JUDGMENT - R.A. JAHAGIRDAR, J.:---This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the order dated 24th of July, 1981 passed by the Industrial Court, Thane Bench, in Complaint (ULP) No. 162 of 1980, which had been preferred by the petitioner-union before the Industrial Court. That complaint was filed on 24th of September, 1980, alleging certain acts of unfair labour practices on the part of respondent No. 1, hereinafter referred to as "the company". Those unfair labour practices consisted of, among other things, the dismissal of the employees of the company, who were members of the petitioner-union, on the ground, among others, that they were members of the petitioner-union. The complaint which was filed on 24th of September, 1980 was found to have been filed tow days beyond the period of limitation prescribed for filing such complaints under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, hereinafter referred to as "the PULP Act". The period of limitation is ninety days as per section 28 of the PULP Act. Subsequently, on being informed that there was a delay in the filing of the complaint, the petitioner-union filed an application on 8th of December, 1980 for condonation of delay. In this application, it has been mentioned that the individual employees had approached the company through individual letters and had also approached the Government Labour Officer. It was only when those efforts were unsuccessful that they approached the petitioner-union to file the complaint before the Industrial Court.

2. On the facts mentioned in the complaint, the petitioner-union alleged unfair labour practices under Items Nos. 3 and 4(a) of Schedule II and Items Nos. 1(a), (b), (f) and 2 and 5 of Schedule IV of the PULP Act. Under the provisions of the PULP Act, the items covered by Schedule IV of the Act are to be investigated into by the Labour Court, whereas the matters falling under items Nos. 3 and 4(a) of Schedule II of the PULP Act are to be investigated into and decided by the Industrial Court.

3. The Industrial Court rejected the application on tow grounds. In the first place, it held that the complaint related to the items in Schedule IV of PULP Act and it was the Labour Court alone which would have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon disputes in respect of the items in Schedule IV of the PULP Act. Secondly, the Industrial Court held that an application for condonation of delay ought to have been made along with the main application alleging unfair labour practices. Since this was not done, the main application was itself liable to be dismissed. On this ground, it held that the application was barred by limitation. It is on these two grounds that the Industrial Court rejected the application, by the aforesaid order which is the subject-matter of challenge in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

4. Mr. Puri, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, had no difficulty in showing that the view of the Industrial Court that an application for condonation of delay in the filing of the main application ought to be made along with the main application is erroneous. Fortunately for Mr. Puri, the point is fully covered by the judgment of this Court in (Shankar Mahadeo Charpe v. S.S.H. Qazi)1, (1985)II Labour Law Journal 94. Interpreting the relevant provisions, namely section 28 of the PULP Act and Regulations 5, 5-A and 101 of the Industrial Court Regulations, Dhabe, J. held that the provision relating to the filing of a separate application for condonation of delay along with the main application was directory and not mandatory. He held that there cannot be automatic dismissal of the complaint for failure to comply with the requirement of filing an application for condonation of delay along with the complaint.

5. While interpreting an analogous provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court in (M. Das Gupta v. Prakash K. Shah)2

Click Here to Read the rest of this document