1987 Supreme(Bom) 231
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
(Aurangabad Bench)
B.G. Deo V.P. Salve, JJ.
Bhagwanrao s/o Jijaba Auti .... Petitioner.
Versus
Ganpatrao s/o Mugaji Raut another .... Respondents.
Civil Revision Application No. 138 of 1983 with Civil Revision Application No. 24 of 1987, decided on 7-8-1987.
Advocates appeared :
D.B. Yewtekar, for petitioner in C.R.A. 138 and for respondent in C.R.A. 24.
S.C. Bora, for respondent No. 2 in C.R.A. 138 and for petitioner No. 2 in C.R.A. 24.
Headnote:Section 37-Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, while Order 39 Rule l-Injunction-Held that temporary injunction can be granted without referring the question of tenancy to the Tenancy Court, a relief of permanent injunction on merit cannot be granted in a suit simpliciter for permanent injunction unless an issue is raised referred and decided by Tenancy Court.
A temporary injunction can be granted at any stage of the suit. It is regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure and it continues only up to a specified time. Unlike temporary injunction, a perpetual intimation is granted upon merits of suit, after hearing both the parties. A decree for perpetual injunction, as the Nomenclature shows, perpetually restrains the defendant from assertion of a right or from commission of an act. The difference between the two is real and substantial one is a temporary measure, the other is a perpetual restraint by a decree. A relief of perpetual injunction on merits can not be granted, unless relative rights are considered. What is required under Order 39 of the Code of Civil procedure in only a prima facie case, which means physical possession at the date of the suit which, if found proved, would Necessarily lead to the conclusion that the balance of inconvenience lies in favour of the plaintiff. The question of tenancy has neither to be dealt with nor arises while deciding the question of temporary injunction. Its proper place is the trial on merit. It is opined that while temporary injunction can be granted without referring the question of tenancy to the Tenancy Court, a relief of permanent injunction on merit cannot be granted in a suit simpliciter for permanent injunction, unless an issue is raised, referred and decided by the Tenancy Court in accordance with the provisions of the Tenancy Act.
Sections 37- Code of civil Procedure, 1908, Order 39 Rule l-Injunction-Perpetual Injunction can be granted where right exists, or where right is created or where right Is cognizable by law-To grant relief only on basis of possessory title would cause injustice, may lead multiplicity of proceedings and In some cases deprive the rightful owner of enjoyment of the property.
Section 37 of the specific Relief Act, provides that temporary injunction are such as are to continue until a specified time, or until the further order of the Court, and they may be granted at any stage of a suit, and are regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure, while a perpetual injunction can only be granted by the decree made at the hearing and upon the merits of the suit; the defendant is thereby perpetually enjoined from the assertion of a right, or the commission of an act, which would be contrary to the rights of the plaintiff. Section 37 (2) is the key to the entire controversy. Even in a suit for a permanent injunction simpliciter, where rival contentions as regards possession are made, it has to be considered on merits as to who has better right for possession. Obviously, when a plaintiff claims to be a tenant and is in possession, and it is established that he is in possession on the date of the suit, perpetual injunction can be granted in his favour, only if the defendant has no better right than him (plaintiff). If the defendant is the owner of the property, the plaintiff as a tenant in the present state of tenancy legislation has certainly a better right than the owner for possession, provided he establishes tenancy rights. It is only in such a case that perpetual injunction can be issued in his favour. For deciding the issue of perpetual injunction, a question as regard the rights of either the plaintiff or the defendant as a tenant is necessarily involved and has to be decided first, and when such a question is to be dealt with only by the authority under the tenancy Act, Civil Courts jurisdiction to consider and decide such a question is barred and reference becomes absolutely necessary.
The contention, that once possession is established, the plaintiff would be entitled to a permanent injunction ipso facto, cannot be accepted. The relief of perpetual injunction is discretionary. The law of perpetual injunction, although codified, only expresses in general terms the rules acted upon by Courts of equity, because they are in accordance with justice, equity and goon conscience. Sections 38, 39 and 42 of the Specific Relief Act mention the circumstances under which perpetual injunction can or cannot be granted. But these sections do not exhaust all the possibilities.
Where there is a duty enforceable by law, whether express or implied, whether arising out of a contract or otherwise, the relief of injunction can be granted, unless considerations of expediency or convenience determine the discretion of the Court otherwise. Perpetual injunction can be granted where right exists, or where right is created, or where right is cognizable by law. It can be granted to prevent the infringement of that right. When a tenant comes to the Court contending, inter alia, that he is a tenant-in-possession and that there is a real threat to his possession from the defendant, who may either be a trespasser or a land-owner, an injunction to protect his possession can be granted, provided the tenant establishes the alleged right of tenancy, if it is disputed. He has to prove that he is not only in possession but that his possession is referable to his tenancy right. A corresponding obligation is cost on the defendants, if he is an original owner, not to disturb the right of the plaintiff in respect of possession. A decree can be passed only when the tenancy right of the plaintiff is established in such a situation. To grant relief only on the basis of possessory title would cause injustice, may lead to multiplicity of proceedings and in some cases deprive the rightful owner of enjoyment of the property.
2. The question referred is as under :---
"In a suit simpliciter for a permanent injunction, is it necessary to frame an issue of tenancy either of the plaintiff or of the defendant?"
3. This reference arose out of Regular Civil Suit No. 71 of 1979 filed by plaintiff-Bhagwanrao in the Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Bevarai, District Beed, for a permanent injunction simpliciter for restraining the defendant No. 1---Ganpatrao and defendant No. 2---Mrs.. Kamlabai from disturbing his possession over the suit field being a portion of survey No. 260, situated at Umapur. Bhagwanrao contends that he is a tenant in possession in respect the suit field by virtue of a Batai-Patrak, dated 8-5-1978, executed by defendant No. 1 - Ganpatrao in his favour. The defendant s disputed plaintiff's possession over the suit field, much-less by virtue of the alleged Batai-Patrak.
4. The plaintiff obtained a temporary injunction which was confirmed throughout and which his still subsisting.
5. On the basis of the pleadings, about five issues were struck by the learned Civil-Judge. Issue No. 1 reads thus :
"Does plaintiff prove his possession of suit land on the basis of Batai Partrak?"
6. The plaintiff, thereafter, by an application sought reference of this Issue No. 1 to the tenancy authority for decision. The prayer made by the plaintiff-Bhagwanrao for referring Issue No. 1 to tenancy Court was rejected by the learned Civil Judge by an order, dated, 15-1-1983. The relevant portion of the order reads thus :
"From the contents of Batai-Patrak, it is clear that defendant No. 1 has obtained Rs. 2000/- from the plaintiff also given the land for cultivation for a period of five years. It is also mentioned in the Batai-Patrak that the defendant will return the amount to the plaintiff after expiry of five years and get possession under the usufructuary mortgage, and bound himself to pay Rs. 2000/- on expiry of five years period, which is one of the essential ingredients of mortgage transaction. In such type (of) covenants of repayment of any amount does not exist, hence, the plaintiffs is in possession on the basis of mortgage and he is not in possession on the basis of leased transaction. Hence, the issue is not required to be referred to Revenue Court for getting findings of tenancy of the plaintiff on the suit land. The application is liable to be rejected.
ORDER
Application is rejected. No order as to costs.
Dated : 15-1-1983. Sd/-".
7. Plaintiff-Bhagwanrao challenged this order of rejection of reference of issue No. 1 to tenancy Court in Civil Revision Application No. 138 of 1985. Defendants-Ganpatrao and Kamlabai have also preferred Civil Revision Application No. 24 of 1987 for modification of issue No. 1, contending inter alia, that in suit simpliciter for injunction, if filed, an issue as regards tenancy is not required to be decided, as it is not involved, within the meaning of section 99-A of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act. The defendants contended that the issue about tenancy was not involved in the suit of this nature and the reference to Tenancy Court made by the Civil Court was uncalled for and without jurisdiction. This defendants prayed in their Revision Petition No. 24 of 1987 that the issues framed in Regular Civil Suit No. 71 of 1979 may, therefore, be suitably ordered to be modified.
8. Our learned brother, Pratap, J. having heard both the revision petitions, noticed that there was a conflict of decisions of this Court on the question as to whether in a suit simpliciter for injunction, an issue as regard tenancy of either plaintiff or defendant is involved