IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
[Nagpur Bench]
V.A. Mohta D.J. Moharir, JJ.
Anant s/o. Narayan Naik... Appellant.
Versus
State of Maharashtra... Respondent.
Letter Patent Appeal No. 69 of 1989, decided on 15-9-1989.
Advocates appeared :
S.R. Deshpande, for the appellant.
B.P. Jaiswal, Special Counsel and V.V. Naik, Asst., Government Pleader, for the respondent.
Section 30-See Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings)
Act, 1961, Section 44-B.
BAR COUNCILS ACT, 1926 Section 14 (1) (b).
See Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holding.) Act, 1961, Section 44- B.
Section 44-B-Advocates Act (25 of 1961) Section 30-Bar Councils Act (38 of 1926)-Section 14 (1) (b)-Constitution of India Articles 14 and 31-B -Whether Section 44-B of Act 1961 void for want of Legislative competence-Whether Section 44-B repugnant to Section 30 of Advocates Act 1961 and Section 14 (1) (b) of Bar Councils Act.
Section 44-B of the Ceiling Act cannot be viewed in isolation and will have to be viewed in the context of the letter and spirit of the Ceiling Act as a whole for the purposes of determining the correct legislative head under which it falls. The purpose and scheme of the Ceiling Act is too well known to be elaborately stated and discussed. The said Act in pith and substance relates to land which comes under Entry 18 in List II read with Entry 65 in List 11 and the Advocates Act or the Bar Councils Act in pith and substance relates to Entries 77 and 78 in List I.
Having regard to all these factors it is extremely difficult to locate any want of legislative competence of the State legislature in enacting Section 44-B of the Ceiling Act. Section 30 of the Advocates Act is not in operation and Section 14 (1) (b) of the Bar Councils Act does not occupy the field of entitlement to practice in Courts other that High Court, Tribunals etc. referred to in Section 14 (1) (b) which can be regulated by other laws including a State law. Therefore, Section 44-B is not repugnant to Section 14 (I) (b) which itself permit legislation in this regard.
2. In our view, the point has to be answered in the negative. Here are our reasons:
In the first place, the validity of the Ceiling Act has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the cases of (Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. The State of Maharashtra)1, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 915 and (Waman Rao v. Union of India)2, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 271. Initially, a Division Bench of this Court had upheld the validity of the said Act including section 44-B in the case of (Vithalrao v. The State of Maharashtra)3, A.I.R. 1977 Bom. 99 and this judgment was affirmed in the former Supreme Court case. These decisions are not merely binding precedents but are "law declared" under Article 141 of the Constitution it is impermissible for us to go behind those conditions. It is true that the validity has not been examined on the touch stone of the points raised before us, but it is nobody's case that those points were not available then. As held in the case of (T. Govindraja Mudaliar v. State of Tamil Nadu)4, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 974 binding effect of the conclusion about the validity of the provisions is not taken away merely because certain aspects based on Article 19(1)(f) were not considered therein. It is further held that the points though available were not raised then and hence cannot be raised in subsequent petitions even before the Supreme Court. In the case of (Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of U.P. and others)5, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1762 it is held that every new discovery or argumentative novelty cannot undo or compel reconsideration of binding precedent. Moreover, High Court cannot ignore a Supreme Court decision on the ground that certain legal provisions were not brought to its notice. See (Ballabhdas Mathurdas Lakhani v. Municipal Committee, Malkapur)6, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1002. Inspiration behind all these decisions are well known legal principles---stare decicis, judicial discipline and certainly of law.
3. The Supreme Court in the case of (Lingappa Pachanna v. State of Maharashtra)7, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 389 had occasion to examine the validity of a similar prohibition contained in section 9-A of the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1975, on the very same grounds raised before us. That attack on the validity was repelled holding that the said provision was not repugnant to section 30 of the Advocates Act dealing with Advocates absolute right of practice before all the Courts and Tribunals because it has not been brought into force so far. It was not repugnant to section 14(1)(b) of the Bar Councils Act because the right to practice before Court (other than High Court), Tribunals etc., contained therein is itself subject to any other law for the time belong in force. The said provision was held to be valid. The ration of that decision will apply on all fours to section 44-B of the Ceiling Act since the two provisions in the State Law are in pari materia. It seemed that controversy which arose directly was set at rest. But it was not to be so.
4. Controversy was sparked off once again in the case of (H.S. Srinivasa Raghavachar v. State of Karnataka)8, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1516, in which section 48-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1962 containing similar prohibition against appearance of Legal Practitioner was held to be (i) void for want of legislative competence of the State legislature in view of Entries 77 and 78 of List 1 in 7th Schedule of the Constitution of India and (ii) repugnant to section 30 of the A
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