The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of section 4 of the Bombay Tenancy Agricultural Lands Act, which deems a person lawfully cultivating land belonging to another person to be a tenant under certain conditions.

JUDGMENT - KHANWILKAR A.M., J.:---This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India takes exception to the order passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Pune dated 27th August, 1987 in Revision Application No. M.R.T./K.P./96/84.

2. The land in question in the present proceeding is admeasuring 8 acres 20 gunthas out of Gat No. 37 of Village Talanduge, Taluka Hatkanangale, District Kolhapur. The petitioners claim that they were tenants in respect of the said land prior to 1957, for which reason they had become deemed purchasers on the tillers day (1-4-1957). On that premises, application was filed by the petitioners under section 32-G of the Bombay Tenancy Agricultural Lands Act. The Additional Tahsildar and A.L.T. Hatkanangale by order dated 20th September, 1982 allowed the said application and held that the petitioners were tenants on the tillers day and have become deemed purchasers. As a consequence of that declaration, the authority determined the purchase price in respect of the suit lands and also provided for time to pay the said amount. The first authority the Tahsildar, for recording the finding that the petitioners were tenants on the tillers day, essentially took into account 7/12 extracts in respect of the disputed land for the last 35 years which clearly indicated that the petitioners were cultivating the suit land as tenants. The Tahsildar also adverted to the fact that the landlords plea was that the petitioners were partners in cultivation and not tenants. The Tahsildar however, held that the landlords failed to establish that the petitioners were servants within the meaning of section 4(1)(b) of the said Act. Accordingly, the application preferred by the petitioners was allowed. The respondents filed appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Division Kolhapur being Tenancy Appeal No. 2188/82. The Appellate Authority was pleased to reverse the view taken by the Tahsildar, by its order dated 26th March, 1982. The Appellate Authority of the view that if the petitioners claimed to be the tenants on the tillers day, there was no justification for the petitioners to take out the proceedings under section 32-G as late as in the year 1981. Moreover, the Appellate Authority was of the view that it is not understood as to why the suo motu proceedings were not started by the A.L.T. on the tillers day. In so far as entries in 7/12 extracts are concerned, the Appellate Authority discarded the same on the premises that the oral evidence on record would indicate that the status of the applicant was only that of a servant. The Appellate Authority, while referring to the receipts relating to the sugarcane sold to Kolhapur Sugar Mills purported to have been cultivated in the suit land, was of the view that the receipts have come from the custody of the respondents landlord-which confirms the position that the status of the petitioners was one of the servant and not as a tenant. The Appellate Authority has also adverted to the stand taken by the respondents that the petitioners were not tenants as such but partners in cultivation. However, relying on the oral evidence, the Appellate Authority took the view that the petitioners were cultivating the land only as servants and therefore, cannot be said to be tenants on the tillers day. Accordingly, the appeal preferred by the respondents was allowed. The petitioners carried the matter before Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Tribunal moreover or less adopted the same reasons noted by the Appellate Authority for deciding the matter in favour of the respondents. Accordingly, the revision application was dismissed. It is against this decision that the present writ petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

3. The learned Counsel for the petitioners contends that going by the plain language of section 4 and the stand taken by the respondents before the authorities, the authorities had no option but to hold that the petitioners were lawfu

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