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2001 Supreme(Bom) 559

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
R.J. Kochar, J.
A.H. Wadia Charity Trust others .... Petitioners.
Versus
Neville Jathan others.... Respondents.
Writ Petition No. 1289 of 2001, decided on 25-6-2001.
Advocates appeared :
C.U. Singh with Shobhna Gopal Ruben i/b., Gagrat Co., for petitioners.
S.K. Talsania with J.K. Mistry i/b. Sanjay Udeshi Co., for respondent No. 1.
S. Banerjee i/b. Doijade Phatarphekar Co., for respondent Nos. 2 3.

Headnote:INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947

       Section 2 (j) and Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1972, Section 30- Termination of charity trust employee- Where there was nothing to show that the trust was not an industry and activities of the trust were commercial in nature, it was rightly held by the labour Court that trust was an industry and therefore the complaint filed by the employee will be maintainable. 1978 1 LLJ 349, Relied on. .

JUDGMENT- R.J. KOCHAR, J.:---The petitioner trust has impugned the judgment and order dated 6-6-2001 passed by the Industrial Court, Maharashtra at Mumbai in Revision Application (ULP) No. 2 of 2000 filed by the trust and Trustees against the judgment and order of the 6th Labour Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 314 of 1994 filed by the respondent No. 1, concerned employee, under section 28 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971 read with Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act to challenge the order of termination dated 6-7-1994 on the ground that he was found guilty of habitual late attendance in the office.

2. The charge against the respondent employee who had put in 19 years of clean and umblemish service, was that he had attended the office late on 11 days in September, 1993, 20 days in October 1993 and 14 days in December 1993. It was further alleged against him that in the months of April and May 1994 he had attended the office very late. By a letter dated 7-6-1994 he was called upon to show cause why he should not be terminated from employment for habitual late attendance. It was mentioned in the said letter that he was warned several times of his unpunctuality and that he was found flouting the managements' instructions. It appears from the record that in his first reply dated 13-12-1994 he had admitted that his attendance was not exemplary and that he was delayed on account of difficulties of travel. In the very same letter he had however pointed out that he had put in 19 years of service and that he had taken very minimum lunch break and that he was invariably attending the Chairman's Bungalow for official duty sometimes even beyond 8.30 p.m. reaching home late at night. He has also mentioned that he was asked to take the load of work to his residence which he did without any grudge or grumble. He has also pointed out that on account of reduction in the staff he was over burdened with extra work of other staff members who had resigned/retired and whose posts were not filled up for economy. The aforesaid reply did not satisfy the management. It thought that the respondent employee was trying to justify his habitual late attendance and that he was giving excuses which were not tenable and not acceptable to the management. By a letter dated 28th June, 1994 he was called upon to attend the enquiry to find out "why he should not be dismissed from service for habitual late attendance". It appears that an enquiry was held and was finished within 40 minutes on the same day i.e. on 4-7-1994 and he was terminated from employment by an order dated 6-7-1994. It was recorded as finding in the said letter that the respondent employee had committed misconduct by habitually attending late over a long period despite several warnings given to him.

3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of termination the respondent employee filed the complaint of unfair labour practice and prayed for a declaration that the said order amounted to an unfair labour practice within the meaning of Items 1(a), (b), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of Schedule IV of the Act, and he also sought affirmative orders of reinstatement with full backwages and continuity of service. It appears that his application for interim orders was not granted. The petitioners trust contested the complaint by filing a reply. The petitioners herein had also raised a point of jurisdiction that the trust was a Charitable Trust and it was not an industry as contemplated under section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and therefore the complaint was not maintainable. In a reply filed by one of the Trustees Mrs. Mary C.P. Wadia had however taken a different stand to say that the signatory of the termination Order dated 6-7-1994 had no powers to pass such orders and that no such decision was taken by the trust and that no meeting of the Trustees was convened to take decision of dismissal of the employee. Two of the trustees have supported the case of the respondent employee that the order of termi























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