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1999 Supreme(Bom) 366

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
(AURANGABAD BENCH)
S.B. Mhase, J.
M/s. Nanded Wine Mart..... Petitioner.
Versus
Suresh Shankarlal Dhoot..... Respondent.
Civil Revision Application No. 698 of 1990, decided on 7-5-1999.
Advocates appeared :
A.B. Naik, for the petitioners.
A.G. Godhamgaonker, for the respondent.

Headnote:Sections 15(2)(i) Proviso, 15(3) (a)(iii)-Eviction-Wilful default-It is a positive burden on tenant to prove that default was not wilful.- The obligation to pay and/or tender the rent due is on tenant. This contemplates that if there is an agreement to pay and/ or tender the rent due on a fixed time, that the rent due shall be paid, within fifteen days from the time specified in the agreement or contract and on such a failure the tenant will be defaulter. If there is no time specified in the agreement for the payment of the rent due, then in that eventuality the tenant shall pay the rent by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable and if the rent is not paid by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable, then the tenant becomes a defaulter. Thus, in the first contingency tenant becomes a defaulter on completion of fifteen days from the time specified for the payment of the rent due in the agreement and in the absence of such agreement a tenant becomes a defaulter on completion of 30 days of the next following month of the due rent of the earlier month.

       Whenever the Rent Controller finds that the default as provided under clause (i) of sub-section 15(2) is established, the Rent Controller shall find out as to whether the tenant has offered any explanation and/or has

       pointed out any facts which may point out that the tenants default to pay or tender the rent was not wilful and whether the said explanation or the facts have been proved and established by the tenant and thereafter the Controller will have to consider whether such explanation and the established fact is sufficient to satisfy the controller that the tenants default to payor tender the rent was not wilful. Therefore, the burden to prove that the tenants default to payor tender the rent was not wilful is on the tenant, because the circumstances and/ or the facts as a result of which the tenant failure to pay rent and/ or tender it are within the knowledge of the tenant which tenant can only allege and prove. Therefore, even though prima facie it appears to be negative burden, factually and in reality it is a positive burden on the tertant.

       In the circumstance the finding recorded by the District Judge that the tenant was wilful defaulter and that he had failed to prove that he was not a defaulter was proper and had to be confirmed.

JUDGMENT- S.B MHASE, J.:---This Revision under section 26 of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954 is directed against the order passed by the District Judge, Nanded in Rent Appeal HRCA No. 28 of 1989, decided on 7-8-1990 wherein the said District Judge dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner and confirmed the order passed by the Rent Controller for eviction of the petitioner from the said premises on the grounds under section 15 (3)(a)(iii) and section 15(2)(v) of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954 and also further allowed the cross objections filed by the respondent and granted an order of eviction in favour of the respondent on the ground under section 15(2)(i) of the said Act.

2.The petitioner is tenant of the suit premises bearing Municipal No. 3-1-14 admeasuring 25 ft. to the east-west and 30 ft. north-south, situated at Station Road, Nanded and agreed rent of the said premises is Rs. 400/- per month and the petitioner entered the said premises as tenant in 1974. Initially the respondent/landlord filed eviction proceedings bearing No. 88-MAG-RCA-13 before the Rent Controller, Nanded claiming the eviction of the petitioner/tenant on following grounds:-

i) wilful default (i.e. section 15(2)(i));

ii) Bona fide requirement for personal use (i.e. section 15(3)(a)(iii));

iii) Availability of the alternative accommodation with the petitioner (i.e. section 15(2)(iv)).

iv) Nuisance (i.e. section 15(2)(iv)).

The Rent Controller by his judgment dated 17th July, 1989 passed order of eviction against the present petitioner on grounds that the premises are required by the respondent for bona fide personal use and that the alternative accommodation is available with the petitioner. So far as the grounds of default and nuisance are concerned, the Rent Controller has negatived the said grounds. However, in view of the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller, the petitioner preferred the appeal before the District Judge bearing HRCA No. 28 of 1989. When that appeal was pending, the respondent/landlord preferred cross objections challenging the findings of the Rent Controller on the points of wilful default and the nuisance. The District Judge, while confirming the order of the eviction against the petitioner confirmed the findings of the Rent Controller on the point of bona fide personal use or requirement of the premises by the landlord and that the alternative accommodation has been secured by the tenant. The District Judge reversed the finding of the Rent Controller on the point of wilful default and decided that the petitioner is a wilful defaulter. So far as the point of nuisance is concerned, the District Judge confirmed the finding of the Rent Controller. In the result, presently the order of eviction from the suit premises stands against the petitioner on three grounds, namely, (i) requirement for bona fide personal use of the premises by the landlord; (ii) availability of the alternative accommodation of the premises with the tenant and (iii) that the tenant is a wilful defaulter. Out of these three grounds, there is a concurrent finding on facts and law in respect of the bona fide personal requirement of the landlord and availability of the alternative accommodation with the petitioner/tenant.

3.Before proceeding to consider the points raised in the present matter, it requires to be stated that the learned Counsel for the petitioner tried to raise the point that in a rent appeal the cross objections cannot be filed and that the District Judge erred in entertaining the cross objections and reversing the finding in respect of the wilful default of the petitioner. However, this point was not pressed at a subsequent stage of the argument by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and thus, the point was given up. Under these circumstances, as the point was given up by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it is not considered in this judgment.

4.So far as the wilful def











































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