JUDGMENT - V.A. MOHTA, J.:---This application filed on 8th September, 1987 by M/s. Golchha Advertising Agency, Nagpur, for initiating proceedings of contempt against the respondents under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971(the Act) for the alleged disobedience on 4th August, 1987 of the ad interim orders passed in Writ Petition No. 1443 of 1981 and Writ Petition 816 of 1982, was placed before us for admission on 13th January, 1989.

2. On 10th January, 1987 this Court had issued notice before admission to ascertain facts and to show cause as to why proceedings of contempt should not be initiated. The respondents-the State of Maharashtra and the executive Engineer-filled submissions explaining the factual back ground and stoutly denying the allegations of disobedience of any order passed by this Court. They opposed initiation of proceedings of contempt on merits as well as on the ground of limitation. The objection on the ground of limitation is based on section 20th of the Act. Considering the plain language used therein and crystalized legal positions regarding basic approach to the law relating to contempt of Courts, it seems to us that the said objection has to be up held. Section 20 reads thus:

"No Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed."

3. It is of significance to note that a fixed period of 12 months for initiating proceedings has been newly introduced in the Act. No period was fixed in the old 1952 Act which has been repealed following the Sanyal Committee report made in 1963 accompanied by a draft Bill Which was altered on the basis of suggestions made by a Parliamentary Committee headed by Shri M.P. Bhargav in 1970. It has always been recognised that delay defeats the very object of law of contempt of Court. Previously Courts were empowered to decide in each case whether there was undue delay or not. Not that uncertainty has come to an end. Outer limit is statutorily fixed.

4. Proceedings of contempt are summary in nature. They are sui generis and can be initiated by the Court even suo motu Court has ample discretion not to initiate the proceedings even though there is contempt-technically so-called. The matter of contempt is entirely between the Court and the contemner. Third party's role, if any, is to bring the matter to the notice of the Court. The following observations in the case of (Barada Kanta Mishra v. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Mishra)1, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2255 are to the point:

"The mention or reference is only for the purpose of drawing the attention of the Court to the contempt alleged to have been committed and it is for the Court, on a consideration of such motion or references, to decide in exercise of its discretion, whether or not to initiate a proceeding for contempt. The Court may decline to take cognizance and to initiate a proceeding for contempt either because in its opinion no contempt prima facie appears to have been committed or because, even if there is prima facie contempt, it is not a fit case in which action should be taken against the alleged contemner. The exercise of contempt jurisdiction being a matter entirely between the Court and the alleged contemner, the Court, though moved by motion or reference may in its discretion, decline to exercise its jurisdiction for contempt. It is only when the Court decides to take action and initiates a proceedings for contempt that it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of proceeding for contempt, whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. That is why the terminus a quo for the period of limitation provided in section 20 is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court."

5. After the contempt is alleged to have been committed, the first stage is of making a reference or of moti

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