JUDGMENT - B.N. DESHMUKH, J.:---This Second Appeal by original defendant against whom suit was filed by the plaintiff for claiming perpetual injunction restraining him from causing obstruction in the possession of the plaintiff over the suit property---gat numbers 440 and 443 of village Dongaon, Taluka Jafrabad. The facts which are not in dispute are as follows :

That the defendant-appellant in this Appeal is the owner of the suit land. On 30 August, 1974, he executed an Issar Parvati i.e. agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff. The agreement of sale recites that on the date of the document, defendant received Rs. 5,000/- and agreed to receive the balance on the date of the sale-deed. Further it recites that the possession of both the lands in dispute was delivered to the plaintiff on that date. These facts are not in dispute, and were not disputed before me.

2. The plaintiffs filed a suit for injunction simpliciter on the ground that he was put in possession on the agreement of sale and defendant is causing obstruction to his possession.

3. The trial Court, as well as the lower Appellate court held in favour of the plaintiff and the suit of the plaintiff was decreed.

4. Learned Counsel Shri Bora appearing for the defendants appellants did not challenge the findings of facts arrived at by both the Courts, but what he contended is that such suit for injunction is not maintainable because the cause of action in this case is founded on the claim of the plaintiff under section 53-A and as such, the suit is not maintainable. Learned Counsel further argued that in view of provision of section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, the injunction should have been refused when equally efficacious relief can be obtained by usual mode of proceedings. As the usual mode of proceedings by filing the suit for specific relief is not filed, the Courts below should have refused the grant of injunction, as prayed by the defendants.

5. The contention of the learned Counsel Shri Bora will have to be accepted in view of the fact that the plaintiff is admittedly claiming the possession under an agreement of sale. The cause of action for the suit is founded on the basis of possession under an agreement of sale. This, the plaintiff is claiming under section 53-A.

6. Learned Counsel Shri Bora invited my attention to several authorities. In A.I.R. 1940 P.C. 1. (Probodh Kumar Das and others v. Dantmara and Company Limited and others)1, what was observed in that judgment is that a right conferred by section 53-A is a right available to the defendant only to protect his possession. The section is so framed as to impose a statutory bar on the transferrer it confers no active title on the transferee. In A.I.R. 1940 Nagpur 113 (Kashiprasad Sukhiram v. Bedprasad Parmeshwar)2, also, it is held that section 53-A does no entitle a person to it enables him to defend his right to possession. In 1966 Mh.L.J. 24 (Maruti Gurappa and another v. Krishna Bala and another)8, in this Judgment what is observed while considering the provisions of section 53-A and Order XXI, Rule 103 is that, although it is a settled law that section 53-A is available by way of defence only, that principle is not applicable to a suit brought by a vendee under Order XXI, Rule 103 because the vendee in substance is merely seeking to protect the rights to which he is entitled under section 53-A. In A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 794, (Delhi Motor Company and other v. U.A. Basrurkar (dead) by L.R. and others)4, what the Supreme Court held in that case is that section 53-A is only meant to bring about a bar against enforcement of rights by a lessor in respect of property which the lessee had already taken in possession, but does not give any right to the lessee to claim possession or to claim any other rights on the basis of an unregistered lease. Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act has only offered a right on the basis of which the lessee can claim right against the lessor. The Supreme Court had also re

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