JUDGMENT - BHATTACHARJEE A.M., C.J.:—This is an appeal against an order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court dismissing an appeal under section 82 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, in limine. The order assailed is not a speaking order as the learned Judge has dismissed the appeal by a one-word order to the effect 'dismissed'.

2. In (Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India)1, 1966 M.P.L.J. 256(S.C.), Subba Rao, J., in his separate but concurring judgment, while pointing out that the orders of Appellate Court should contain the reasons therefor, has nevertheless relieved such courts from making a speaking order when they dismiss an appeal or a revision in limine. It has been observed therein that in the latter cases, a non-speaking order may be justified because the appeal or revisional Court in that case must be presumed to have agreed with the reasoned judgment of the subordinate Court and to have found no legally permissible grounds to interfere therewith. These observations in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. (supra) have been referred to with approval in the Five-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in (S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India)2, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1984 at 1992, and, therefore, dismissal of an appeal or a revision in limine by a non-speaking and unreasoned order cannot be assailed on that ground alone.

3. Under section 82(2) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 ('Act', for short) “an appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order of an Employees' Insurance Court if it involves a substantial question of law. In answer to our question as to what substantial 'question of law' was involved in the appeal before the learned Single Judge, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants has not been able to formulate any question of law, far less any substantial question of law, to be involved in the appeal. All that the learned Counsel has urged is that on the evidence on record, the two concerns were not to be treated as one. But that is a matter to be decided on appreciation of evidence and other materials on record, and even if we assume arguendo that the Employees' Insurance Court was wrong in its appreciation of the evidence on record, that cannot amount to any question of law, and far less a substantial question of law, to sustain an appeal under section 82(2) of the Act.

4. Reference in this connection may be made to a unanimous Five-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in (Sir Chunilal V. Mehta v. The Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co Ltd.)3, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1314 at 1318, where, construing the expression “substantial question of law” in Article 133 of the Constitution, as it stood then, it was held as under :—

“The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general cept and deal with a case which principles to be applied in determining the question are well-settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd, the question would not be a substantial question of law.”

These observations in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta, (supra) have again been referred to and relied on in a unanimous Three-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in (Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India)4, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 798 at 812, where it has been observed as under :—

“What should be the test for determining whether a question of law raised in an appeal is substantial has been laid down by this Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta Sons Ltd. v. The Century Spinning and Manufacturin

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