The standard of proof required for a valid adoption depends on the circumstances of the case.

Headnote:
ADOPTION - Validity - Proof - Standard of proof - Circumstances of the case - Omission to consider material evidence - Misdirection - Findings vitiated.
Fact of the Case:

The appellant, who belongs to a prominent family of Jabalpur, instituted a suit, out of which the present appeal arises, for partition and separate possession and for rendition of accounts. The properties in suit comprise most of the estate falling to the share of one Seth Jagannathdas on a family partition of October 19, 1939.
Finding of the Court:

The High Court disagreed with the trial Court and held that the adoption had not been established. In doing so, it adopted an approach which, to our mind, is plainly erroneous. It proceeded to judge the credibility of the witnesses mainly with reference to their relationship with the parties without placing adequate weight on the nature of the evidence and the probability of its truth in the context of the surrounding circumstances, it rejected the testimony of the appellant’s witnesses substantially on the ground that they were related to the appellant or out of favour with Narsinghdas.
Issues: 1. Whether the appellant was in fact adopted by Jagannathdas and Premwati? 2. Whether the adoption was valid?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The standard of proof required for a valid adoption depends on the circumstances of the case. In the present case, where the adoption was alleged to have taken place in circumstances which did not permit time for making acknowledgments, observing elaborate ceremonies and giving notices generally, the High Court erred in applying a standard of proof which the circumstances did not warrant. 2. The High Court misdirected itself in applying a standard of proof to the evidence which the circumstances did not warrant. Its appreciation of the evidence is founded in that misdirection, leading to findings which are accordingly vitiated.
Final Decision: Appeal allowed.

JUDGMENT - Pathak J.-This is a plaintiff's appeal on a certificate granted under sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 133 of the Constitution by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh.

2. The appellant, who belongs to a prominent family of Jabalpur, instituted a suit, out of which the present appeal arises, for partition and separate possession and for rendition of accounts. The properties in suit comprise most of the estate falling to the share of one Seth Jagannathdas on a family partition of October 19, 1939.

3. The genealogy of the family may be set forth:

Diwan Bahadur Ballabhdas (died in 1925)

Mannoolal Kanhaiyalal Jamnadas Mankuarbai

(died in 1916) (died in 1523) (died in 1939)

M. Narayanibai

(respondent) Narsinghdas

(respondent)

Jagannathdas

M. Premwati

Balkrishandas Goverdhandas Madhusu- Tribhu

dandas wandas

(appellant)

Jagannathdas and his wife Premwati had no children. Premwati suffered from tuberculosis for several years and died on September 24, 1951. After her death Jagannathdas created a trust by a registered deed dated March 17, 1952 called the Seth Maitinoolal Jagannathdas Hospital Trust in respect of most of his estate. He reserved the right to revoke the trust, but subsequently by a further document dated July 14, 1952 he relinquished that right. Ever since the inception of the trust, the trustees have remained in possession of the estate.

4. The appellant filed the present suit on September 24, 1957 against Jagannathdas and the other trustees claiming that he had been adopted by Jagannathdas and Premwati as their son on September 24, 1951, that the trust was void and that he was entitled to half the estate. Jagannathdas died on October 7, 1957 during the pendency of the suit, and in consequence the appellant claimed a 3/4 share of the estate, with the remaining 1/4 being conceded to Narayanibai the mother of Jagannathdas.

5. The suit was decreed by the trial Court on September 27, 1961 and a preliminary decree was passed declaring the appellant entitled to the share claimed by him and to partition and separate possession of theproperties. The trust was declared invalid and the trustees, in consequence, were declared trespassers and liable to render accounts to the appellant.

6. An appeal by the trustees was allowed by the High Court by its judgment and decree dated September 30, 1967 and the suit has been dismissed.

7. Several issues were tried by the trial Court and considered on appeal by the High Caurt, but the most crucial and decisive issue, and which consti- tutes the core of the controversy between the parties, is whether the appel- lant can be said to be the adopted son of Jaggannathdas. The trial Court found that the appellant was in fact adopted by Jagannathdhas and Premwati on September 24, 1951 and that the adoption was valid. The High Court has reversed the finding, taking a different view altogether of the evidence on the record.

8. The question whether the appellant was in fact adopted by Jagan-cathdas and Premwati has been determined essentially on the basis of oral testimony, and reference has been made to a few documents only in supple-mentation of the oral evidence. At this stage, it would be right to refer to the general principle that, in an appeal against a trial Court decree, when the appellate Court considers an issue turning on oral evidence it must bear in mind that it does not enjoy the advantage which the trial Court had in having the witnesses before it and of observing the manner in which they gave their testimony. When there is a conflict of oral evidence on any matter in issue and its resolution turns upon the credibility of the witnesses, the general rule is that the appellate Court should permit the findings of fact rendered by the trial Court to prevail unless it clearly appears that some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness has escaped the notice of the trial Court or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace its opinion as to where the credibility lie

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Judicial Analysis