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1989 Supreme(Bom) 170

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
S.C. Pratap, J.
Ahmed R..V. Peermohamed ... Plaintiff.
Versus
Jogi S. Bhar others ... Defendants.
Notice of Motion No. 961 of 1988 in Suit No. 595 of 1983, decided on 12-7-1989.
Advocates appeared :
R.A. Kapadia with J.B. Chinai D.B. Shroff i/b Pravin Mehta Mithi Co., for plaintiff in support.
R.A. Dada with E.P. Bharucha i/b Ambubhai and Diwanji for defendant Nos. 5 to 23 and respondents to show cause.
Janak Dwarkadas with Rajadhyaksha i/b Desai Borgie for applicant in support of C.S. No. 602 of 1989.
Iqbal Chagla i/b S.F.B. Tayabji, for intervenor

Headnote:CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1971

       Section 2 (b)-Civil contempt-Breach of undertaking-When no undertaking given either to court or Petitioner or when difference between parties on construction of certain clauses of terms-No contempt committed-Direct or indirect execution of consent decree not to be made through medium of contempt-Willfulness is essence of valid charge of civil contempt.

       Turning to the consent decree itself, on searches in vain for any nexus with contempt. There is, at best and at the highest, difference between the parties on the correct construction and interpretation of certain clauses thereof. And that, strangely enough, is sought to be made the sub-stratum of these contempt proceeding. Now, either party, only because it does not agree with or accept the rival interpretation of a decree is therefore, surely enough not guilty of contempt.

       As judicial experience demonstrates, rival versions qua one or the other clauses of a consent decree, or for that matter, a decree in invite are not unknown. But that is a far cry from contempt. Court will not permit execution directly or indirectly, of a consent decree (which contains no undertaking) through the medium of a contempt proceeding. Such short circuiting of the normal process cannot be encouraged Contempt jurisdiction is not to be invoked as an easy escape from tile normal judicial route to justice. Nor is it a sub situte or an alternative there to. Well settled also is the field and spectrum of civil contempt wilful disobedience to judgment, decree etc., or wilful breach of undertaking to Court. As already noted, there is here no undertaking at all not is there any wilful disregard or disobedience of the consent decree. Willfulness is of the essence, a sine qua non for a valid charge of civil contempt.

JUDGMENT - S.C. PRATAP, J.:---This is plaintiff's motion for action in contempt against defendants Nos. 5 to 23 as also the respondents who are the director of defendant No. 5 Company.

2. Facts and circumstances, briefly narrated, are as follows :

At Wodehouse Road, Colaba, there was situated an immoveable property "Marble Hall" owned by the plaintiff and occupied by his tenant's. The plaintiff instituted suits for possession inter alia under section 13(1)(hh) of the Rent Act against his tenants on the ground that he desires to demolish the said property and put up in its place a new building. The plaintiff undertook to give to his tenants premises in the new construction to be put up in place of the old building 'Marble Hall'. On 18th November, 1978, the plaintiff entered into an agreement of sale of his aforesaid property with defendant No. 4, a partnership firm with defendant Nos. 1 to 3 as partner's, thereof, for a consideration of rupees twenty five lacs and subjects to the rights of the tenants. The purchasers commenced construction of a new building `President House'. They also entered into agreement with defendant Nos. 5 to 23 who agreed to purchase flats in the new building. However, in or about 1982 the construction stopped with the builders setting up difficulties in the way of completing the same. Ultimately, in March 1983, an agreement was entered into between the flat owners and the builders under which the flat owners agreed to bring in additional funds required to complete the building. Even so, however, the construction could not be completed because in the meanwhile, the plaintiff terminated the 1978 agreement and filed in this Court Suit No. 595 of 1983 inter alia for liquidated damages, interests and other financial claims.

3. The flat owners got themselves impleaded as party defendant Nos. 5 to 23 to this suit. After protracted negotiations, consent terms were arrived at and decree in accordance there with was passed. Pursuant thereto the flat owners became the absolute owners of the suit property; they were put in possession thereof accordingly; the consent decree was to operate as conveyance; the rights of the former tenants were duly protected; the plaintiff handed over to defendant No. 5 an behalf of defendant Nos. 6 to 23 all the original title deeds, documents and writings relating to the suit property; the plaintiff was paid the full balance of the construction of rupees twenty five lacs; in addition he was paid by defendant Nos. 6 to 23 rupees six lacs as damages; these defendants also made a further payment of rupees seven lacs to defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 4. In due course, the building `President House' was completed. Completion as also occupation certificates (save and except the second floor) were also obtained. However, just when at long last after several years of waiting and litigation, defendant Nos. 5 to 23 were about to enter into actual possession, the plaintiff took out this motion for contempt.

4. (a) In support, Mr. Kapadia for the plaintiff relied at the outset on clause 8 of the consent decree under which the plaintiff is to be provided the second floor and six garages in the President House as also three flats (one of 700 square feet and two of 500 square feet each) in a similar building or in President House. These, however, as submitted by Mr. Rafiq Dada for the defendants, were to be given to the plaintiff (vide Clause 10 of the consent decree) in discharge of the obligation under term No. 2 of the agreement in the suit viz., to provide accommodation to the former tenants for which the defendants have all along been ready and willing.

(b) Mr. Kapadia further contended that if defendant Nos. 5 to 23 occupy their own respective flats without complying with Clause 8, they would be guilty of contempt. This is emphatically denied by Mr. Rafiq Dada for the defendant. He submitted that the consent decree categorically declares these defendants to be the full and absolute owners of the prope














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