Sections 33 of the NDPS Act, 360 of the CrPC, and 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act are not applicable at the interim stage of bail.

JUDGMENT - Dudhat M.L., J.:—This Criminal Application is filed against the order dated 28th July, 1992 passed by the Special Judge for Greater Bombay in N.D.P.S. Bail Application No. 388 of 1992 in R.A. No. 113 of 1992.

2. It is the case of the respondent that the petitioner together with two more persons when apprehended during the course of raid on 25-6-1992. were found in possession of 500 grams of Brown-sugar. The present petitioner who was at the time of the offence 16½ years of age filed application for grant of bail before the Special Judge for Greater Bombay. It was contended on behalf of the present petitioner that the petitioner being minor Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 is applicable and, therefore, is entitled for the grant of bail. However, the trial Court after taking into consideration the School Leaving Certificate came to the conclusion that on the date of the offence i.e. on 25-6-1992 the petitioner was of 161/2 years of age while under section 2(h) which defined Juvenile in relation to a boy who has not attained the age of 16 years, in view of this the trial Court came to the conclusion that Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 is not applicable to the present petitioner. This particular finding given by the trial Court is not assailed by Mr. Lalla, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the present petitioner. However, Mr. Lalla, strongly contended that since the petitioner was 16½ years of age, the petitioner is still entitled to the bail application under N.D.P.S. Act, more particularly taking into consideration section 33 of the N.D.P.S. Act. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that section 33 which is as under:—

“Section 33 :­

Application of section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958:—

Nothing contained in section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973 (2 of 1974) or in the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958) shall apply to a person convicted of an offence under this Act unless such person is under eighteen years of age or that the offence for which such person is convicted is punishable under section 26 or section 27.'

3. After going through the aforesaid provision section 33, it is clear that the provision of section 360 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 and section 6 of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 are applicable to the persons convicted of an offence under N.D.P.S. Act and this being the position it was contended that the petitioner will be entitled to the grant of bail even within the meaning of section 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act. It is an admitted position that for the grant of bail under N.D.P.S. Act relevant provision is section 37 which is as under:—

Section 37 : Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable.—

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)—

(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable;

(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years or more under this Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless—

(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to opposes the application for such release, and

(ii) where the Public Prosecutor oppose the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in Clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973(2 of 1974), or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.

4. In the present case what one has to see is as to whether within the meaning of Clause (2) of sub-clause (b) of section 37, the petitioner being 16½ years of age, entitled to the grant of bail only on the ground being the minor. As per the aforesaid provision the bail can be granted if this Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believin

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