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1981 Supreme(Bom) 98

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
(Nagpur)
Mohta V. and Palshikar P.G. JJ.
Deorao Vithoba Kale .... Petitioner.
Versus
Divisional Joint Registrar Co-operative Societies, Nagpur and others.
.... Respondents.
Writ Petition No, 39 of 1981 decided on 27-3-1981.
Advocate appeared:
For petitioner-Subhash Paliwal, Pradip Marpakwar and
Basant Agrawal. For respondents-A. A. Desai, Asstt. Govt. Pleader.

The impugned order violated the principle of natural justice, and there was no legal bar to the reappointment of the petitioner after the disqualification was removed.

Headnote:

Natural Justice - Co-operative Societies - The court held that the impugned order was violative of the principle of natural justice as the removal took place without issuing any show cause notice to the petitioner. The court also interpreted the provisions of section 78(1)(b) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, and concluded that there was no bar to the reappointment of the same person after the disqualification is removed.

Fact of the Case:

The Assistant Registrar cancelled the petitioner's appointment as a member of the Managing Committee of a Co-operative Society due to defaulting on a loan borrowed from the Society. The petitioner was later nominated again, but the Assistant Registrar passed an order prohibiting the reappointment of the same person.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the impugned order violated the principle of natural justice and that there was no legal bar to the reappointment of the petitioner after the disqualification was removed. The court also rejected the preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petition.

Issues: Violation of natural justice, interpretation of section 78(1)(b) of the Act, maintainability of the petition

Ratio Decidendi: The impugned order was held to be violative of the principle of natural justice, and the court interpreted the provisions of section 78(1)(b) to conclude that there was no legal bar to the reappointment of the same person after the disqualification is removed. The court also clarified that the remedy of appeal was not available due to the time bar, and the petition was maintainable as it raised a pure question of law.

Final Decision: The petition was allowed, and the rule was made absolute without any order as to costs.

JUDGMENT - Mohta V.J.-Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Sub-Division, Pusad, District Yavatmal, respondent No. 3, passed an order dated 29-12-1980 (Annexure-VI) cancelling his earlier order of appointment of the petitioner as a member of the Managing Committee of Umarkhed Block Co-operative Purchase and Sale Society Limited, Umarkhed, a society duly registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, I960 (The Act, for short). This order is impugned in the present petition. On 29-11-1978 in exercise of the powers under Section 77-A of the Act, the third respondent nominated three persons to be the members of the Managing Committee of the Society which included the petitioner. The term was co-extensive with the term of the other members of the Managing Committee. It appears that the petitioner became defaulter of loan borrowed from the Society to the tune of Rs. 16803. As a result a show cause notice under section 78 was served on him. This was followed by an order dated 9-11-1979 (Annexure-3) dismembering the petitioner on the aforesaid ground, contemplated under Rule 58(1)(a) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Rules 1961 ('the rules' for short). Subsequent to this order, the petitioner cleared the entire dues. On 14-2-1980 he was again nominated as the post was vacant and the disqualification was removed. Common point is that since then the petitioner continued as a member. The Divisional Joint Registrar (respondent) No. 1) called for the report regarding the nomination of the petitioner from the District Deputy Registrar (respon­dent No. 2). On 25-12-1980, the second respondent sent the report mentioning that there was no ground for removing the petitioner as he was validly nominated member having no disqualification at the relevant time and that too after 10 months. It is against this back ground that the impugned order (Annexure-VI) came to be passed holding that section 78(1)(b) of the Act prohi­bited appointment of the same person over again.

2. Shri Paliwal, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, in the first place, contended the impugned order is violative of the principle of natural justice inasmuch as, admittedly removal has taken place without issuing any show cause notice to the petitioner .It seems to us that grievance made this connection is sound. On merits, it was contended that in view of Shri Paliwal, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, in the first place, contended that the impugned order is violative of the principle of natural justice inasmuch as, admittedly removal has taken place without issuing any show cause notice to the provisions of section 78(1)(b) of the Act, there is no bar to the appointment of the same person over again after the disqualification is removed. If that was the intention of the legislature in place of the word “person” the word ”other person” would have been incorporated in the said section. Shri Desai, the learned Assistant Government Pleader, on the other hand, contended that by virtue of the fact that appointment has to be in his place it has to be presumed that the appointment of the same person was prohibited. We have given our thought to this question and in our judgment interpretation put on behalf of the State is fallacious. On the language of the provision, we see nothing illegal in reappointment of a person after the disqualification is wiped out. Moreover, we fail to appreciate under what provision of law the third respondent reviewed his own order. The only power of review in the Act is to be found in section 150 bu obviously it does not grant any jurisdiction to the third respondent for review. It was further contended that the order of nomination (Annexure-IV) was void ab initio and, therefore, the third respondent had every jurisdiction to correct his own mistake when he noticed it. We are unable to see how this appointment is void ab initio. It is a common point that either on the date of his fresh nomination on 14-2-1980 or subsequent




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