JUDGMENT - BHATTACHARJEE A.M., C.J.:— In opposing this appeal against the orders of the learned Single Judge, appointing ad interim Receiver and also granting ad interim injunction, the learned Advocate General, appearing for the 1st respondent, Central Bank of India, has firstly urged that the appeal is not maintainable. The learned Advocate General contended that the orders being ad interim and subject to further and final hearing, do not have any finality in order to become a “judgment” within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and are not accordingly appealable under that Clause. The learned Advocate General has mainly relied on the well-known decision of the Supreme Court in (Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben)1, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1786 and relying mainly on the observations contained in paragraphs 119, 123 and other paragraphs, the learned Advocate General has urged that an interlocutory order in order to be appealable as a judgement within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must contain the traits, trappings and quality of finality. We need not, and therefore, we do not, decide the question as to whether the impugned orders, not being final interlocutory orders, are appealable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shah Babulal Khimji (supra) is also a clear authority for the proposition that if an appeal is maintainable under the provisions of Order XLIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the provisions of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are not required to be invoked for the maintenance of such appeal. The impugned orders in question, whether ad interim or interim or final, are nevertheless orders passed under the provisions of Order XL, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. And if that is so, then we have the binding authority of the Federal Court in (Kutoor Vengayil Rayarappan Nayanar v. Madhavi Amma)2, A.I.R. 1950 F.C. 140 at 141, that “whenever an order can be brought within the purview of Order XL, Rule 1, it at once becomes appealable under the provisions of Order XLIII, Rule 1(s)” of the Code of Civil Procedure . The contention of the learned Advocate General on this score, therefore, must be rejected and we accordingly proceed to consider the legality and the propriety of the impugned orders.

2. The suit giving rise to this appeal from the impugned orders passed therein, has been branded by the learned Single Judge as “a usual bank suit”. No citation is obviously necessary for the proposition that appointment of a Receiver is an extraordinary and a harsh remedy provided by law and not just a usual or an ordinary one. We would have, therefore, to consider as to whether there were good grounds to justify the appointment of a Receiver in this case in a “usual” or “ordinary” suit.

3. The plaintiff bank no doubt claims a huge amount of money in this suit. The suit is not one by a simple contract creditor having no specified charge or right to be paid out of a specified fund or property, in which case the Court may not ordinarily appoint a Receiver. That is the view of this Court in (Harkisondas Nanjibhai v. Chaturbhuj)3, A.I.R. 1947 Bombay 437, and also of the Calcutta High Court in (Hemendra Nath v. Prokash Chandra)4, A.I.R. 1932 Cal. 189. The suit is one where the plaintiff bank seeks to enforce the hypothecation and the securities in its favour. In such a suit, a Receiver may be appointed under the law but is not to be appointed unless it appears that the sale proceeds of the property secured or other securities are insufficient to satisfy the claim.

4. The principles relating to appointment of Receiver are well-settled for more than a century and we respectfully agree with the principles laid down in the Madras decision in (T. Krishnaswamy Chetty v. C. Thangavelu Chetty)5, A.I.R. 1955 Madras 430, where Ramaswami, J. (as His Lordship then was) has laid down the five principles or requirements which have been described by His Lordship as 'panch sadachar'

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