1986 Supreme(Bom) 140

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
P.S. Shah Smt. Sujata Manohar, JJ.
Nowroji Jehangir Gamadia others .... Appellants.
Versus
Deputy Collector, Inami and Special Tenures Abolition
Branch, Bombay City .... Respondents.
Appeal No. 24 of 1980 in Misc. Petition No. 1566 of 1975, Misc. Petition No. 1262 of 1976, Misc. Petition No. 1343 of 1976, Misc. Petition No. 1161 of 1976, Appeal No. 83 of 1980 in Misc. Petition No. 1535 of 1975, Appeal No. 138 of 1980 in Misc Petition No. 1272 of 1975, Writ Petition No. 693 of 1981, Writ Petition No. 1224 of 1980, decided on 15-4-1986.
Advocates appeared :
K.S. Cooper, A.N. Mody, S.K. Cooper, Miss U.M. Dalal i/b. R.D. Sethna Co., for appellants, in A. No. 24/80.
L.C. Chogle, B.E. Patil, for respondents in A. No. 24/80, M.R. 1262/76, M.P.1343/ 76, W.P. 1161/76, A.No. 83/80, A.No. 138/80, W.P. 693/81, W.P. 1244/80.
U.M. Dalal i/b. R.d. Sethna Co., for petitioners on M.P. 1262/76, M.P. 1343/76, W.P. 1161/ 76.
M.S. Sanghavi i/b. Ambubhai Diwanji, for appellants in A. No. 83/80.
D.D. Madon, K.D. Mehta i/b. Payne Co., for respondent No. 3 in A. No.83/80.
R.J. Joshi with D.B. Shroff i/b. Little Co., for appellants in A.No. 138/80.
G.E. Vahanvati i/b. Manilal Kher Ambalal Co., for petitioners in W.P. 693/81W.P. 1244/80.

Headnote:BOMBAY CITY (INAMI AND SPECIAL TENURES) ABOLITION AND MAHARASHTRA LAND REVENUE CODE (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1699

       Section 4 (2)-Relief to trusts-A liberal and benevolent construction called for while considering provisions of Section 4 (2)-Regard to be given to well settled principles construing the statutory provisions --Interpretation of a statute not to be collected from any notions-Words not to be construed contrary to their meaning.

       Though, the Abolition Act in the instant case is a taxing statute, a benevolent and liberal construction is required to be placed on the provisions of Section 4 (2), having regard to the intention of legislature to grant relief to the Trusts from the applicability of the other provisions of the Act. A liberal and benevolent construction is called for while considering the provisions of Section 4 (2). It is not possible to agree with the view taken by the Single Judge that being a exception carved out of the general rule, Section 4 (2) must be given a strict and narrower meaning.

       While considering Section 4 (2) regard must be had to the well settled principles construing the statutory provisions. The relevant principles are (1) where the language is plain and admits of but on meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise, (2) where by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the legislature, it must be enforced however, harsh or absurd or contrary to common sense the result may be. The interpretation of a statute is not to be collected from any notions which may be entertained by the Court as to what is just and expedient: words are not to be construed, contrary to their meaning, as embracing or excluding cases merely because no good reason appears why they should not be embraced or excluded.

       MAHARASHTRA LAND REVENUE CODE (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1969

       Section 4 (2) -Bombay City (Inami and Special Tenures) Abolition Rules, 1972, Role 14-The expression used for the object of the Trust-Connotation of.

       The expression used for the objects of the Trust is not so clear as to convey the only meaning that the land must be physically used for the objects of the Trust as the word used is capable of different meanings depending on the context of the subject matter in which it is used. The object of the provisions appears to be to confer a benefit on the public trusts by excluding them from the operation of the Act. The section does not afford any clear indication that the legislature intended to use it in a narrower sense of physical user and excludes the economic user. There are no clear words in the section indicating that the land must be physically used for the objects of the Trust nor do we find the use of the expression such as used and also occupied for the objects of the trust. In the absence of the intention being clearly expressed by use of plain language of the section, it would be permissible-indeed it is the duty of the Court to construe the words in the light of the surrounding circumstances such as the object behind making the provision, the historical back-ground which led the legislature to exempt the public trust, the mischief sought to remedied and so on.

       Similarly, it would be permissible to take the aid of the rules framed under the Act in an endeavor find the true intention of the legislature and construe the section accordingly. As indicated above, the. word used has no fixed meaning and has to be construed in the light of the surrounding circumstances from which one has to deduce the real intention of the legislature as to whether the expression used for the objects of the trust in Section 4 (2) should be given a restricted or narrower meaning or a wider meaning so as to include economic user by letting out the trust property and utilising the income so received for the objects of the trust.

       Sub-section (2) of Section 19 provides that every rule made under this section shall be laid, as soon as may be, after it is made, before each House of the State Legislature while it is in session for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two successive sessions and if, before the expirty of the session in which it is so laid or the session immediately following both Houses agree in making any modification in the rule or both houses agree that the rule should not be made, the rule shall from the date of publication of a notification in the Official Gazette, of such decision, have effect only in such modified from or be of no effect as the case may be.

       The provisions of Section 19 indicate that the legislature has not merely left it to the Executive to frame the Rules, but has preserved into itself powers to modify the Rules which are required to be laid before the House within the prescribed period. It is significant that the legislature did not think it fit to modify the Forms VII and VIII which indicates that even economic user of the land entitles the trust for the exemption provided the income received is utilised for the fulfillment of the objects of the Trust for which it is established. It would be legitimate to infer that if the intention of the legislature was to exempt only lands which are physically used for the objects of the trust and to exclude those which are not so used, the legislature would have modified the said forms, not only by deleting the above quoted portions, but on the contrary indicating explicity physical user as a condition for exemption.

       It would, therefore, be permissible to look into the relevant contents of the two Forms VII and VIII in the Rules as an aid for construing the expression used for the objects of the trust. In Section 4 (2) of the Act. Undoubtedly if the language of section is clear and unambliguous the Rule framed under the enactment cannot control the meaning of such a provision. Such a Rules being contrary to the statutory provisions will be ultra vires and cannot be given effect. Such, however, is not the case here. The wording of section is ambiguous. The word used is capable of different meanings and would also include the renumerative user of land by letting out the same and utilising the rent by the trustees gained there from for the purpose of the trust. It is well settled that the Rules and section have to be read in harmony with each other, and though in the normal course the Rule must take the colour from the section, in view of the ambiguity in the wording of section in contrast with the clear wording in the two forms which form part of the Rules framed under the Act, the wording of the forms VII and VIII which are unambigous will have an important bearing on the construction of Section 4 (2).

       It must be held that the expression used for the objects of trust in Section 4 (2) is intended to embrace in its operation even cases of economic user of the property by letting out the same and utilising the income so received there from towards the objects of the trust. It is well known that there are many trusts where the property is not intended to be physically used, for instance, a trust the object of which is to give Scholarships to the students out of the income of the trust property. It the legislature intended to extend the benefit only to the properties of trusts which are physically used by the trust, the language would have been more specific.