The consequences of non-compliance with an order for deposit of rent under section 11(4) of the Bombay Rent Act do not automatically flow from the provision of the law but must be specified by the court in a direction given under the second part of sub-section (4).

JUDGMENT - R.A. JAHAGIRDAR, J.:---The petitioner has challenged decree of eviction passed against him in proceedings arising under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Bombay Rent Act"). Regular Civil Suit No. 289 of 1978 was filed by the respondent in this petition against the petitioner in the Court of the Civil Judge, (Junior Division), at Ulhasnagar on the ground that the petitioner was in arrears of rent which had not been paid despite the notice issued under section 12(2) of the Bombay Rent Act. The claim for possession was also included in the suit. Thus the suit was one for recovery of rent with a claim for possession of the premises tenanted by the petitioner.

2. In that suit, on behalf of the respondent-landlord an application was made on 4th August 1979 under section 11(4) of the Bombay Rent Act requesting the Court for a direction that the petitioner should pay all the arrears of rent at the rate of Rs.50/- per month forthwith "failing which his defence may be struck off and he may not be permitted to appear and defend the suit". On the same day, the learned Civil Judge directed that the other side should give its say in the matter. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted her say. Thereafter the learned trial Judge passed an order as follows :---

"The interim rent of the suit premises is fixed at Rs. 50/- p.m. exclusive all other charges.

The defendant is directed to deposit in Court on or before 15-9-79 all the arrears of rent at that rate for the period from 1-12-77 till 31-3-79 and shall continue to deposit the future rent at that rate on or before 15th of every subsequent month.

The amount of rent if deposited for the period from 1-12-77 till 31-5-78 shall not be paid to the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit C.O.A."

3. From the order reproduced above it is clearly seen that the learned trial Judge did not indicate anywhere in the order what the consequences of the non-compliance of the said order would be. However, on a report submitted by the Nazir of the Court on 15th September, 1979 the learned trial Judge noted that the petitioner had not complied with the orders of the Court passed on 29th October, 1979 and, therefore, he said that the petitioner's defence were struck off. From the record it is not clear and I have not been informed under what circumstances the learned trial Judge asked for the report of the Nazir and whether the order striking off the defence was passed after or without hearing the petitioner. In any case, that does not affect the discussion that has taken place before me and the decision which I am called upon to give on the facts and circumstances of this case.

4. Thereafter the learned trial Judge proceeded to decree the suit by his judgment and order dated 26th October, 1979 in a judgment which consists of about 10 lines which are practically the mere recital of the respondents' case. The claim of the respondent was upheld and a decree as prayed for by the respondent was passed.

5. The petitioner preferred an appeal, being Civil Appeal No. 6 of 1980. The learned Appellate Judge formulated the point which he is required to do under Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure as follows :

"The only point for my consideration is whether the judgment and decree of the trial Court are liable to be set aside.........."

He gave his finding in the negative and proceeded to dismiss the appeal which he did by his judgment and order dated 30th August, 1980.

6. In my opinion, the point for determination framed by the learned Assistant Judge is hopelessly inadequate and indeed inaccurate. I will, in the course, of the judgment, indicate a trend which is becoming monotonously routine whereby the courts of first appeal are formulating the points for decision in a highly unsatisfactory manner. It is sufficient at the stage to state that the question before the learned Assistant Judge was not whether the judgment of the Court below was liable to

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