The Industrial Court has the power to interfere with the Labour Court's findings under Section 44 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, if the Labour Court has applied the wrong test or if the findings are perverse.

JUDGMENT - F.I. REBELLO, J.:---The petitioner workman had filed a complaint bearing No. 419 of 1994 before the 4th Labour Court at Thane. The respondent Company raised a preliminary issue that the petitioner was not a workman within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and as such the complaint ought to be dismissed on that count alone. On a preliminary issue being framed, the respondent Company examined two witnesses, petitioner did not examine any witness nor stepped into the witness box. By order dated 31st March, 1995, the Labour Court on a consideration of material before it and various judgments which are referred to in the order came to the conclusion that the petitioner was not doing work which is of a supervisory nature and consequently answered the issue in the negative. It held the petitioner to be workman.

2. Aggrieved by the said Order, the respondent Company preferred a revision application bearing No. 76 of 1995 before the Industrial Court at Thane. The Industrial Court reappreciated the evidence. The Industrial Court further held that while holding that the petitioner was a workman the Labour Court had given emphasis on the point that the complainant was reporting to the Manager and that the petitioner had no power to grant leave but only to recommend leave as also no power to appoint, take disciplinary action or dismiss anybody. The Industrial Court held that if these powers were absent, it would mean that the petitioner was not in the managerial cadre but certainly on the duties performed would fall under the cadre of supervisory cadre and as such the finding that the petitioner was a workman was not supported by evidence and material on record. It held that the Labour Court erred in not holding that the petitioner was performing work of a supervisory nature. The Learned Judge distinguished the judgment in the case of (S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra)1, reported in A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1462 on the fact of that case and similarly distinguished the case of (Ved Prakash Gupta v. M/s. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd.)2, reported in A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 914 on the fact of that case. The Industrial Court as a consequence reversed the order of the Labour Court on the preliminary issue and held the petitioner not to be a workman and consequently dismissed the complaint.

It is this order, which is the subject matter of the present petition.

3. Shri Naidu appearing on behalf of the petitioner contends that the Industrial Court in the exercise of its power under section 44 could not have interfered with the finding of fact recorded by the Labour Court. He submits that the said findings could not be said to be perverse on the fact on record and merely because another view may have been possible the Industrial Court ought not to have reversed the finding of the Labour Court; secondly he contends that if the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Ved Prakash Gupta (supra) are considered which was also a case of a security supervisor then the case of the petitioner would squarely fall within the law laid down by the Apex Court and as such the Industrial Court was also wrong in reversing the order of the Labour Court.

4. Shri Singh appearing for the respondent Company contends that there is no perversity in the finding recorded by the Industrial Court that the petitioner was not a workman. He contends that the material on record shows that the petitioner was doing the work of a supervisory nature and the Labour Court proceeded on the test viz. applying the consideration of managerial and/or administrative work and consequently the said order was rightly reversed by the Industrial Court. He further contends that the judgement of the Apex Court in the case of Ved Prakash Gupta (supra) is clearly distinguishable. It is his contention that Ved Prakash Gupta's case proceeded on the footing as to whether the Security Supervisor fell within the third part of the definition of workman viz. managerial or admini

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