JUDGMENT - SHARAD MANOHAR, J.:---By my earlier order dated 18th August, 1986. I had directed the appointment of Receiver in respect of the suit premises and the Receiver was directed to take possession of the suit premises from the defendant and to remain in possession of the same until further orders. There is no dispute that the order has been complied with, at least, substantially. There is some dispute as to whether the possession of all parts of the suit premises have been taken or not. The plaintiff's contention is that a portion of the premises still remains in possession of the defendant in spite of the order of appointment of Receive passed by me. I will deal with that contention in this judgment a little later. At present, I am delivering the final judgment and I am passing this final order in the Second Appeal.

2. The facts relevant to the appeal have been already set out by me in my said earlier order dated 18th August, 1986 and I direct that the said order should form part of this judgment. I may also mention here that in fact the order was passed after fully hearing not only Mr. Rane but also Mr. Rajani on all points raised by him in support of the appeal. I passed the said order before the judgment, because I had noticed the deceptive and somewhat fraudulent methods adopted by the defendant for the purpose of defeating the plaintiff's claim. The said conduct of the defendant gave a distinct impression that he was not a man who would allow execution proceedings to take place without further thwarting them by any means fear foul, mostly foul. It was in the peculiar circumstance that I ordered the Receiver to be appointed for taking possession of the suit property so that the decree would not be defeated in the execution proceeding. After the order was complied with and the Receiver took possession (at least of the substantial portion of the suit premises) and at the time when I was about to deliver the said judgment Mr. Manudhane, the learned Counsel, applied to the Court for hearing him on behalf of the appellant/defendant. By was of courtesy to him, I allowed him to advance his arguments and all that I am required to do in this judgment is to deal with those arguments. I may repeat that this was only a concession given to the learned Counsel by way of courtesy.

3. Mr. N.S. Manudhane has urged three points in support of the Second Appeal, which are as follows :---

(i) that ordinary Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's instant suit, having regard to the provisions of section 28 of the Rent Act;

(ii) that the defendant is a protected licensee within the contemplation of section 15-A of the Rent Act; and

(iii) that no case is made out by the plaintiff in his pleadings of revocation of licence at the expiry of the 1st period of 11 months.

I may state at this stage itself that so far as the 3rd point is concerned, Mr. Manudhane need not have laboured on the said point, because I have not accepted and do not propose to accept the view taken by the District Court to the effect that immediately at the expiration of the 1st period of 11 months mentioned in the Agreement (Exh. 28), the licence granted by the plaintiff to the defendant came to an end ipso facto by the efflux of time.

I find no difficulty in accepting Mr. Manudhane's contention that the defendant continued to be a lawful licensees of the plaintiff even on 1-2-1973 when some licensees of certain categories got such protection under the Rent Act as was previously availed of by the tenants. Question, how ever, is as to whether the defendant falls in one of these categories of the licensees, who are given protection by the relevant amendment of the Rent Act. In my earlier order dated 18th August, 1986, I have observed, at the end of Para 11 thereof that a licensee who has taken any business in the premises for conducting is not a protected licensee within the contemplation of section 5(4-A) of the Rent Act. Mr. Rajani, who appeared at that ti

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