JUDGMENT - B.N. SRIKRISHNA, J.:---Appeal admitted. Respondent waives service through their Counsel. By consent, Appeal called out and heard.

2. This appeal under the Letters Patent impugns an order of the learned Company Judge dated November 23, 2000 by which the respondent's petition for winding up the company has been admitted.

3. The facts are that the respondent is a bank which had lent large sums of money of Rs. 5,17,46,623.96 to the appellant Company. It issued a statutory notice for repayment of the aforesaid amount on 8th March, 2000. Since the company did not pay or secure the large amount due and payable, a petition for winding up of the company was presented under section 433(e) of the Companies Act, 1956. After the petition was accepted and notice was issued to the company, the company appeared and opposed the petition by an affidavit in reply. The only point urged in the affidavit in reply dated 8th October, 2000 is that it was not commercially insolvent, that it engaged a large number of workers and that winding up of the company would cause hardship to the workers and their families. It was further urged that the respondent had already moved Application No. 1249 of 2000 seeking recovery of certain debts before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "DRT") constituted under the Recovery of Debts Due to Bank and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as "RDB" Act). Based on this circumstance it was urged in opposition to the petitioner for winding up that the company Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the winding up petition. Hence, it was prayed that the company petition be dismissed summarily. The argument did not find favour with the learned Company Judge who admitted the petition. Hence, this appeal.

4. Mr. Shah, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, strenuously contended that the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank and another)1, 2000 Bank.J. (S.C.)663, supports the proposition canvassed by him. He contends that this judgment of the Supreme Court holds that once a bank or financial institution, which is entitled to move the Tribunal constituted under the RDB Act for recovery of debt, has moved the DRT, then a winding up petition is totally barred. We shall, shortly examine whether this contention or has merit.

5. Section 18 of the RDB Act provides that, on and from the appointed day, jurisdiction of Courts and other authorities in relation to matters specified in section 17 is barred. Section 17 provides that on and from the appointed day, a Tribunal constituted under the RDB Act shall exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority "to entertain and decide applications from the bank and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to such banks and financial institutions". Thus, it is obvious that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of all other Courts and authorities is only to the extent the jurisdiction is specifically vested in the DRT. That jurisdiction under section 17 is only the jurisdiction to entertain and decided application from banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to them. On first principles, we are unable to agree with the learned Counsel that a petition presented under section 433(e) of the Companies Act, 1956 for winding up of a company is or equivalent to an application seeking recovery of a debt due to the petitioning creditor. In the first place, section 433 of the Companies Act, 1956 is not intended to supplant the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to adjudicate a money suit. Section 433(e) vests in the Company Court the jurisdiction to wind up a company, inter alia under Clause (e), if the company is unable to pay its debts. Section 434 creates a statutory fiction that if the creditor has issued a prescribed notice to the company to pay up the debt and the company fails to do so or fails to secure the said debt within the prescribed time, the company shall be deemed to be unable to pay its debt. O

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