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1999 Supreme(Bom) 989

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
R.M. Lodha, J.
Shetkari Sahakari Sangh Ltd...... Petitioner.
Versus
Shahuwadi Taluka Shetkari Sahakari Kharedi
Vikri Sangh others.... Respondents.
Writ Petition Nos. 2640 2676 of 1984, decided on 2-9-1998.
Advocates appeared :
M.A. Rane, for the petitioner.
V.B. Rajure, for respondent No. 1.

Headnote:-Section 9-Limitation-Appointment to Promotional Post-Appeal against appointment-Appeal filed well after 4 years-Prescription 30 days-Explanation for delay unsatisfactory-Not to be condoned-Appeal-Not maintainable.- There was, therefore, a delay of more than four years and four months in filing the appeal as against the prescription of thirty days. There is absolutely no explanation by respondent No.1 as to why he could not file an appeal under Section 9 of the MEPS Act within the prescribed period of limitation after the appointment of respondent No.2 to the post of clerk. It was tried to be submitted by Shri Singh that respondent No.1 made several representations to the management but he was not given any reply. Therefore, according to him, the respondent No. 1 was waiting for the reply. I do not think that this sort of explanation is in anyway satisfactory to explain the long delay of more than four years. The learned Presiding Officer has observed in para 26 of his judgment that respondent No. 1 first on 20.12.1995 to approach the School tribunal. Therefore, according to the learned Presiding Officer, the delay deserves to be condoned. In my opinion, the leaned Presiding Officer of the School tribunal has clearly acted in contravention of the provisions of the MEPS Act in condoning the delay.

       Thus, sub-section (2) of Section 9 prescribes the limitation of thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of dismissal, removal, otherwise termination of service or reduction in rank. It does not speak of any order of super-session, obviously because in the case of supersession, there is no order, the appointment of a Junior employee to the promotional post itself amounts to supersession. Therefore, there is no dispute of the fact that an appeal in the case of supersession has to be filed within a period of thirty days from the date on which such supersession occurs. Sub-section (3) gives power to the School tribunal to maintain an appeal even after the expiry of the prescribed period if it is satisfied that the appellant has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within that period.

       Having regard to the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 9 of the MEPS Act, it cannot be said that respondent No. 1 had any sufficient cause for not filing his appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. The learned Presiding Officer has, therefore, acted illegally in condoning the delay without properly ascertaining the existence of sufficient cause. Therefore, on this count alone, the appeal filed by respondent No. 1 was not maintainable. Consequently, it must be held that the learned Presiding Officer of the School tribunal committed an illegality in entertaining the appeal.

       Super-session takes place when a junior employee is promoted to a higher post by overriding the claim of a senior employee of his cadre. It is in this context that the words "while making an appointment to any post by promotion" occurring in sub-clause (b) are material and relevant. The case of respondent No. 1 would have been covered by sub-clause (b) if respondent No.2 had been appointed to the post of clerk by way of promotion. That is, however, not so. As pointed out above, she was not an employee of the school earlier and she was directly appointed to the post of clerk. Therefore, there is no question of respondent No.1 being superseded by respondent No.2. The view taken by the learned Presiding Officer that there was an "implied super-session" of respondent No. 1 is not proper and correct and it ignores the provisions of sub-clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 9 of the MEPS Act.

       -Section 9(1)(b)-Super-session-Promotional post filled by direct recruitment-Not super-session.

       -Sections 9(2) and (3)-Appeal against super-session not filed within prescribed period M limitation-Condo-nation of delay by School tribunal without ascertaining existence of sufficient cause illegal.

       -Section 1l(2)(f)-Power of tribunal-Appointment to promotional post by supersession appeal made-No supersession made out-No relief granted.-Section 11 (2)(f) empowers the tribunal "to give such other relief to the employee and to observe such other conditions as it may specify, having regard to the circumstances of the case". In fact, when there is no case of supersession of respondent No.1, no question of granting to him any relief including the alternative relief arises. Therefore, it must be said that by granting the alternative relief, the learned Presiding Officer of the School Tribunal has exceeded his power under Section 11 of the MEPS Act. Consequently, the impugned order suffers from serious illegality and, therefore, liable to be quashed and set aside.

JUDGMENT -R.M. LODHA, J.:---These two writ petitions involve common question of law relating to sections 91 and 92 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act and, therefore, both the writ petitions have been heard together and are disposed of by common order.

2.For the sake of convenience I intend to refer to the facts of Writ Petition No. 2640 of 1984. The petitioner is the original disputant under section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (for short "Co-operative Societies Act"). The disputant is registered under the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act. The respondent No. 1 is also a society registered under the Co-operative Societies Act and respondent No. 2 is the District Central Co-operative Bank which too is registered under the Co-operative Societies Act. It is the case of the disputant that it carries on business in wholesale of fertilisers. The disputant appointed the respondent No. 1 as sub seller of the fertilisers as per the terms and conditions of letter dated 17-6-1968. According to the terms and conditions of the said agreement the disputant supplied the fertiliser to the respondent No. 1 on credit for sale. Respondent No 2 stood guarantee for 10% of the value of the fertiliser supplied by the disputant to the respondent No. 1. It is the case of the disputant that respondent No. 1 failed to pay a sum of Rs. 1,45,854.56 being the amount of credit as on 30-6-1970. A meeting took place between the disputant and the respondent No. 1 in the office of the District Deputy Registrar on 25-3-1974 wherein the respondent No. 1 admitted the claim and agreed to pay the entire amount by instalments. The respondent No. 1 did pay some instalments as admitted by him before the District Deputy Registrar but later on failed and neglected to pay further instalments. A sum of Rs. 1,13,116.52 remained due and payable by the respondent No. 1 to the disputant and, therefore, the disputant filed dispute against the respondent No. 1 and the respondent No. 2 herein as well as guarantor. The respondent No. 2 herein filed the written statement, disputed its liability and denied the claim of the disputant qua him. The respondent No. 2 set up the plea that it was not liable for claim which was decided before the District Deputy Registrar on 25-3-1974 between the plaintiff and respondent No. 1. The plea of limitation was also set up by respondent No. 2 and it was submitted in the written statement that the claim against him was barred by time. The Co-operative Court No. 1 by its judgment and order dated 21-2-1980 decreed the claim of the disputant to the sum of Rs. 1,13,116.52 and further interest at 12% on Rs. 1,07,699.11 from the date of the filing of the suit. The trial Court further decreed that if the respondent No. 1 failed to pay the suit claim, the respondent No. 2 guarantor was liable to pay 10% of the suit claim. The disputant was not satisfied with the judgment and order passed by the trial Court and, therefore, carried the matter in appeal before the Co-operative Appellate Court. The respondent No. 2 herein was also not satisfied and it also challenged the order passed by the trial Court. Both the appeals were heard together and by common order the Co-operative Appellate Court allowed the appeal filed by respondent No. 2 and set aside the judgment and decree passed against the respondent No. 2 guarantor on the ground that the claim against the guarantor respondent No. 2 herein, was barred by limitation and not maintainable. In view of this finding in the appeal filed by the respondent No. 2 guarantor, the appeal filed by the disputant was dismissed. The order passed by the Co-operative Appellate Court on 1-12-1983 is under challenge in the writ petition.

3.Sections 91 and 92 of the Co-operative Societies Act read thus:-

"91. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any dispute touching the constitution, elections of the committee or its officers other than
































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