The requirement of the landlord for providing for a person other than himself amounts to his need would depend upon facts and circumstances of each particular case and it would not be possible or appropriate to lay down any hard and fast rule. Each case will be required to be decided on the peculiar facts and circumstances prevailing in that case.

Headnote:
RENT ACT - SECTION 13(1)(G) - BOMBAY RENT ACT - REQUIREMENT OF PREMISES - REASONABLE AND BONA FIDE - SECTION 25 - BAR TO PASSING OF DECREE - COMPARATIVE HARDSHIP - ALTERNATE ACCOMMODATION - CONDITION PRECEDENT TO GRANT OF DECREE - WRIT PETITION - JURISDICTION UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION.
Fact of the Case:

The plaintiff, a mechanical engineer, filed a suit for possession of the suit premises under section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rent Act, claiming that he required the premises for his own use and occupation. The defendant, a tenant, resisted the suit, denying the plaintiff's requirement and contending that the claim was barred by section 25 of the Act, which prohibits the conversion of residential premises into non-residential premises. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove his bona fide requirement and that the claim was prohibited by section 25. On appeal, the appellate court remitted the matter to the trial court for recording additional evidence on three points, namely, whether the defendant was in occupation of the suit premises as a tenant and using the same for his residence on the date of coming into operation of the Rent Act, what could be the effect on the appellant's claim of requirement after the marriage of his daughter Geeta on 29th May, 1985 (during the pendency of the suit) since the claim of requirement is based on Geeta's requirement; and, on the question of offers of alternative accommodation that have been made by the appellant to the respondent vide the application that was made in this Court. The trial court recorded additional evidence and remitted the same to the appellate court. On receipt of the additional evidence, the appellate court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court in so far as the claim of the plaintiff for possession was dismissed and decreed the suit with no order as to costs. By the very same judgment the plaintiff was ordered to provide alternative accommodation to the defendant as a condition precedent, to being entitled to obtain possession of the suit premises. The defendant filed a writ petition challenging the decree for possession, and the plaintiff filed a writ petition challenging the condition imposed of providing alternate accommodation.
Finding of the Court:

The court held that the plaintiff had proved that he required the suit premises reasonably and bona fide for his own use and occupation, as he desired to provide for his daughter, Geeta, who, even after her marriage, continued to have a blood relationship with him and for whom he had moral obligations. The court further held that the requirement of section 25 of the Rent Act would not be a bar to the passing of a decree for possession, as the plaintiff intended to demolish the suit premises and construct a commercial complex, the substantial portion of which would be used for running a lodge, and hence, the dominant user of the newly constructed premises would continue to be for the residence of lodgers. The court also held that the appellate court had erred in passing a conditional decree for possession, as there was no provision in the Rent Act for passing such a decree, and that the plaintiff's suit for possession under section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rent Act was decreed with costs throughout.
Issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff had proved that he required the suit premises reasonably and bona fide for his own use and occupation? 2. Whether the requirement of section 25 of the Rent Act would be a bar to the passing of a decree for possession? 3. Whether the appellate court had erred in passing a conditional decree for possession?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The requirement of the landlord for providing for a person other than himself amounts to his need would depend upon facts and circumstances of each particular case and it would not be possible or appropriate to lay down any hard and fast rule. Each case will be required to be decided on the peculiar facts and circumstances prevailing in that case. 2. The requirement which runs in the teeth of section 25 and which, if established, may throw the landlord open to the risk of a prosecution cannot be called reasonable. Whether the requirement of the landlord is reasonable or not is to be judged from all the facts and circumstances of the case and a highly relevant circumstance bearing on the reasonableness of the landlord's requirement is that the purpose for which the possession is sought is a purpose for which the premises cannot be used save on pain of penal consequences. 3. Under the impugned order, the plaintiff has been ordered to provide alternate accommodation of specified dimensions and on specified rent and in specified areas. The plaintiff has been awarded a decree for possession on the condition of his providing alternate accommodation. On his failure to provide alternate accommodation within the stipulated time his suit for possession has been directed to stand automatically dismissed. In my judgment, the learned judges of the Appeal Court have clearly erred in passing such a conditional decree. This is not contemplated by any of the provisions of the Rent Act.
Final Decision: Writ Petition No. 293 of 1989 filed by the defendant is dismissed and the rule is discharged, whereas Writ Petition No. 4257 of 1989 filed by the plaintiff is allowed and the rule is made absolute and the plaintiff's suit for possession under section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rent Act is decreed with costs through out.

JUDGMENT - ASHOK AGARWAL, J.:---Writ Petition No. 293 of 1989 has been filed by the original defendant tenant seeking to challenge the judgment and decree dated 24th November, 1988 passed by the Appellate Court of the Small Causes, Bombay in Appeal No. 89 of 1986. By the impugned decree the plaintiff's suit for possession under section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rent Act has been decreed on certain conditions.

2. Writ Petition No. 4257 of 1989 is by the original plaintiff seeking to challenge the very judgment and decree which is the subject matter of Writ Petition No. 293 of 2989. By this petition the plaintiff seeks to impugn the order directing him to provide alternate accommodation to the defendant as a condition precedent to the grant of a decree for possession in his favour.

3. The suit premises consist of residential premises admeasuring about 500 sq. ft. Situate on plot No. 12.A, First Road, Chembur, Bombay. 400 071. The said property was purchased by the plaintiff on 22nd May, 1972. On 25th January, 1982 the plaintiff by notice called upon the defendant to had over the possession of the suit premises as he bonafide defendant required the same. In the said notice the plaintiff offered alternate accommodation to the defendant. Since the defendant did not favourably respond, the plaintiff, on 11th November, 1983 filed the instant suit being R.A.E. Suit No. 1982. It was the case of the plaintiff that the suit premises were located a plot which has been earmarked in the city development plan for commercial purposes. According to him, his wife was already engaged in commercial activity in a property close to the suit premises. He was, therefore, interested for setting up an ancillary business supplimental to the business for his daughter who had the aptitude an the necessary finances and facilities for such business. The plaintiff desired to help her set-up the business. He, therefore genuinely, reasonably and bonafide needed the suit premises.

4. On 1st March, 1983 the plaintiff get the development plans sanctioned by Municipal Corporation. By written statement dated 21st July, 1983 the defendant resisted the suit denying all the facts set up for claiming possession.

5. After the evidence led on behalf of the plaintiff was partly recorded, the plaintiff by amendment to the plaint gave better particulars regarding is bonafide requirement. By the amendment he pleaded that his requirements of the suit premises was the purpose of enabling his daughter Miss Geeta Iyer to settle in life and for the purpose of enabling her to run and/or conduct a lodging house therein, as his said daughter is fully conversant and experienced in the field of conducting a lodging house. Her mother has been running such a lodging house and the daughter has been helping the mother throughout. By the said amendment the plaintiff further contended that although the suit plot has been earmarked for commercial purpose, the running and/or conducting of a lodging house is not for use for non-residential purpose and the same is thus not and cannot be prohibited under the provision of section 25 of the said Act. During the evidence the plaintiff made out case that he had no male issue but had only two daughters. Geeta was the elder daughter was aged about 21 and had passed her B. Sc. His younger daughter was studying in first year B. Com. The elder daughter Geeta did not have any desire to get married and he was, therefore, interested in settling her in life. However, the said Geeta, during the pendency of suit, on 29th May, 1985 got married to the one Sivaswamy Ramakrishnan who is an Additional Director of a company "Transport Shipping Services (India) Private Limited" which has its office premises in Maker Chamber No. 32 Nariman Point. The said Sivaswamy Ramakrishnan resides in a flat in Thakur Nivas, Jamshedji Tata Road, Bombay 400 020. Thus, apparently Geeta appears to have got married in a reasonably well off family.

6. By the judgment and decree dated 6th N

Click Here to Read the rest of this document