SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Article Pause Article
judgment-img

1987 Supreme(Bom) 407

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
(Nagpur Bench)
V.A. Mohta, J.
Madhukar S/o Abaji Kalbande others.... Appellants.
Versus
Mangalchand S/o Mannalal Agrawal others .... Respondents.
Civil Revision Application No. 181 of 1984, decided on 3-12-1987.
Advocates appeared :
V S. Moharil, Anil Padiyar, A. Deshbhratar and E.N. Quazi, for applicants.

Headnote:BOMBAY COURT FEES ACT, 1959

       Section 6 (v) (i)-Residuary provision-Resort to-Rightly taken b) the plaintiff when the suit did not fall under any other specific provision.

       Section 6 (iv) (j) is a residuary provision and applies only when the suit does not fall under any other specific provision. Thus, three aspects fall for consideration (i) what is the subject-matter of the suit? (ii) is it susceptible of monetary evaluation? and (iii) is it otherwise provided for in the Act? The trial Court has held that (i) the suit is about the nature of tenancy in respect of a house, (ii) the said house is susceptible monetary evaluation and hence provisions of Section 6 (iv) (d) are attracted. There has been an error on the part of trial Court in not appreciating the real nature of the suit. The suit is not at all about nature of tenancy in respect of a house. The plaintiff had proceeded upon the assumption that he is the tenant qua the said house. He is interested only in clearing a cloud about his right in the property vis-a-vis the defendants inter se. He is neither a party to the sale deed dated 28-12-1981 nor is he interested in setting aside the said transaction. The very limited relief he is interested in is to avoid the affect of that transaction on him. Thus subject matter of the suit is not the house and the suit is not about the property as such Declaration sought is neither ownership in the property nor about nature of tenancy. There is no standard by which the present suit can be valued otherwise than on plaintiffs own valuation. In other words the subject matter is incapable of being valued in terms of money Al1 that remains to be considered in whether such a suit is otherwise provided for in the Act. Neither Section 6 (iv) (d) nor any other section is attracted Thus resort to residuary provision Section 6 (iv) (j) was rightly taken by the plaintiff and there was no jurisdiction whatsoever for the trial Court to direct payment of additional Court-fees.

JUDGMENT - V.A. MOHTA, J.:---This revision arises out of an order passed by the Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Yavatmal, directing the applicants (plaintiffs) to pay Court-fee as per section 6(iv)(d) of the Bombay Court-fees Act, 1959 (the Act). Plaintiffs had paid Court-fee of Rs. 30/- under section 6(iv)(j) of the Act.

2. In order to ascertain which of the two provisions are attracted, it is necessary to set out what in substance is the claim made: The plaintiffs are tenants of a block in a Chawl in Peshve plot, Yavatmal. The property was taken on lease from Dongaonkars who executed a sale-deed dated 28-12-1981, in favour of non applicants Nos. 2 to 4 (defendants Nos. 2 to 4). The house is let out for residential purposes and is governed by the local Rent Control Order, Non-applicant No. 1 (defendant No. 1) was serving as a Civil Surgeon, Yavatmal. He was staying in a Government Bungalow. Defendant No. 2 is his wife, defendant No. 3 is his son and defendant No. 4 is his brother-in-law. The property is in fact purchased by defendant No. 1 but Sale-deed has been taken benami in the name of defendants Nos. 2 to 4 solely with 3 view to make out a case before the Rent Controller for bona fide occupation on the ground that defendants Nos. 2 to 3 have no accommodation to live in the town of Yavatmal. Hence it be declared that real owner of the property is defendant No. 1 and not defendants 2 to 4 and the plaintiffs are the tenants of defendants No. 1 and not of defendants Nos. 2 to 4.

3. Section 6 (iv)(d) reads thus :

"In suits for declaration in respect of ownership, or nature of tenancy, title, tenure, right, lease, freedom or exemption from, or non-liability to, attachment with or without sale or other attributes, of immoveable property, such as a declaration that certain land is personal property of the Ruler of any former Indian State or public trust property or property of any class or community one-fourth of ad valorem fee leviable for a suit for possession on the basis of time of the subject-matter, subject to a minimum fee of eighteen rupees and seventy-five naye paise :

Provided that if the question is of attachment with or without sale the amount of fee shall be the ad valorem fee according to the value of the property sought to be protected from attachment with or without sale or the fee of fifteen rupees, whichever is less:

Provided further that, where the defendant is or claims under or through a limited owner, the amount, of fee shall be one-sixth of such ad valorem fee, subject to the minimum fee specified above :

Provided also that, in any of the cases falling under this clause except its first proviso, when in addition any consequential relief other than possession is sought the amount of fee shall be one-half of ad valorem fee and when the consequential relief also sought include a relief for possession the amount of fee shall be the full ad valorem fee ;"

Section 6(iv)(j) reads thus :---

"In suits where declaration is sought, with or without injunction or other consequential relief and the subject-matter in dispute is not susceptible of monetary evaluation and which are not otherwise provided for by this Act ad valorem fee payable, as if the amount or value of the subject matter was three hundred rupees";

It will be seen that section 6(iv)(j) is a residuary provision and applies only when the suit does not fall under any other specific provision. Thus, three aspects fall for consideration (i) what is the subject-matter of the suit ? (ii) Is it susceptible of monetary evaluation ? and (iii) is it other wise provided for in the Act ? The trial Court has held that (ii) the suit is about the nature of tenancy in respect of a house, (ii) the said house is susceptible to monetary evaluation ; and hence provisions of section 6 (iv)(d) are attracted. In my judgment, there has been an error on the part of the trial Court in not appreciating the real nature of the suit. The suit is not at all about nature of tenancy in respe






Click Here to Read the rest of this document

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top