JUDGMENT - A.C. AGARWAL, J.:---The present petition in so far as it seeks to impugn the virus of sub-section (2) of section 28 of the Bombay Building Repairs and Reconstruction Board Act, 1969 and sub-section (2) of section 83 of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 will no longer survive in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (State of Maharashtra v. Basantibai)1, reported in 1986(3) Bom.C.R. 243 wherein the virus of the entire Act has been upheld. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision in para 13 has observed as follows (Page 256 Bom.C.R) :

"13. Even granting for purposes of argument that sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 44 are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, we are of the view that the said provisions receive the protection of Article 31-C of the Constitution. We shall proceed to test the validity of the argument keeping aside for the time being the observations in (Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd.)2, 1983(1) S.C.R. 1000 Let us proceed on the basis that after (Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kerala)3, 1973 Supp. S.C.R. 1 and (Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India)4, 1981(1) S.C.R. 206. Article 31-C reads as notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in Clause (b) or Clause (c) of Article 39 shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19. Clause (b) of Article 39 of the Constitution which is relevant for our purpose states that the State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing that the ownership and control of material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve common good. The High Court rightly observed at the end of paragraph 14 of its judgment following Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company's case (supra) that the expression material resources of the community would cover the lands held by private owners also. But it however erred thereafter in reaching the conclusion that Article 31-C was not applicable to the case for the reason that (i) the Act did not contain a declaration that it was enacted to give effect to Article 39(b), (ii) by undertaking development of commercial centres while providing housing accommodation, the Authority was expected to make profits and hence followed that the power to acquire was not conferred with a view to achieving the directive principles in Article 39(b), and (iii) the object of enacting the legislation was obviously to provide wholesome civic life to the citizens and not distribution of material resources. We are of the view that each one of these reasons is invalid and erroneous. First, Article 31-C does not say that in an Act there should be a declaration by the appropriate legislature to the effect that it is being enacted to achieve the object contained in Article 39(b). In order to ascertain whether it is protected by Article 31-C the Court has to satisfy itself about the character of the legislation by studying all parts of it. The question whether an Act is intended to secure the objects contained in Article 39(b) or not does not depend upon the declaration by the legislature but depends on its contents. We have already dealt with the objects of the Act with which we are concerned in this case. In it inter alia makes provisions for acquisition of private lands for providing sites for building houses or housing accommodation to the community. The title to the lands of the private holders which are acquired first vests in the State Government. Later on the land is developed and then distributed amongst the people as house sites. It also provides for reserving land for providing public amenities without which people cannot live there. Community centres, shopping complexes, parks, roads, drains, play grounds, are all necessary for civic life

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