Rekapally Laxminarayanrao Naidu vs Union of India & others

Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

1986 Supreme(Bom) 256

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
[NAGPUR BENCH]
M.M. Qazi M.S. Deshpande, JJ.
Rekapally Laxminarayanrao Naidu.... Petitioner.
Versus
Union of India others.... Respondents.
Writ Petition No. 1370 of 1974, decided on 12-9-1986.
Advocates appeared :
R.R. Pillai, for petitioner.
S.V. Natu B.P. Jaiswal, A.G.P., for respondents.

Headnote:ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS ACT, 1985
       Section 14, 28 and 29-Constitntion of India, Articles 226 and 323 - A Provisions of Administrative Tribunal Act completely exclude jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution-Section 29 specifically states that "cry suit or other proceeding pending before a court or other authority before the date of establishment of Tribunal shall stand transferred, the section saves appeals pending before the High Court-Held that High Court cannot proceed to hear and dispose of the petition.
       The provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act completely exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution notwithstanding whether the challenge is based on the breach of statute: rules or orders or notifications or relating to contravention of fundamental rights such as those contained under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In fact, there is nothing in the Administrative Tribunals Act to suggest that the Parliament intended that only a part of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in so far as that jurisdiction relates to the service matters of the Union be excluded.
       It was submitted that the writ petitions in which the rule has been issued have been saved by the Administrative Tribunals Act and they cannot, therefore, be transferred. He has further submitted that since the appeals have been saved, the writ petitions must also be taken to have been saved by any implication. There is no substance in these submissions. There is nothing either in Sections 14, 28 or 29 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, which would justify this interpretation placed by P. On the contrary, Section 29 specifically states that every suit or other proceeding pending before a Court or 6ther authority immediately before the date of establishment of a Tribunal under this Act, shall stand transferred. There can be no doubt that the word proceeding shall include also the writ petitions. The words used in section 29 specifically refer to the proceedings pending and does not make any distinction as sought to be made by P, that it would not cover the petitions which are already admitted. The second limb of his submission that since the appeal have been saved the writ petitions must also be taken to have been saved, is wholly without substance. Section 29 specifically saves the appeals pending before the High Court. If the Legislature also wanted to the writ petitions which are admitted, then surely it would have been s mentioned, Section 28 read with Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act completely excludes the jurisdiction of all the Courts except that of the Supreme Court of India. It is, therefore, held that High Court cannot proceed to hear and dispose of this petition and the same is being transferred to the central Administrative Tribunal, Bombay, forthwith.

JUDGMENT - M.M. QAZI, J.:---The petitioner is a Central Government employee working as a Time Scale Clerk with the Divisional Engineer, Telegraphs, Nagpur. It is contended that on 15-3-1967 the Post Master General, Maharashtra Circle Bombay, issued a direction for the fixation of seniority of those clerks who were recruited before 27-1-1959 but have passed confirmation test at fifth or sixth attempt. In view of these instructions, the petitioner was relegated to the bottom for that particular year of recruitment on the basis of the date of confirmation. It is contended that on 10-8-1970 the Director General issued a circular for preparation of common gradation list of the then T.R.A. personnel and the personnel already working in the Engineering division on the basis of continuous service in either of the units. In pursuance of the said circular, the Division Engineer, Telegraphs, Nagpur, prepared and issued a common gradation list of seniority working in the cadre, scale and same grade of time scale. According to the petitioner the aforesaid directions and circular resulted in his supersession. The petitioner made a representation dated 1-2-1971 to the Post Master General, Maharashtra Circle, Bombay, making a grievance about his supersession on account of the directions and circular referred to supra. However, the representation was rejected and hence he approached this Court by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It appeared that during the pendency of the petition certain developments took place and the respondents considered the question of refixation of seniority of all the categories of employees including the Time Scale Clerks working under the control of the Post Master General and the Divisional Engineer, Telegraphs, Nagpur, in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court of India, reported in A.I.R 1972 S.C. 670 (Union of India and others v. G.S. Ganapathi Kini)1, (Inspector of Central Excise, Hassam and others). The principles for revision of seniority in the light of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court were evolved by the Government finally by its memo dated 28-4-1978 (Annexure P). However, it appears that the petitioner was not even then satisfied and, therefore, he amended the petition and also challenged the memo dated 28-4-1978.

2. Mr. Pillai, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that the present petition will have to be heard by this Court itself, notwithstanding the establishment of Central Administrative Tribunal. According to Mr. Pillai, certain circulars are under challenge and the same cannot be decided by the Administrative Tribunal. According to him, the Administrative Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudge the validity of the circulars or notifications issued by the Government. He has heavily relied on the decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in 1986 Labour and industrial Case, July issue, 1034 (M.B. Shukla and others v. Union of India and others)2.

3. Since the question involved is of some importance, we also heard Mr. Bobde, Senior Advocate. He invited our attention to the decisions reported in A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461 (Keshavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru others v. State of Kerala another)3, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789; (Minerva Mills Ltd. others v. Union of India others)4, and A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1272 (Umaji Kesharo Meshram others v. Smt. Radhikabai another)5. According to him, the constitutional power of the High Court such as the one contained in Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be affected in any manner by an ordinary law made by the Parliament. Therefore, according to him, the Act itself is unconstitutional. He has also submitted that Article 323-A is violative of the basic structure of the Constitution, inasmuch as it excludes the jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of the matters relating to recruitment and conditions of Civil servants.

4. The question that fell of consideration before the Allahabad High C

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