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1988 Supreme(Bom) 249

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
C. Mookerjee, C.J. S.P. Bharucha, J.
D. Shanalal.... Appellants.
Versus
Bank of Maharastra .... Respondents.
Appeal No. 192 of 1988 in Suit No. 2271 of 1985 with Appeal No. 68 of 1988 in Summary Suit No. 2275 of 1985 etc., decided on 27-7-1988.
Advocates appeared :
K.S. Coober with Mr. S.K. Cooper i/b Thakordas Madgaonkar Co., for appellants.
A.P. Chinoy with S.J. Vazifidar, I.M Chagla and J.D. Dwarkadas i/b Little Co., for respondents.

Headnote:Order 37, Rule 3 (2)-Letters Patent (Bombay) Clause 15-Bank suit under Order 37, Rule 3 (2)-Refusal or granting order of Single Judge in respect of leave to defend suit judgment within meaning of Clause 15-Such order appealable.

       The order of a Single Judge refusing or granting leave to defend the suit instituted under Order XXXVII of the Code is a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and would be appealable.

       Order 37, Rule 3 (2)-Letters Patent (Bombay) clause 15-Single Judges order refusing a granting leave-Held order is judgment under cause 15 and so appealable.

       Clause 15.

       See Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Order 37, Rule 3 (2).

JUDGMENT - C. MOOKERJEE, C.J.:---The Bank of Maharashtra which is the respondent in all the twenty two Appeals before us had instituted suits against the appellants in the respective appeals under Order XXXVII of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, seeking to recover moneys payable by the defendants appellants upon bills of exchange. After summonses of the suit were served upon them, the defendants appellants had entered appearances whereupon the plaintiff -respondent Bank had served upon each set of defendants summonses for judgment under Order XXXVII, Rule 3(2) of the Code. Thereupon the defendants -appellants had applied before the learned Single Judge for leave to defend the respective suits against them. The learned Single Judge had granted them such leave upon condition of depositing the amounts mentioned in the orders. Being aggrieved by the said conditional orders granting leave, the defendants appellants had preferred Appeals before the Division Bench. The Division Bench had upheld the learned Single Judge's orders granting conditional leave but had reduced the amounts of security deposits to be furnished by the defendants. The Appellants had thereafter filed Special Leave Petitions to the Supreme Court against the said orders granting conditional leave to defend suits brought by the respondent plaintiff. The Supreme Court had rejected the Special Leave Petitions. A statement at the Bar has been made that Review Petitions filed in the Supreme Court were also rejected.

2. Each of the defendants-appellants had failed to give the security and the learned Single Judge had proceeded to dispose of the suits in terms of Order XXXVIII, Rule 3(6)(b) of the Code. When the suits were called out for disposal, Counsel for the defendants had appeared before the learned Single Judge and had prayed for adjournment. The learned Single Judge rejected the said prayer. The learned Single Judge took the non-deposit certificates on record and also marked the documents filed by the plaintiff as Exhibit 'A' (collectively). The learned Single Judge ordered that there would be decrees as prayed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. Being aggrieved by the said judgements and decrees, the defendants have preferred these Appeals.

3. The learned Counsel for the respondent Bank has raised a preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of these Appeals which have been preferred against decrees passed in summary suits under Order XXXVIII of the Code after the defendants had filed to deposit the conditional securities. Mr. Cooper, the learned Counsel for the appellants, on the other hand, has contended that these Appeals are maintainable. He has made broadly the following submissions in support of these Appeals :-

4. His first submission is that an appeal lies from every decree save as otherwise expressly provided by section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code. The learned Counsel for the respondent, however, has rightly pointed out that these Appeals have been preferred under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, but none the less the general principles embodied in section 96 of the Code would be attracted. We are inclined to uphold the appellants' first submission that Order XXXVIII does not expressly or by implication bar presentation of appeals against decrees passed in summary suits governed by Order XXXVIII of the Code. The question as regards the maintainability of an appeal against the decree passed in a summary suit under Order XXXVIII of the Code is settled by more than one reported decision of this Court and this point is no longer res integra. Chief Justice Marten and Mr. Justice Kemp in the case of (Madanlal v. Kedarnath)1, A.I.R. 1930 Bombay 364 had, inter alia, held that an appeal lies from the final judgement passed in a summary suit directing the defendant to pay the amount of the decree claimed in default of security not having been furnished to defend the suit under Order XXXVIII Rule 3(2). The learned Chief Justice i




















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