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1986 Supreme(Bom) 225
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
(PANAJI BENCH)
Couto G.F. (Dr.), J.
Oriental Fire General Insurance Co. Ltd. .... Appellant.
Versus
Shantabai S. Dhume others.... Respondents.
First Civil Appeal No. 70 of 1983, decided on 14-8-1986.
Advocates appeared :
H.R. Bharne, for appellant.
S.D. Lotlikar for Amicus Curiae.
Headnote:Section 92(1)-Liability for payment of Compensation on death or permanent disability in an accident arising out of use of motor vehicle.
Sub-section (1) of Section 92 provides that where the death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of the said section.
Section 92-A (As amended by Act 47 of 1982)-Benefits of Section to be extended to all victims of accidents or their families as no where postulated for its operation prospectively only.
Section 92-A embodies and is, as such, a piece of welfare legislation which requires a liberal interpretation so as its benefits may be extended to all victims of accidents or their families, especially when nowhere in the said provision of law, it is postulated that tile benefit is given prospectively only and on the contrary, it would appear from its wording that the said benefit Is to he given in all cases where an accident occurred and as a result thereof a death or a permanent disablement was occasioned, The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act to some extent corroborates this view, for it particularly indicates that the intention of the Legislature was to remove the evil and mischief that people who suffered the accident had to face, being sometimes unable to prove the negligence or rashness of the driver or the owner of the vehicle and, therefore, unable to get the compensation they were entitled to, It is indeed stated therein that incidents of road accidents by motor vehicles have reached serious proportions and the victims of the accidents are generally pedestrians belonging to the less amount sections of society that the provisions of the Act as to compensation in respect of accidents can be availed of only in cases of accidents which can be proved to have taken place as a result of a wrongful act or negligence on the part of the owners or drivers of the vehicles concerned.
Section 92-A-Payment of compensation to victim of a traffic accident. Section 92-A of the Act provides for liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no fault. It constitutes a beneficial piece of legislation, undoubtedly meant to give a quick and effective relief to the victim of a traffic accident, or to his legal representatives in case of death.
Section 92-A-Beneflt of Section 92-A will be given to all cases of Motor Vehicles Accidents pending disposal-Even if the cause of action arose prior to Section 92-A came into effect.
Section 92-A is intended to provide to social justice by giving compensation without proof of fault or negligence by the driver or owner of the vehicle and as such, it is manifest that the question as to whether the cause of action are prior to its coming into force or not becomes irrelevant, for the material consideration for the purpose of awarding compensation under the said provision of law, being whether the case giving rise to that liability is still pending.
No doubt, a law is ordinarily prospective it its operation, but its retrospective application may he expressly provided for or may flow by necessary implication, from its language. The amendment to the Act was enacted with the aim to give a quick and effective relief to the victim of a motor vehicle accident or to his family and it would appear from the language of Section 92-A that the Legislature intended to extend such benefits to all the persons who had been affected by a traffic accident resulting in a death or in a permanent disablement.
Even where a right had been vested in a particular party, retrospective application of a new law can be made if such is the intendment of the Legislature. The benefit of Section 92-A of the Act is to be extended to all cases arising out of the motor vehicle accident which are pending disposal even if the cause of action, i.e., the accident occurred prior to the coming: into force of the said provision of law.
2. A traffic accident took place on 9th August, 1982, and as a result thereof, the husband and the father of respondents Nos. 1 to 6 herein came to die. By an application dated 28-1-1983, the said respondents sought a compensation under section 110-A of the Act and, thereafter, by another application dated 21-7-1983, they sought the benefits given by the newly introduced section 92-A. This application was allowed by order dated 5th August, 1983 and the Presiding Officer of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Margao, according ordered the appellant and the National Insurance Company Limited to deposit, each of them, a sum of Rs. 7,500/- to be paid to respondents Nos. 1 to 6 in case they were able to prove to be the legal representatives of the deceased.
3. It is against this order that the present appeal is directed, the appellant's case being that the impugned order is bad in law inasmuch as the Tribunal has wrongly held that the provision of section 92-A of the Act is applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. Mr. Bharne, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, has indeed submitted that the amendment through which section 92-A was inserted in the Act came into force only on 1st October, 1982, i.e., some time after the date on which the accident took place. In fact, the accident took place on 9th August, 1982, and therefore, when the cause of action arose, the provision of section 92-A of the Act was not yet in force. He then contended that in the premises and since the applications to get the compensations under sections 110-A and 92-A were filed only on 28-1-1983 and 21-7-1983, respectively, the latter provisions of law ought not and could not have been applied with retrospective effect as it was done by the Tribunal.
4. Though duly served, the respondents did not put in an appearance at the hearing, nor were they represented and thus, in order to get adequate and proper assistance, the Court appointed Mr. S.D. Lotlikar, amicus curiae. Dealing with the submissions of Mr. Bharne, the learned amicus curiae urged that it is quite clear from the acts of the case that the Tribunal has not applied the provision of section 92-A retrospectively, but on the contrary, its application was prospective, for section 92-A came into force on 1st October, 1982 and the applications for compensation, both under sections 110-A and 92-A, were filed much after. Thus, it would be wrong to hold, he contended, that section 92-A was applied in this case retrospectively. This apart, according to him, it is obvious that the said provision of law has to be applied to all pending cases, for it was introduced to remove the then existing evil which was, in practice, depriving the victims of a traffic accident or their legal representatives of the benefits of compensations. He contended that as held by the Supreme Court in (L.N. Guin and others v. Niranjan Modak)1, 1985(1) R.C.J. 152, the new law applies even to pending matters if, by express language or by clear intendment, it can be inferred that that was the intention expressed by the legislature and therefore, since the intention of the legislature while inserting section 92-A was to enable the victims of the accidents or their representatives to receive a compensation in all cases on the principle of no fault, it necessarily follows that the said provision of law applies to all pending cases, even if some rights had been accrued to the other parties. In fact, he further argued, in Guin's case, the Supreme Court held that although rights had been vested in a party, if the intendment of the legislature i
