JUDGMENT - C.S. DHARMADHIKARI, J.:---As both these appeals arise out of the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 1599 of 1985 and Writ Petition No. 2360 of 1985, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order.

2. The main question, which is raised in these appeals relates to the interpretation of Item No. 1 in Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, Item No. 1 of the said Schedule reads as under :

“1. To discharge or dismiss employees---

(a) by way of victimisation;

(b) not in good faith, but in the colourable exercise of the employer's rights;

(c) by falsely implicating on employee in a criminal case on false evidence or on concocted evidence;

(d) for patently false reasons;

(e) on untrue or trumped up allegations of absence without leave;

(f) in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice in the conduct of domestic inquiry or with undue haste;

(g) for misconduct of a minor or technical character without having regard to the nature of the particular misconduct or the past record of service of the employee, so as to amount to a shockingly disproportionate punishment.”

The words and expression used in Item No. 1, are “to discharge or to dismiss the employees”.

3. The petitioners in this case approached the Labour Court with a complaint that they are either discharged or dismissed by the respondents employers by obtaining resignations under duress or by force. The Labour Court as well as the Industrial Court took the view that even a forced resignation will not amount to discharge of dismissal of an employee within the contemplation of Item No. 1 of Schedule IV of the Act. The learned Single Judge held that a forced resignation is covered by the said item and, therefore, the complaints made were maintainable. It is this order of the Single Judge, which is challenged in these appeals.

4. Shri Damania, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants contended before us that a resignation, whether forced or otherwise, is not covered by Item No. 1, Schedule IV of the Act. It is not possible for us to accept this contention. In our view, the view taken by the learned Single Judge is the correct view of the matter.

5. This Court had an occasion to consider as to what is the effect of a forced resignation in (Yeotmal District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., Yeotmal v. Ramchandra Wamanrao Deshpande and others)1, 1978 Lab.I.C. 1321 and (2) (Shriram Swami Shiksan Sanstha, Nagpur v. Education Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nagpur and others)2, 1984(1) Lab.L.J. 432. In Shriram Shiksan Sanstha's case, the Division Bench held :

“We feel that it is a well settled proposition of law that a forced resignation, which means a resignation not voluntarily given by the employee but is brought about by force, duress or in any other manner by the employer is by the act of the employer. In substance the contract of service comes to an end in such case by the action on the part of the employer. It therefore amounts to termination of service by the employer.”

In this decision a reference was also made to a decision in (Abraham Reuben v. Karachi Municipality)3, A.I.R. 1929 Sin. 69 also to a decision of the Karnataka High Court in (Southern Railways Ltd. v. Padmnabhan)4, 1979 Lab.I.C. 254.

6. A similar view was taken by this Court in Yeotmal District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Ramchandra Wamanrao Deshpande and others, 1978 Lab.I.C. 1321 to which one of us (Dharmadhikari, J.) was a party. In this context reference could usefully be made to the following observations of the Supreme Court in (The Manager, Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills Ltd. v. J. Bastin)5, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 110.

“That leaves only one question to be considered. It was urged before the authorities below that the present dispute is not an industrial dispute for the reason that the respondent had not been dismissed, but he had voluntarily retired. If it was a case of voluntary r

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