IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
B.A. Masodkar, J.
Madanlal Mulchand Soni.... Petitioner.
Versus
Mainkichand Dhanraj Gugle another.... Respondents.
Writ Petition No. 3395 of 1981, decided on 8-3-1982.
Advocates appeared :
Navin B. Shah, for petitioner-original plaintiff.
C.R. Dalvi, for respondants-original defendents.
Revision - Rent Act - The court held that the remedy under section 29(3) of the Rent Act is not available for mere interlocutory or procedural orders, but only for orders that formally adjudicate and affect the rights of the parties. The decision emphasized that the words 'decree or orders' in section 29 intend to indicate formal decisions affecting the substantive rights of the parties.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner filed a civil suit, and the trial court issued a process to the Income-Tax Officer at the behest of the defendants. The petitioner challenged this order before the Second Extra Assistant Judge, Ahmednagar, under section 29(3) of the Rent Act.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the revision filed under section 29(3) of the Rent Act was rightly rejected as the provision does not apply to mere interlocutory or procedural orders. The court also noted that the trial court's rejection of the opposition to the process was based on the ground of delay, and any other legal objections should be raised before the trial court for consideration.
Issues: The issues involved the applicability of section 29(3) of the Rent Act to the orders made by the trial court and the grounds for opposing the issuance of the process to the Income-Tax Officer.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized that the remedy under section 29(3) of the Rent Act is available only for orders that formally adjudicate and affect the rights of the parties, and not for mere interlocutory or procedural orders.
Final Decision: The court discharged the rule with no order as to costs, but allowed the plaintiff to raise any legal objection for the issue of the summons by filing a proper application for consideration by the trial court.
2. An far as the tenability of the revision is concerned, it is undoubtedly clear that the provision of sub-section (3) of section 29 of the Rent Act do not provide for any such revision. Section 29 of the Rent Act deals with appeals. Sub-section (1) of section 29 of the Rent Act indicates, by Clauses (a) and (b), the decree and order against which an appeal lies. Provision enacted excepts and indicates the decree or order against which no appeal shall lie. Sub-section (2) enacts that there would be no further appeal against any decisions in the appeal under sub-section. In the context of sub-sections (1) and (2), sub-section (3) has to read and it means that "the orders", which are otherwise non-appealable, are primarily spoken to in sub-section (3) of section 29. It is not as if each and every order made by the trial Court is intended to be subjected to the process of revision under sub-section (3). Mere interlocutory or procedural orders are not the orders which can be taken up and challenged under section 29(3) of the Rent Act. Unless the orders formally adjudicate and effect rights of the parties, including those in the matters of procedure, it is difficult to conceive that the remedy under section 29(3) of the Rent Act would be available. In the context of the entire scheme of section 29, it appears that the orders, which under the Rent Act determine substantively the rights of the parties and because of that are orders or decrees as such, are in the contemplation of the legislature. Sub-section (3) does not style it as power of revision. It is a power akin to it circumscribed by conditions enacted therein, one such condition being it is available against only otherwise non-appealable "decree" or "order". Wherever the words "decree or orders" are used in section 29, it is apparent that it intends to indicate formal decision affecting rights of the parties. The decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of (Maharana Mills v. Maharrai)1, A.I.R. 1972 Gujarat 226, with respect, is an authority for the proposition that purely procedural orders not affecting the substantive rights of the parties are not within the contemplation of sub-section (3) of section 29. The view taken by the Second Extra Assistant Judge, Ahmednagar, therefore, is, thus correct and the revision filed was rightly rejected.
3. Turning to the other submission of the learned Counsel that the process should not have been issued by the trial Judge, it appears that the only opposition recorded was on the ground of delay and that was rejected by the learned trial Judge. If there be any other ground, like the bar of law, to issue such a process, the same has not been raised before the trial Judge if it be raised, the trail Court is bound to consider the same like any other objection. As the point was not raised before the trial judge, it will not be proper to express any view on that aspect.
4. In the result, the rule is discharged with no order as to costs. However, if the plaintiff raises any legal objection for the issue of the summons by filing a proper application, the trial Court would hear the parties and decide the
AI
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.