the Bank draft drawn in favour of the defendants Counsel Mr. K.T. Khilnani, to be paid over by him to the defendant. Against the plaintiffs paying the said sum as aforesaid the defendant undertakes to this Honble Court to forthwith quiet, vacate and deliver possession of the suit flat to the plaintiff or his representative or to the Court Receiver.

4) The defendant undertakes not to deal with or dispose off the suit flat and to continue to occupy the suit flat as agent of the Court Receiver until he hands over the possession thereof to the plaintiff as aforesaid.

5) On the defendant handing over to the plaintiff the possession of the suit flat as aforesaid, the Court Receiver to stand discharged without passing accounts on the plaintiffs paying all his costs, charges and expenses.

6) All monies so far deposited in the Court by the defendant to be withdrawn by the plaintiff and the same be paid to the plaintiff.

7) No order as to costs".

2. The prayer Clauses (a) and (c) in terms of which the decree was passed by the High Court read as under :---

"(a) That the defendant may be ordered by mandatory injunction of this Honble Court to forthwith remove himself, his servants and agents from the flat bearing No. B-3 on the ground floor of the building known as "Fatima Manor" situate

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(c) That the defendant, his servants and agents may be permanently restrained by an order and injunction of this Honble Court from entering upon or remaining in the said flat or any part thereof or from doing any other act or thing so as to prevent disturb or interfere in any manner with the peaceful and quiet possession and enjoyment of the said flat by the plaintiff or the members of his family.

It appears from the record that prior to the passing of the said consent decree the High Court appointed had a Court receiver and had issued direction to permit Shri Merchant to use and occupy the said flat and the moveables fittings and furniture during the pendency of the suit. I am informed that the receiver who was appointed in the said suit is still not discharged in view of the terms and conditions incorporated in the consent terms.

3. It appears from the record that thereafter Shri Sanghavi as per Clause (3) of the consent terms offered to pay Rs. 75,000/- to Shri Merchant. However, he refused to accept the same and instead filed the present suit before the City Civil Court challenging the said decree itself. In para 9 Shri Merchant challenged the said decree by contending that it is not binding on him nor it is enforceable on the following gr

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