The amended Regulation 7 was applicable to the case as it was in force at the time the extensions were granted, there was no discrimination as the Respondents were taking steps to recover the additional premium from other parties who had been charged a lower premium, and the doctrine of estoppel could not be invoked against the Respondents as the demand and recovery of the premium was in accordance with the law.

Headnote:
LANDLORD AND TENANT - LEASE - EXTENSION OF TIME - PREMIUM - INTERPRETATION OF CLAUSE - APPLICABILITY OF AMENDED REGULATION - DISCRIMINATION - ESTOPPEL - COMPLETION OF BUILDING - DELAY - VALIDITY OF DEMAND AND RECOVERY OF PREMIUM.
Fact of the Case:

The Petitioners, who were granted a lease to construct a building on a plot of land in New Bombay, challenged the validity and legality of the Respondents' demand and recovery of a sum of Rs. 9,42,000/- as premium for the extension of time granted for the completion of the building. The Petitioners contended that the premium payable was governed by the Regulation 7 as it stood at the time of the execution of the lease agreement, and that the amended Regulation 7, which provided for a higher premium, was not applicable. They also argued that the demand and recovery of the premium was discriminatory and that the Respondents were estopped from demanding the higher premium as they had charged a lower premium for the first three extensions.
Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the amended Regulation 7 was applicable to the case as it was in force at the time the extensions were granted. The Court also held that there was no discrimination as the Respondents were taking steps to recover the additional premium from other parties who had been charged a lower premium. The Court further held that the doctrine of estoppel could not be invoked against the Respondents as the demand and recovery of the premium was in accordance with the law.
Issues: 1. Whether the amended Regulation 7 was applicable to the case. 2. Whether the demand and recovery of the premium was discriminatory. 3. Whether the Respondents were estopped from demanding the higher premium.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the amended Regulation 7 was applicable to the case as it was in force at the time the extensions were granted. The Court relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Padma Srinivasan v. Premier Insurance Co. Ltd., wherein it was held that where a policy of insurance is issued for a certain period, the liability of the insurer for third party risks under the statutory policy would not be limited to the amount specified in the policy as it existed on the date on which the policy came into force, but would be extended to the amount specified in the policy as it stood on the date of the accident. The Court also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Pune Cantonment Board and another v. M.P.J. Builders and another, wherein it was held that despite the sanction granted before the subsequent restrictions came into effect, the matter would be governed by the subsequent restrictions. 2. The Court held that there was no discrimination as the Respondents were taking steps to recover the additional premium from other parties who had been charged a lower premium. The Court relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Gursharan Singh and others v. New Delhi Municipal Committee and others, wherein it was held that the guarantee of equality before law is a positive concept and cannot be enforced in a negative manner. The Court also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Chandigarh Administration and another v. Jagjit Singh and another, wherein it was held that the mere fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. 3. The Court held that the doctrine of estoppel could not be invoked against the Respondents as the demand and recovery of the premium was in accordance with the law. The Court relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Shabi Construction Company v. CIDCO and another, wherein it was held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to compel the public bodies or the Government to carry out the representation or promise which is contrary to law or which is outside their authority or power.
Final Decision: The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Petitioners had failed to make out any case for interference by the Court.

JUDGMENT - N.D. VYAS, J. :---By the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioners are challenging the validity and legality of the action on the part of the Respondents in demanding and recovering a sum of Rs. 9,42,000\- from the Petitioners. The Petitioners have further prayed for a suitable order directing the respondents to withdraw and/or cancel their letters dated 19th January 1988 and 11th May, 1988 impugned in the petition and to refund the amount of Rs. 9,42,000/- with interest. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to the present petition are as follows.

2.By an application dated 17th January 1981, the Petitioner No. 1 requested the Respondents to grant a lease to them of a plot of land in Sector 17 in Vashi, New Bombay, admeasuring about 1,850 sq. mtrs. The Respondents is a Government Company, incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act and have been designated as the New Town Development Authority of the new town of New Bombay under the provisions of Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966. Pursuant to the Petitioner's said application, an agreement to lease was executed between the parties on 22nd October 1981. Under the said agreement, the Petitioners were required to commence the construction work within six months and to complete the same within a period of two years from the date of the agreement. Clause 6 thereof provided for extention of time inter alia on the condition that the same would be done as per provisions of New Bombay Disposal of Lands Regulations, 1975 (the said Regulations for short). The Petitioners were put in possession of the said plot on 22nd October, 1981. It is the Petitioners' case that they commenced construction work within the stipulated period, however, for various reasons entirely beyond their control and difficulties faced by them, the same could not be completed within two years i.e. by 21st October, 1983 as stipulated under the said agreement. It is the Petitioners' case that the Petitioners and other such builders were granted extention of 16 months i.e. till 21st February, 1985 but no premium was charged as according to the Petitioners, the Managing Director of the Respondents realised that non-completion of the construction work was due to the failure of the Respondents to supply proper infrastructure. Even during the extended time, the construction could not be completed and therefore, the Petitioners accordingly applied for first extention on 23rd August 1985. By letter dated 14th October, 1985 addressed by the Respondents, the Petitioners were asked to pay 5% of the premium amounting to Rs. 55,500/- in terms of clause 6 of the agreement to lease . The said amount was paid by the Petitioners and time for completion was extended from 22nd October, 1985 to 21st February, 1986. Again on 11th June 1986, the Petitioners sought further extention as the construction could not be completed by 21st February, 1986. The second extention was thus granted by the Respondents for a period upto 20th February, 1987 subject to the Petitioners paying an additional premium of Rs. 1,11,000/- i.e. 10% of the lease premium. This amount was also paid by the Petitioners. It is the Petitioners' case in the petition that by the end of January 1987, the construction work was completed and that all structural work was done in accordance with the licence and plans approved by the Respondents. However, the work relating to lift and fire fighting equipment was required to be done. The Petitioners, applied for part occupation certificate for ground floor. This application was dated 4th February 1987 alongwith which necessary certificate dated 30th January 1987 of Petitioner's Architect was also sent to the Respondents. The Petitioners completed the remaining work and obtained their Architect's completion certificate dated 10th December 1987. With reference to the said certificate, the Respondents by its letter dated 19th January 1988 informed the Pet

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1996 Supreme(Bom) 288

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