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2002 Supreme(Bom) 348

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
F.I. Rebello, J.
Rajendraprasad Kedarprasad Tiwari .... Petitioner.
Versus
Shankar Vithu Kuveskar.... Respondent.
Writ Petition No. 2056 of 2002, decided on 5-4-2002.
Advocates appeared :
G.S. Godbole, for petitioner.

The main legal point established in the judgment is that under section 13(1)(l) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, the acquisition of alternative premises need not be voluntary and can include allotment by the employer, and the concept of locality cannot be read into the section.

Headnote:

Acquisition - Tenancy - Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 - Section 13(1)(l)

Fact of the Case:

The respondent/landlord filed an eviction suit against the petitioner, which was initially dismissed by the trial court but later allowed by the appellate court based on the grounds of the petitioner acquiring suitable alternative accommodation and keeping the suit premises vacant for six months before the suit.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the petitioner's acquisition of alternative premises need not be voluntary and could include allotment by the employer, and that the concept of locality cannot be read into section 13(1)(l). The court also upheld the appellate court's finding that there was no jointness in the family occupying the premises.

Issues: The issues included the voluntariness of acquiring alternative premises, the concept of locality in relation to the acquired premises, and the jointness of the family occupying the premises.

Ratio Decidendi: The court interpreted section 13(1)(l) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 to include allotment of suitable residence by the employer and rejected the requirement of voluntariness and the concept of locality in relation to the acquired premises. The court also upheld the finding that there was no jointness in the family occupying the premises.

Final Decision: The petition was dismissed, and no costs were awarded. The respondent was restrained from executing the decree if the petitioner and other adult members filed a usual undertaking within a specified time.

JUDGMENT - F.I. REBELLO, J.:---Rule. Heard forthwith.

2. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The respondent/landlord had filed eviction suit against the petitioner on various grounds. The trial Court by judgment dated 11th January, 1999 dismissed the suit on all grounds.

3. Aggrieved, the respondent/landlord preferred an appeal. By judgment and order dated 29th January, 2002 the appeal was allowed, on the ground that the defendant has acquired suitable alternative accommodation as also on the ground that the defendant has kept the suit premises vacant for six months before the suit. I do not propose to consider the issue of keeping vacant the premises for six months before filing of the suit. The sole issue is, as to whether the tenant after creation of the tenancy and coming into force of the Act has built, acquired vacant possession of/or been allotted premises for residence. On behalf of the petitioner, their learned Counsel assailed the order of the Appellate Court on the following grounds :

4. It is firstly contended that acquisition of the alternative premises must have an element of voluntariness. In the instant case, it is contended that the petitioner had to shift to other places on account of his transfer by his bank and, therefore, even if the bank had allotted premises, that would not be an act of voluntariness on the part of the petitioner. The acquisition further must be in the locality where the suit premises are located. Petitioner has not got any other alternative premises in the locality.

Secondly, it is contended that the premises were taken on tenancy by the joint family. The first Appellate Court in reversing findings of joint tenancy has not addressed itself to the correct question and, therefore, the order discloses an error of law apparent on the face of it.

5. We may now advert to the issue framed under section 13(1)(l) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. Section 13(1)(l) reads as under :

"that the tenant after coming into operation of this Act has built, acquired vacant possession of, or been allotted a suitable residence."

A look at the section would indicate that it does not require any other rule of construction except the literal construction. Such a construction would contemplate that building or owning a premises is distinct from acquiring vacant possession or allotment of suitable residence. If the arguments of the petitioner is to be accepted, it would contemplate that if the petitioner is allotted the premises by his employer in the same locality that would not amount to acquisition of premises. The argument is based on the contention that there must be an element of voluntariness. In other words, it is sought to be contended on behalf of the petitioner that once petitioner is a tenant and during the course of his employment is allotted residence by his employer, that allotment would not amount to acquisition of suitable residence. It would be difficult to accept this contention as the consequences that follows from the argument, would be that once a tenant, always a tenant. In other words it may amount to depriving the landlord of his right to property. Such construction in my opinion is not possible.

The purpose of the Rent Act was to prevent eviction of the tenant except for those grounds contained in section 13 and section 12(3) of the Bombay Rent Act. If, therefore, during the course of the tenancy the tenant acquires whether by way of tenancy or by way of allotment by his employer accommodation that would fall within the meaning of section 13(1)(l). The element of voluntariness in those matters would be immaterial as otherwise. It would be carving out a class of tenants in organisation who though allotted suitable accommodation by the employer can continue to reside in the premises for all times to come. This would have never been the object for which section 13(1)(l) was enacted which was to provide protection to the tenant. That contention, the







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