1982 Supreme(Bom) 280
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
R.A. Jahagirdar, J.
Shashikant Bajirao Pagare.... Petitioner.
Versus
State of Maharshtra.... Respondent.
Criminal Revision Application No. 780 of 1981 with Criminal Revision Application No. 350 of 1981, decided on 18-10-1982.
Advocates appeared :
C.G. Gavvnekar with Mrs. Jadhav, for petitioner.
M.D. Gangakhedkar, P.P., for State.
The prosecution must prove the commission of the offence which it says has taken place. The prosecution cannot put an alternate case.
Headnote:
CRIMINAL LAW - SECTION 366, 376 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE - INDUCEMENT - ENTICEMENT - RAPE - EVIDENCE - INTERPRETATION - CONVICTION SET ASIDE - ACCUSED ACQUITTED.
Fact of the Case:
The accused was convicted by the Sessions Judge of Nasik for offences punishable under sections 366 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code. The accused and the prosecutrix, a girl called Namrata, were taking private tutions in a coaching class and came in close contact with each other. The accused promised to marry the prosecutrix, and she left her parental house on 16th March 1979. They stayed in a house at Nasik, where the accused had sexual intercourse with her. They then went to Bombay, where they stayed with the maternal uncle of the accused until 23rd March 1979, when the parents of the accused came to Bombay and took both the accused and the prosecutrix back to Nasik, where the accused was arrested and prosecuted.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the prosecution failed to prove that the accused had induced or enticed the prosecutrix to leave her parental house. The court also found that the prosecution failed to prove that the accused had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix on the night of 16th and 17th March 1979, as alleged by the prosecution.
Issues: 1. Whether the accused had induced or enticed the prosecutrix to leave her parental house? 2. Whether the accused had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix on the night of 16th and 17th March 1979?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the prosecution failed to prove that the accused had induced or enticed the prosecutrix to leave her parental house. The court relied on the letters written by the prosecutrix to the accused, which showed that she was unhappy in her house and was opposed to the proposal for marriage which was being considered by her parents. The court also noted that the accused had been called by the prosecutrix's mother and had promised not to see her daughter again. 2. The court held that the prosecution failed to prove that the accused had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix on the night of 16th and 17th March 1979. The court relied on the prosecutrix's testimony, which was hesitant and half-hearted, and on the fact that she had admitted in cross-examination that the accused had left the house on that night and that she had slept alone in the house.
Final Decision: The court allowed the accused's revision application and set aside the order of conviction and sentence recorded by the Sessions Judge of Nasik. The accused was acquitted of the offences with which he had been charged.
2. Aggrieved by the said order of conviction, the accused has preferred Criminal Revision Application No. 780 of 1981 because the sentence awarded by the learned Sessions Judge is not appealable. This Court has issued a notice of enhancement, which is being treated as Criminal Revision Application No. 350 of 1982.
3. The facts leading to the prosecution have been set out in sufficient details in the judgment of the Court below and it is not necessary for me to refer to the same. However, the prosecution case may be briefly stated. The accused and the prosecutrix, a girl called Namrata, were taking private tutions in a coaching class known as Yeshwant Classes. They came in close contact with each other and, according to the prosecution, the accused promised to marry the prosecutrix, as a result of which she was induced to leave her parental house an 16th of March, 1979. Therefore both the accused and the prosecutrix, says the prosecution, stayed in a house at Nasik, which seems to have been used as a lodging house, and the accused has sexual intercourse with her in that house. Thereafter both the accused and the prosecutrix made their way to Bombay where they stayed with the maternal uncle of the accused upto 23rd of March, 1979. The evidence discloses that on that day the parents of the accused came to Bombay and both the accused and the prosecutrix returned to Nasik, where the accused was put under arrest and later prosecuted for the offences as mentioned above.
4. The defence of the accused was one of total denial. It is not necessary to refer to the defence of accused No. 2 as she has been rightly acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge. The learned Sessions Judge was persuaded to hold that there was an inducement on the part of the accused to the prosecutrix to leave the house of her father and this amounted to an inducement within the meaning of section 361 of the Indian Penal Code and since, subsequently, the accused is shown to have had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix the offence was brought within the four corners of section 366 of the Indian Penal Code. The girl was, according to the evidence on record, below the age of 16 years and, therefore, though the sexual intercourse might have been committed with her contest, it amounted to a rape within the meaning of section 375 of the Indian Penal Code.
5. Mr. Gavnekar, the learned Advocate appearing for the accused, has contended that the learned trial Judge totally ignored the voluminous documentary evidence which has been brought on record an which, according to Mr. Gavnekar, shows that not only there was no inducement by the accused to the prosecutrix to leave her parental house but, on the other hand, the prosecutrix herself had at all times an intense desire to abandon her parental house. The learned Advocate has made a grievance, and in my opinion with sufficient justification, that the learned Sessions Judge has not considered this voluminous documentary evidence at all while deciding the question as to whether the conduct of the accused and the prosecutrix sho