JUDGMENT - T.K. CHANDRASHEKHARA DAS, J.:---The respondent has filed a Summary Suit No. 5187/6181 of 1978 in the Small Cause Court at Bombay against the petitioner to recover a sum of Rs. 10,000/- together with cost of the suit and interest of Rs. 9063.32/- at 6% per annum from the date of the filing of the suit till realisation.

2. The petitioner/defendant contested the suit. The trial Court decreed the suit. The main contention, apart from the merit of the case, has been raised by the petitioner/defendant is that suit is barred by limitation. The trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation and on merit also the Appellate Court found that the suit is not barred by limitation and going by merit the suit is decreed.

3. In this proceeding I am not concerned about the facts of the case. Because in exercising the writ jurisdiction, this Court normally would not go into the disputed question of facts. Since the question of limitation has been taken differently by the trial Court from that of lower appellate Court, I have to address that question in this writ petition.

4. The case of the petitioner/defendant is that he has entrusted the work of plumping to the respondent/plaintiff, and the work was completed and the bill was raised of Rs. 19,275/-. Therefore the amount if any under that contract is become payable on 19-2-1975. Three years period of limitation starts from that day. Since the suit was filed on 28-11-1978 the petitioner contended that the suit was barred by limitation. The trial Court accepted that contention. But the lower appellate Court has come to the conclusion that even though the final bill has been raised on 19-2-1975 the payment could not have been made until and unless the architect certifies the work of the bill. Though certain correspondence between the parties indicate that an architect has employed to verify and certify the bill, there is no material available in the Court that the payment could be made only after the architect certifies. It is to be noted here that the entrustment of the work was done orally. There is no written contract between the parties. The controversy between the parties were that as to who had appointed the architect.

5. The learned Counsel for the respondent has argued that the money became payable only when the architect certified and for the purpose of limitation we have to rely on Article 113 of the Limitation Act. I find there is no ground to accept this argument. Of course both the parties were corresponding each other regarding the appointment of architect. But there is no evidence or material that architect's certificate is a sine quo non for the payment of the bill.

6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the relevant article for the purpose of considering the question of limitation is Article 18, which reads as follows :

"For the price of work done by the plaintiff for the defendant at his request, where no time has been fixed for payment-three years-has to be reckoned when the work is done."

7. From the evidence available in this case, I have no hesitation to hold that the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant was in the nature of work contract and the relevant Article is 18. The "price of the work" appears in Article 18 will clearly amplify that the article is related for the claim of money due under the works contract. The learned Counsel for the respondent tried to argue that it will not come under Article 18 but comes under Article 7 which deals with the payment of wages. A work is a composite contract where worker, while doing his work, had to purchase some article for the fulfilment of the contract to be used for the work. This is not an acceptable proposition. Merely because under a work contract the work is given to a worker by utilizing his skill as well as involving purchase of some article, the question arises in such circumstances is whether it is a work contract or it is a supply contract depends largely on the nature of the

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