1994 Supreme(Bom) 124
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
M.F. Saldanha, J.
Pune Municipal Corporation by its Commissioner.... Appellant.
Versus
Nanasaheb Nagoji Bhosale.... Respondent.
Second Appeal No. 60 of 1982, decided on 11-3-1994.
Advocates appeared :
R.G. Ketkar, for the appellant-orginal defendant.
Headnote:BOMBAY PROVINCIAL MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACT, 1949 Section 2 (5)-Definition of building-Wood made or metal made funcing or compound wall falls under.
JUDGMENT - M.F. SALDANHA, J.:---With the uncontrolled growth of unauthorised structures erupting in the cities, the time has come now for the courts to specify in no uncertain terms as to what is the correct ambit and scope of the powers vested in the Corporations to order demolition or to themselves pull down or remove the structures. The traditional argument that has been advanced to the effect that it is a basic requirement of law that the procedure of showing cause or hearing and passing of an order must precede the demolition has unfortunately resulted in a time-consuming and laborious exercise in every case, inevitably followed by litigation, with the result that for decades together the structures continue in existence without any legal justification whatsoever. In the meanwhile, ration-cards are obtained, licences are issued, names are put down on the voters lists and all sorts of evidence establishing long-term user comes forth in support of the plea that it would be harsh and improper to order demolition. The net result, however, is that the law is subverted, slumlords have a heyday and building activities continue in flagrant breach of all established norms of planning and rules and regulations. It is, therefore, very essential that the law be correctly applied and, more importantly, that the courts desist from mechanically interfering in all except the genuine cases. It has unfortunately become the order of the day, particularly in the trial courts, for suits to be filed by the basket-load and injunction orders passed against the Municipal Corporations either in collusion with the representatives of the Corporations, both in the Court and outside, or, more importantly, because of the case having gone by default, which is another subtle method of collusion. Once such an order is passed, either the proceedings remain pending for abnormally long period of time with not even an application made to vacate the injunction order. In several other cases an even cleverer mode is employed where by the plaintiff withdraws the suit an files another one. The law requires that such proceedings cannot be instituted without statutory notice, but this provision is observed more in the breach. It is in these circumstances that the point involved in the present Second Appeal is one of crucial importance and requires to be decided and implemented forcefully. First, the facts.
2. The plaintiff, who is a motor mechanic, is the owner of house property C.T.S. No. 481, situated at Rasta Peth, Pune. He constructed what may be termed as a fencing or a compound partition measuring about 5 x 5 in height which consists of wooden pillars and tin-sheets around the open space admeasuring 60 x 60 in the said property. The obvious intention of enclosing this area was in order to cordon off and convert it into a shed, which could be thereafter used for two garages. Since no permission of the Corporation had been obtained, a demolition notice No. 2604 dated 2-1-1976 was served on him. The plaintiff challenged the notice by filing Civil Suit No. 22 of 1976 before the Court of the Fourth Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Pune, and prayed for a perpetual injunction against the defendants restraining them from proceeding with the contemplated action. Among other things, the plaintiff contended that the structure had been put up in the year 1948, prior to the coming into operation of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as "the B.P.M.C. Act") and that, consequently, the notice in question was liable to be quashed. It was the case of the Corporation that the suit was not maintainable, in the first instance, as a statutory notice under section 487 of the B.P.M.C. Act was necessary which had not been served, but, more importantly, that the action of demolition was fully justified in so far as the requisite permission had not been obtained from the Corporation before erecting the structure in question. The learned tr
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