1998 Supreme(Bom) 8

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
R.M. Lodha, J.
Laxman N. Divekar ..... Petitioner.
Versus
State of Maharashtra .... Respondent.
Writ Petition No. 6019 of 1997, decided on 9-1-1998.
Advocates appeared :
P.K. Hushing, for petitioner.
Kansare, A.G.P., for State.

Headnote:Article 227-Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5-Appeal-Time barred-Condo-nation of delay of 750 days-Allowed-Jurisdiction-Held-Sufficient cause confers jurisdiction to Court in condoning the delay-When state is an applicant, the Court may give certain latitude-Provision has to be applied without causing separate standards equally to all litigants-May be the state or private party.-Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 enables the Appeal Court to admit the appeal after the prescribed period on the appellant/ applicant satisfying the Court that he had sufficient case for not preferring the appeal in time it is the satisfaction about the sufficiency of the cause in not preferring the appeal in time that counts the jurisdiction to the appeal Court in condoning the delay in filing appeal, if the appellant does not show the sufficient cause nor does not Court record the finding that the cause shown by the appellant is sufficient in not preferring the appeal in time, the Court does not possess power to arbitrarily condone delay in the name of advancing substantial justice merely because the appellant litigant happens to be the Government. It need not be emphasised that no separate standards to determine the sufficient cause could be laid be it private party or the State. Though the factors which are peculiar to the functioning of the Government conditions may require pragmatic approach in justice oriented process. The Court, when the State is an applicant, may give certain amount of latitude because of impersonal nature of administrative working in the State. Nevertheless it is incumbent upon the Court that discretion is exercised in accord with well recognised principles. The discretion so exercised by the Court must proceeded on material which spells out sufficient cause. Limitation is prescribed by law and the said provision has to be applied without carving separate standards equally to all litigants be it the State or private party. The discretion, exercised by the Appellate Court in condoning the delay of 750 days in the facts and circumstances of the case was neither proper nor judicious and rather suffered from serious error of jurisdiction. In the circumstances the impugned order deserves to be set aside.

       Section 5-Condonation of delay in filing appeal by Government- Taking grounds of delay as rush of administrative work and other pre-occupations-Held, these grounds being too vague and general, not sufficient cause to condone vague and general not sufficient cause to condone such long delay.

       Section 5-Filing of appeal by Govt.-Cause shown sufficient for condonation of delay-Condonation for 750 days delay-Work load-A ground pleaded-Baseless vague ground for condoning delay of 750 days-Sufficient cause not shown Applicability of law of limitation to all disputes-Govt. applicant-Approach of Court under Section 5 of Limitation Act-Discussion,-In the present case there is no allegation in the application made by the State that delay occurred due to the acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents or the concurred officers acted contrary to the interest of the State. Turning to the facts of the present case, it would be seen that the only ground stated in the application for condonation of delay is :

       "The appellant/defendant is the State of Maharashtra because of the rush of the administrative work and other preoccupations the Govt. of Maharashtra could not file the appeal within time. If, the delay is condoned there will be irreparable injury to the State public at large. If, the delay is condoned no loss would be caused to the opponents/respondents."

       The aforesaid cause is no cause in the eye of law sufficient for condoning the delay of 750 days. The averment is too vague and general to be accepted for making out a case of sufficient cause for condonation of delay of 750 days.

       Limitation is prescribed by law and the said provision has to be applied-without carrying separate standards, equally to all litigation; be it the State or private party. The discretion, exercised by the Appellate Court in condoning the delay of 750 days in the facts and circumstances of the case already noted above was neither proper nor judicious and rather suffered from serious error or jurisdiction. In the circumstances, the impugned order deserves to be set aside.

       Section 5-See Constitution of India, Article 227.