The Industrial Court has jurisdiction to restrain workmen from resorting to an illegal strike, but not from resorting to a legal strike.

Headnote:
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES - UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICES - JURISDICTION OF INDUSTRIAL COURT - STRIKE - LEGALITY - INTERIM RELIEF - MAHARASHTRA RECOGNITION OF TRADE UNION AND PREVENTION OF UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICES ACT, 1971, SCHEDULE III, ENTRY 1.
Fact of the Case:

The petitioner company challenged the order passed by the Industrial Court rejecting the prayer to prevent workmen from resorting to or continuing a strike. The company filed an application for interim relief under section 30(2) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (the Act). The Industrial Court refused to grant the interim relief, holding that it had no jurisdiction to restrain workmen from resorting to a strike.
Finding of the Court:

The court held that the Industrial Court had jurisdiction to restrain workmen from resorting to an illegal strike, but not from resorting to a legal strike. The court found that the strike in question was not covered by Entry 1 of Schedule III of the Act, which deals with unfair labour practices on the part of trade unions, because the strike was not deemed to be illegal under the Act. The court also held that the Industrial Court could not adjudicate upon the justifiability or propriety of the strike, as that area was not covered by section 30 of the Act.
Issues: 1. Whether the Industrial Court had jurisdiction to restrain workmen from resorting to a strike? 2. Whether the strike in question was covered by Entry 1 of Schedule III of the Act?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Industrial Court had jurisdiction to restrain workmen from resorting to an illegal strike, but not from resorting to a legal strike. 2. The strike in question was not covered by Entry 1 of Schedule III of the Act because the strike was not deemed to be illegal under the Act.
Final Decision: The petition was dismissed and the interim order passed by the court was vacated.

JUDGMENT - C.S. DHARMADHIDARI, J.:---In this writ petition the petitioner Company has challenged the order passed by the industrial Court dated 21st of July, 1982 rejecting the prayer in terms or Clause 4(ii) of the application. The petitioner Company filed an application for interim relief under section 30(2) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union and Prevention of Unfair labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Apart from the reliefs an interim relief was also asked for preventing workman from resorting to or continuing strike in Pursuance to the latter dated 3rd July, 1982. It is not necessary to make a detailed reference to other averments made in the application or the reply filed by the Union. It is that part of the interim relief which was denied to the petitioner Company by the Industrial Court by the impugned order. In para 7 of the order the Industrial Court has given its reasons for refusing to grant the interim relief, which reads as under :

"So far as the second relief sound by the complainant company is concerned, it is doubtful whether this Court has jurisdiction to restrain the workman from resorting to a strike. The collective action by group of employees cannot be lightly considered. The strike resorted to by workers has not been mentioned as an unfair labour practice in the relevant Scheduled to the Act. So when there is no ground to say that the workers resorted to an unfair labour practice, it would not be proper to grant the second relief by way of temporary injunction."

As already observed it is this part of the finding, which is challenged in the present writ petition. Shir Puri, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner Company contended that the Act is a complete code in itself, which has been enacted with the sole object of preventing unfair labour practice. Resorting to lock-out or a strike is not a fundamental right of anybody, but is merely a weapon which can be used as a last resort after all other avenues are exhausted. Therefore, the industrial Court has got jurisdiction to restrain either the employer or employee from resorting to unjustified lock-out or strike and hence the Tribunal below committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the Court has no jurisdiction to restrain workman from resorting to strike. In support of his contention he placed reliance upon the decision in (Chandramalai Esate v. Workmen and others)1, 1960(2) Lab.L.J. 243, (Radhey Shyam v. Post Master-General)2, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 311, (Mumbai Mazdoor Sabha v. Bennet Colman and Co. Limited and others)3, 1980(1) Lab. L. Journal 112, (Amalendu Gupta and others v Life Insurance Corporation of India)4, 1982(2) Lab.L.J 332 and (Nichani Hotels Corporation v. Bombay Labour Union and others)5, 1981 Mh.L.J. 711. Shir Puri also contended that since the present enactment is a complete code, the Industrial Tribunal while entertaining complaint under section 30(2) of the said Act will also be entitled to exercise ancillary jurisdiction. According to him in the present case the Industrial Tribunal has refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law and, therefore, the said order is wholly vitiated.

2. On the other hand it is contended by Ku. Pradhan that the present enactment being a complete code, the entries relating to unfair labour practices are wholly exhaustive and it is not open to this Court to make any addition to the entries by the process of interpretation or construction. In Entry No. 1 in Schedule III the question of propriety or justifiability of strike is not included. As a matter of fact the said question is beyond the scope and the jurisdiction of the Court concerned, while deciding the question of unfair labour practice, though in a given case under section 25 of the said Act the question of proprietor or justifaibility may be relevant. She also contended that unless it is prima facie shown that the strike resorted to is illegal, the Industrial Tribunal has no jur

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