1982 Supreme(Bom) 133
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
(FULL BENCH)
M.N. Chandurkar, D. M. Rege B.C. Gadgil, JJ.
Madhav Shankar Sonawane.... Appellant.
Versus
State of Maharashtra..... Respondent.
AND
State of Maharashtra.... Applicant.
Versus
Madhav Shankar Sonawane.... Respondent.
Criminal Appeal No 1029 of 1980, with Criminal Revision Application No. 231 of 1981, decided on 19-4-82.
Advocates appeared :
In Criminal Appeal No. 1029 of 1980.
S.G. Samant (Senior Counsel) (appointed), for appellant.
Mrs. Manju Roa (Junior Counsel) (appointed), for respondent.
J.A. Bardy, P.P., for respondent.
In Criminal Revision Application No. 231 of 1981.
J.A. Barday, P.P., for appellant.
S.G. Samant (Senior Counsel) (appointed), for respondent.
Mrs. Manju Rao (Junior counsel) (appointed), for respondent.
The Court does not have the power to direct that an accused sentenced to life imprisonment should not be released from jail before completing a specified minimum period of imprisonment, as this would encroach upon the powers of the Executive and would be contrary to the provisions of Section 433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Headnote:
CRIMINAL APPEAL - SECTION 302, INDIAN PENAL CODE - SENTENCING - MINIMUM PERIOD OF IMPRISONMENT - POWER OF COURT - EXECUTIVE POWERS - ARTICLES 72 AND 161 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA - REMISSION AND COMMUTATION OF SENTENCE - SECTION 433-A OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant was convicted of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Division Bench confirmed the conviction but declined to give a direction that the appellant should not be released from jail before completing 25 years of imprisonment, as requested by the State.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that there is no power in the Court to make a direction that an accused sentenced to life imprisonment should not be released from jail before completing a specified minimum period of imprisonment. Such a direction would encroach upon the powers of the Executive under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and would be contrary to the provisions of Section 433-A of the Code.
Issues: 1. Whether the Court has the power to direct that an accused sentenced to life imprisonment should not be released from jail before completing a specified minimum period of imprisonment? 2. Whether such a direction would encroach upon the powers of the Executive under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure? 3. Whether such a direction would be contrary to the provisions of Section 433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court's power to sentence an accused is limited to the punishment prescribed for the offence under the Indian Penal Code. 2. The Executive has the power to remit or commute sentences under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 3. Section 433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure restricts the power of the Executive to remit or commute sentences in cases where the accused has been sentenced to life imprisonment for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law, or where a sentence of death has been commuted to life imprisonment. 4. A direction by the Court that an accused sentenced to life imprisonment should not be released from jail before completing a specified minimum period of imprisonment would encroach upon the powers of the Executive and would be contrary to the provisions of Section 433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed.
2. It is clear that on behalf of the State a similar direction was sought in the present appeal, but the Division Bench found that there was no power in the Court to say that the convict shall undergo imprisonment for a particular minimum period because any direction with regard to the minimum period required to be undergone by way of sentence by an accused would encroach upon the field reserved for the executive and would be contrary to the provision of section 433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is not necessary for us to refer to the facts leading to the conviction of the appellant because the facts and the evidence relied upon by the prosecution have been set out in great detail in the judgment of the Division Bench. The Division Bench has confirmed the conviction of the accused for the offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. It was argued before the Division Bench that the Sessions Judge having awarded sentence of imprisonment for life on the facts of the case, no enhancement of the sentence was called for and the Division Bench discharged the notice for enhancement of the sentence and confirmed the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded by the trial Court. It was insisted on behalf of the State that the Court should at least give a direction that the accused should not be allowed to come out of the jail in any case before the completion of 25 years of imprisonment. Such a request was made in view of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Manohar Ghodakes case cited supra. The Division Bench however took the view that they found it difficult to hold "that is permissible for the courts to direct the life convict to undergo imprisonments for a minimum period different than the one prescribed by the Legislature notwithstanding the remissions that he may earn as per law" The Division bench took the view that any view to the contrary would amount to re-enacting section 433-A of the Criminal Procedure Code and would encroach upon the field reserved for executive and the Court was concerned merely with the passing of the sentence. The Division Bench also referred to the provisions of Article 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India which dealt with the power of the President and the Governor to grant pardon, suspend or commute the sentence in certain cases and the Division Bench took the view that it will not be permissible for the courts to say that despite exercise of the Constitutional jurisdiction by the high constitutional functionaries, namely, the President and the Governor, the convict shall undergo imprisonment for a particular minimum period. Having thus doubted the correctness of the view taken in Ghodakes case, the appeal has been referred to the Full Bench.
3. We may at the outset make it clear that the learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Barday, who also appeared in the appeal on behalf of the State before the Division Bench, found himself unable to support the view taken by the earlier Division Bench in Ghodakes case. The learned Public Prosecutor however made it clear that since the earlier Division Bench had taken the view that a direction specifying that an accu