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1986 Supreme(Bom) 78

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
[NAGPUR BENCH]
H.W. Dhabe, J.
Maimunabai (Smt.) wd/o Akbar Ali others.... Applicants.
Versus
Mumtaz Hussain s/o Akbar Ali Topiwale anothers.... Non-applicants.
Civil Revision Application No. 1015 of 1982, decided on 4-3-1986.
Advocates appeared :
U.P. Deopujari, for applicant.
G.Y. Gharote and Shabbir Hussian, for non-applicant.

Headnote:Section 31 (2)-Questions regarding validity, effect or existence of all award or arbitration agreement between the parties to the agreement or persons claiming under them- Where to be decided.

       Held, Such questions shall be decided by court in which award under agreement has been or may be filed and by no other court.

       Section 32-Bar of suit-Disputes between parties-Parties referring dispute to sole arbitrator-Arbitrator passing award-No steps taken by either of them to file it in competent civil court to make it rule of court-Suit filed by a party on original cause of action-Maintainability-Award final and binding between parties-Final adjudication upon controversy raised therein although not made a rule of court-Held-Suit could not be said to be maintainable.

       REGISTRATION ACT, 1908

       Section 17 (1) (b)-Registration of award and is necessary if the right is claimed under the award and is sought to be enforced either by way of suit or by way of defence.

       On behalf of the plaintiffs is that the arbitration award in the instant we created rights in immoveable property worth Rs. 100/- or more and, therefore, required registration under Section 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act in the absence of which it is not admissible in evidence in the instant case so as to bar it. There is no merit in the above contention. So far as the registration of the award is concerned, it is necessary if the right is claimed under the award and is sought to be enforced either by way of suit or by way of defence. In the instant case, what is pleaded is the existence of the award which would bar the instant suit and, therefore, there was no question of its inadmissibility for the said purpose without being registered. The above contention on behalf of the plaintiffs is, therefore, rejected.

JUDGMENT - H.W. DHABE, J.:---This is a revision by the original defendant Akbar Ali, whose preliminary objection that the instant suit is barred in view of the provisions of section 32 of the Arbitration Act was rejected by the learned trial Court. The original defendant, Akbar Ali died during the pendency of this revision and his legal representatives are brought on record to prosecute the instant revision. The reference hereafter to the defendant would, however, mean the reference to the original defendant-Akbar Ali.

Briefly, the facts are that the non-applicant-plaintiffs filed the instant suit for dissolution of the partnership firm and accounts. The plaintiffs are the sons of the defendant from his first wife who had already died. The plaintiffs and the defendant formed a partnership as per the partnership deed dated 12-12-1964, the name of the partnership being M/s. Kikabhai Rahmat Ali. Since there was a dispute between the plaintiffs on one hand and the defendant on the other as regards the business of the partnership firm, they, by an agreement of reference dated 1-11-1979 referred their dispute to the arbitration of the sole arbitrator Shri Syed Yusufbhai. The sole arbitrator Shri Syed Yusufbhai passed his award on 19-11-1979 determining the shares and liabilities of each partner and dissolving the partnership. However, no steps were taken by any of the parties to the award to file the same in the competent Civil Court to make it a rule of the Court or in other words, to get a decree in terms of the same.

2. On the contrary, the plaintiffs filed on 18-2-1980 the instant suit upon the original cause of action on the ground that the award passed by the sole arbitrators was in excess of the terms of reference and was, therefore, a nullity and was not acceptable to the plaintiffs. It was also averred in para 7 of the plaint that the award was not filed in the Court within the prescribed period of limitation by any of the parties. In the written statement filed by the defendant, it was averred by him in para 9 that the instant suit for dissolution of firm and accounts was untenable in law because the matters thereunder were finally settled as per the aforesaid award dated 19-11-1979. The allegation in para 7 of the plaint that the award was in excess of the terms of reference and that it was a nullity were denied. It was also alleged in the written statement by the defendant that it was not open to the plaintiffs to challenge the validity of the award in the suit, because there were specific provisions made in the Arbitration Act for challenging the same.

3. With these rival pleadings, the following preliminary issue was framed by the learned trial Court :

"Whether his jurisdiction to entertain the suit was barred under section 32 of the Arbitration Act ?"

It appears that there was an application for interim relief of temporary injunction and an appointment of a receiver which prompted the trial Court to frame the issue of jurisdiction in view of the provisions of section 9-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. There was also a preliminary issue framed regarding the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the suit which is not pressed in this revision on behalf of the revision applicants. The learned trial Court held that the instant suit which was filed on the basis of the original cause of action was not barred by virtue of the provisions of section 32 of the Arbitration Act and he had, therefore, jurisdiction to entertain the same. He also rejected the objection about his pecuniary jurisdiction. He, thus, held that it was open to him to consider the question of grant of interim relief of temporary injunction and/or appointment of a receiver in the suit. Being aggrieved the defendant preferred the instant revision against the aforesaid order in this Court.

4. The learned Counsel for the revision applicants has urged before me that the learned trial Court has misread the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Satish Kumar and























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