JUDGMENT - MOHTA V.A., J.:—Section 44-B of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (the Ceiling Act) prohibits appearance of a legal practitioner on behalf of any party to proceedings under the said Act before various authorities specified therein. The only point raised in this Letters Patent Appeal is whether that section is (i) void for want of legislative competence and (ii) unenforceable being repugnant to section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and section 14(1)(b) of the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1976.

2. In our view, the point has to be answered in the negative. Here are our reasons:

In the first place, the validity of the Ceiling Act has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the cases of (i) (Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. The State of Maharashtra)1, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 915 and (ii) (Waman Rao v. Union of India)2, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 271. Initially, a Division Bench of this Court had upheld the validity of the said Act including section 44-B in the case of (Vithalrao v. The State of Maharashtra)3, A.I.R. 1977 Bom. 99 and this judgment was affirmed in the former Supreme Court case. Those decisions are not merely binding precedents but are “law declared” under Article 141 of the Constitution. It is impermissible for us to go behind those conclusions. It is true that the validity has not been examined on the touch-stone of the points raised before us, but it is nobody's case that those points were not available then. As held in the case of (T. Govindaraja Mudaliar v. State of Tamil Nadu)4, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 974 binding effect of the conclusion about the validity of the provisions is not taken away merely because certain aspects based on Article 19(1)(f) were not considered therein. It is further held that the points though available were not raised then and hence cannot be raised in subsequent petitions even before the Supreme Court. In the case of (Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of U.P. others)5, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1762 it is held that every new discovery or argumentative novelty cannot undo or compel reconsideration of a binding precedent. Moreover, High Court cannot ignore a Supreme Court decision on the ground that certain legal provisions were not brought to its notice. See (Ballabhdas Mathuradas Lakhani v. Municipal Committee, Malkapur)6, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1002. Inspirations behind all these decisions are well known legal principles—stare decisions, judicial discipline and certainty of law.

3. The Supreme Court in the case of (Lingappa Pachanna v. State of Maharashtra)7, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 389 had occasion to examine the validity of a similar prohibition contained in section 9-A of the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1975, on the very same grounds raised before us. That attack on the validity was repelled holding that the said provision was not repugnant to section 30 of the Advocates Act dealing with Advocates' absolute right of practice before all the courts and Tribunals, because it has not been brought into force so far. It was not repugnant to section 14(1)(b) of the Bar Councils Act because the right to practise before courts (other than High Court). Tribunals etc. contained therein is itself subject to any other law for the time being in force. The said provision was held to be valid. The ratio of that decision will apply on all fours to section 44-B of the Ceiling Act since the two provisions in the State Laws are in pari materia. It seemed that controversy which arose directly was set at rest. But it was not to be so.

4. Controversy was sparked off once again in the case of (H.S. Srinivasa Raghavachar v. State of Karnataka)8, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1518 in which section 48-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1962, containing similar prohibition against appearance of Legal Practitioners was held to be (i) void for want of legislative competence of the State legislature in view of Entries 77 and 78 of List I in 7th Schedule of the Constitution of India and (ii) repugnant to sectio

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