JUDGMENT - Halbe A.A., J.:—The important question raised is about the scope of section 112 of the Evidence Act, which provides for the presumption about the birth of a child during the marriage.

2. The said provision clearly reads that —

“If a person is born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man or within 280 days after dissolution of their marriage, the mother remaining unmarried, it would be conclusive to hold that the said person is legitimate son of both these spouses.”

The only exception that has been carved out in that section is that this presumption which emerges from section 112 of the Evidence Act can only be set at naught if it could be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time, the child could have been begotten. This question really dominates the consideration of maintenance payable to the petitioner and her minor daughter, who have been branded as petitioner No.1 being a woman of easy virtue and the petitioner No. 2 being not the legitimate child of the respondent No. 1, whose marriage with the petitioner No. 1 is subsisting even at present in this case.

3. The learned Advocate for the petitioners has vehemently contended that the approach of both the courts below lacks indepth study of the facts and points to the easy way of coming to the conclusion that the petitioner No. 2 is not legitimate child and the petitioner No. 1 being unchaste, deserves to be set aside and that the respondent No. 1 should be directed to pay the maintenance to both these petitioners i.e. mother and child.

4. As against this, the learned Advocate for the respondent No.1 has contended that both the Courts below have detailed various facts which go to show conclusively that the respondent No.1-husband had no access to the petitioner No.1 during the period during which petitioner No. 2 was begotten and accordingly, both the Courts have held in his favour. Whereas the trial Court was inclined to grant maintenance of Rs. 100/- to the petitioner mother inter alia holding that one act of unchastity need not deprive the petitioner No. 1 from maintenance, the Appellate Court took the serious view that once a woman begets an illegitimate child, her loyalty to the husband and to the relationship of wedlock are adversely affected and hence the mother was not entitled to the maintenance. Such is the verdict of the revisional Court.

5. In order to appreciate these diverse arguments which, as indicated, involve the serious consideration of the scope of section 112 of the Evidence Act, it is imperative to traverse through the facts which have been canvassed on behalf of the petitioners and the respondent-husband.

6. Before probing into those facts, the learned Advocate for the respondent has alleged that the scope of this Court in writ petition is extremely limited and since both the Courts have held in favour traverse through either the judgments or the evidence recorded on behalf of the respondent-husband. The learned Advocate for the petitioner, on the other hand, has contended that even if the evidence is taken into consideration as it is, it does not at all show that the petitioner No. 1 had relations with one paramour and she gave birth out of that relationship to the petitioner No. 2. I do find substance in this argument because both the courts below have taken a simplistic view of arithmetical calculation of the period of conception and period of delivery. They have dwelt upon the period of 1982 and 1983. The courts have observed that on the evidence led on behalf of the petitioners, it is clearly indicated that the petitioner-mother or wife was not in the company of the respondent No.1 during January to September, 1983 and at best, they could be in company during the similar period of 1982. But when the evidence of the petitioner's witnesses .is taken into consideration, it clearly shows that the year to which they want to make reference is the year 1983 and not 1982. Their ev

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