JUDGMENT -A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.:---Heard the learned Counsel for the parties.

2.This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India takes exception to the order passed by the Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Amravati, Aurangabad Division, Aurangabad, dated 23rd April, 1990, in Appeal No. 35/1989.

3.The only question involved in this writ petition is whether the school run by petitioner/society for blind, deaf and dumb students, can be said to be amenable to the jurisdiction of the School Tribunal, under section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act", for the sake of brevity).

4.The respondent No. 2, an employee, working with the petitioner's school, was terminated from service, for which, he filed an appeal under section 9 of the Act, being Appeal No. 35/1989 before the respondent No. 1/Tribunal. In the said appeal, the petitioner/institution raised preliminary objection as regards the maintainability of the appeal before the School Tribunal, constituted under the said Act, against the petitioner's school on the ground that the petitioner's school was run for blind, deaf and dumb students and was governed by Code titled "Special Code for Schools of Disabled". The petitioner's case was that the petitioner's school was recognised by the Director of Social Welfare, Government of Maharashtra and was governed by a Special Code for disabled persons. The stand taken by the petitioner was that the said Special Code was a self-contained Code and apart from other provisions, it also provides for a remedy of an appeal before the Deputy Director of Social Welfare, to an aggrieved employee.

5.In support of this stand, the petitioner referred to section 9, which according to the petitioner, was available only to an employee in a private school. The petitioner has placed reliance on the definition of "employee" as well as "private school", as defined in section 2(7) and 2(20) of the Act. Placing reliance on the said definitions, it is contended that the petitioner's school has not been recognised by the authorities referred to in the said provisions under section 2(21) and, therefore, it is not a school which was amenable to the jurisdiction of the School Tribunal under Section 9 of the Act.

6.This contention is countered by the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 by placing reliance on section 2(7) which defines "employee" as well as section 2(20) which defines a 'private school" and 2(21) which defines a "recognised school". Section 2(24) which defines "school" includes primary school, while section 2(19) defines a "primary school". It is thus contended that the school referred to above in section 9 of the Act would include all the primary schools irrespective of the authority which has recognised the said school. It is contended that if this view is not accepted, it would create violence to the legislative intention, inasmuch as, large number of employees of such schools would be left without any proper remedy in spite of victimization by the management. It is further contended that the primary school, no doubt, has to be one recognised by a competent authority as per the Municipal Law. In other words, it is contended that restricting the scope of section 9 of the Act only to private schools recognised by the authorities mentioned in section 2(21) would leave out large number of schools including the primary school which are recognised by authorities other than the officers named in section 2(21) of the Act. It is pointed out that the officers named in section 2(21) of the Act, are mainly competent to accord recognition in respect of secondary school and not, any primary school. On the other hand, the primary school is recognised by authority designated under the Municipal Law, who is different than the authorities named in section 2(21) of the Act.

7.Before considering the rival submissions it would be appropriate to reproduce

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