1997 Supreme(Bom) 634
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
T.K. Chandrasekhara Das, J.
Jagu Tukaram Waghamale ..... Petitioner.
Versus
Dnyandeo Bala Waghmale another ..... Respondents.
Writ Petition No. 2783 of 1984, decided on 25-11-1997.
Advocates appeared :
Vineet B. Naik, for the petitioner.
Rajendra V. Pai, for respondents.
Headnote:Section 32-G- Transferee questioning rights of purchaser/tenant. If can be reopened-Revenue authorities setting aside-Held-Authorities cannot reopen tenancy rights, once it is confirmed under Section 32-G.-
There is no dispute that Section 32(g) proceedings have been concluded in favour of the petitioner, in which case, by the operation of statute he has become the purchaser of the land, of course, on fulfilling certain conditions under the Act. Therefore, technically speaking the question of tenancy is no more a res integra as far as the suit is concerned. Be that as it may, the authorities concerned who passed the impugned orders under any circumstances, cannot question the validity of the order passed under Section 32-G. When a proceedings under Section 32G was passed in favour of a tenant unless it is set aside by the competent authority as provided under the Act or declared by Civil Court to be illegal, it is a document evidencing he title and possession of. the property concerned. Court is at a loss to understand how the authorities created under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1948 could clear an order passed by competent authority under the same statute under Section 32-G to be illegal and upset the rights conferred by the authorities viz., Tenancy Awal Karkoon, Satara and Additional Collector Satara and Mahaiashtra Revenue Tribunal, Pune, has committed a serious error Jurisdiction. Therefore, the impugned orders are vitiated by lack of jurisdiction and they are liable to be set aside.
"Whether the plaintiff proves that he was a tenant in the suit property, as on 1-4-57 and become purchaser of the suit property under section 32-G of the B.T. A.L. Act.
Another issue was also referred to the Tenancy Awal Karkoon Satara as Tenancy Court Reference No. 5 of 1969. It was held that the petitioner was not a tenant. The petitioner then took up the matter in appeal and Appellate Court also rejected the appeal and confirmed the order of the Awal Karkoon. The revisional authority also followed the same. Hence the petitioner has filed this petition."
4. Heard the Counsel for the petitioner and respondent No. 1. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case it appears to me that there can not be any dispute with regard to the tenancy of the petitioner in respect of the property. There is no dispute that section 32(g) proceedings have been concluded in favour of the petitioner, in which case, by the operation of statute he has become the purchaser of the land, of course, on fulfilling certain conditions under the Act. Therefore technically speaking the question of tenancy is no more a res integra as far as the suit is concerned. Be that as it may, the authorities concerned who passed the impugned orders, under any circumstances, cannot question the validity of the order passed under section 32-G. When a proceedings under section 32-G was passed in favour of a tenant unless it is set aside by the competent authority as provided under the Act or declared by Civil Court to be illegal, it is a document evidencing the title and possession of the property concerned. I am at a loss to understand how the authorities created under the Bombay Tenancy and Agriculture Land Act, 1948 could declare an order passed by competent authority under the same statute under section 32-G to be illegal and upset the rights conferred by the authority under the certificate. On this ground the authorities viz., Tenancy Awal Karkoon, Satara and Additional Collector Satara and Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Pune, has committed a serious error of jurisdiction. Therefore the impugned orders are vitiated by lack of jurisdiction and they are liable to be set aside.
5. In the result the writ petition is allowed in terms of prayer Clause (b). In the circumstances of the case there shall be no orders as to costs.
6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the Regular Civil Suit No. 245 of 1967 is pending before the Court below for a long time. Hence I direct the 2nd Joint Civil Judge 'Junior Division' Satara to dispose of the suit within 6 months. I make it clear that I have not spoken in this judgement on any other points raised in the