The court cannot grant a stay of a suit under section 151 of the CPC when the conditions laid down in section 10 are not met.

Headnote:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE - SECTION 10 - STAY OF SUIT - JURISDICTION OF COURT - INHERENT POWERS - SECTION 151 - STAY OF SUIT - CONDITIONS - EXERCISE OF POWERS - SECTION 10 AND SECTION 151 - CONFLICT - STAY OF SUIT - FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES - CONDUCT OF PARTIES - DELAY - INTENTION TO DELAY - EXERCISE OF POWERS UNDER SECTION 151 - REFUSAL.
Fact of the Case:

Plaintiff filed a suit in the City Civil Court for declaration of trespass, possession, and injunction against the defendant. The defendant had previously filed a suit in the Small Causes Court for a declaration of tenancy. The City Civil Court stayed the suit under section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) on the ground that the subject matter of both suits was the same and the Small Causes Court had no jurisdiction to grant the reliefs claimed in the City Civil Court suit. The plaintiff challenged the stay order.
Finding of the Court:

The court held that the stay order was wrongly passed. It held that under section 10 of the CPC, one of the requirements for passing a stay order is that the previously instituted suit must be pending in the same or any other Court in India having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed in the subsequent suit. The court found that the Small Causes Court did not have jurisdiction to grant the reliefs claimed in the City Civil Court suit, and therefore, the stay order could not be granted under section 10.
Issues: 1. Whether the stay order passed by the City Civil Court under section 10 of the CPC was valid? 2. Whether the court had inherent powers under section 151 of the CPC to grant a stay of the suit?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the stay order was not valid because the Small Causes Court did not have jurisdiction to grant the reliefs claimed in the City Civil Court suit. The court interpreted section 10 of the CPC to mean that the previously instituted suit must be pending in a court that has jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed in the subsequent suit. 2. The court held that it had inherent powers under section 151 of the CPC to grant a stay of the suit, but that these powers could not be exercised in conflict with the provisions of section 10. The court found that the exercise of powers under section 151 to grant a stay when not all of the conditions laid down in section 10 existed would be contrary to the intention of the legislature.
Final Decision: The court made the rule absolute in terms of prayer (a) with no order as to costs and set aside the order dated 16-3-1979. It directed that the City Civil Court would proceed with the disposal of the suit as expeditiously as possible.

JUDGMENT - A.N. MODY, J.:---This revision application arises out of a judgment in the City Civil Court Suit No. 583 of 1975 dated 16-3-79 staying the said suit under the provisions of section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code. This stay was granted not on any notice of motion taken out as is usually done but was granted after framing a preliminary issue at the hearing of the suit as to whether the suit should be stayed under the provisions of section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code. As I am deciding this application on merits I do not propose to go into the question whether such a stay can be granted without a separate application. I must also point out that there is no pleading and so no issue framed as to whether the stay should be granted in exercise of the inherent powers under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. However, as this point has been argued in detail by both sides and without any objection on behalf of the plaintiff as to want of pleadings or issue I will deal with this point also.

2. Sometime in the year 1959 the plaintiff had given to the defendant its business of vulcanizing and battery charging carries on in the name and style of "Kingsway Garage" in shop No. 2 on the ground floor of a building which was then known as "Kingsway Chambers" and now known as "Kalyan Bhawan" situate at King's Circle on what is described as conducting basis under a written agreement. The agreement between the parties was renewed from time to time by written agreements, the last of such agreement being dated 1-4-1970. It would appear that there were litigation between the present defendant as defendant and Shashikant N. Shah and another as plaintiffs being S.C. Suit No. 56 of 1972 in which a Court Receiver was appointed. An application was made by the present plaintiff for possession which was decided by the City Civil Court by a judgment and order dated 8-3-1972. The relevant portion of the said order and judgment reads as follows :---

"Though the applicant has established his title and right to possession to the exclusion of the plaintiffs and the defendant, it is not possible to direct the Court Receiver to deliver possession to the applicant because he in fact took possession from the defendant who was carrying on business as applicant's licensee. However, the defendant does not dispute that he is a licensee. He undertake to return possession to the applicant after he receives it from the Court Receiver. The Court Receiver, shall deliver possession to the defendant from who he has taken it. He shall thereafter stand discharged without passing accounts. In view of this, I make no order on the applicant's Notice of Motion dated 29-2-1972. No order as to costs on the applicant's Notice of Motion and the Notice of Motion of the plaintiffs. Court Receiver to act on certified copy of Roznama."

I am unable to follow why an order for direct possession in favour of the applicant could not have been made when the defendant was consenting to it. I am not aware of any law which prevented the Court from making such an order. This question, however, does not arise in the present case.

3. There is dispute between the parties hereto as to when the defendant delivered possession to the plaintiff in accordance with the said order. The plaintiff contends that it was delivered late, after a lapse of almost a period of about one year and thereafter the defendant took wrongful possession thereof. The defendant contends that it was delivered within one month from the date of the order and the premises were given back by the plaintiff to the defendant again under an oral agreement. After this the present defendant filed a suit in the Small Causes Court at Bombay being R.A. Declaratory Suit No. 1946 of 1973 for declaration that he was a tenant of the premises and ad interim order was sought under which a notice was served on the plaintiff herein. The Small Causes Court suit was dismissed sometime in November 1974 for default of appearance of the def

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