JUDGMENT - R.M.S. KHANDEPARKAR, J.:---Heard the learned Advocates for the parties. Rule. By consent, the Rule is made returnable forthwith.

2. The petitioner challenges the order dated 21st June, 2002 rejecting the application filed by the petitioner for rejection of the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11(d) of the C.P.C.

3. It is the contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the suit has been filed for execution of the compromise decree in the earlier suit between the parties and therefore considering the provisions of section 47 read with Order VII, Rule 11(d) of C.P.C. the plaint is liable to be rejected.

4. Referring to Clauses 4 and 10 in the compromise decree passed on 19th March, 1987 in Regular Civil Suit No. 24 of 1987 between the parties to the proceedings, it was sought to be contended that in terms of Clause 4 the parties had agreed to enjoy in common the open space by the side of the road and had agreed not to obstruct for such enjoyment to each other and further in terms of Clause 10 of the said decree it was agreed that in case of necessity for enforcement of any of the said terms of the said decree the same can be obtained by way of execution of the said decree. Further drawing the attention to the present suit, it was sought to be contended that it is the case of the respondent/plaintiff that the parties started enjoying the property in terms of the said compromise decree but has recently the petitioner/defendant has caused obstruction to the construction being carried out by the respondent/plaintiff in the said area. According to the learned Advocate for the petitioner therefore it virtually amounts to seeking execution of the said compromise decree. The contention is that since section 47 of C.P.C. provides that all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of decree shall be determined by Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit, and since the grievances of the respondent/plaintiff relates to the non-compliance of the compromise decree in the earlier suit, and the same being apparent from the pleadings in the plaint, the remedy for the respondent/plaintiff lies by way of execution of said compromise decree and not by way of separate suit, and therefore, it is a case fit to invoke powers under Order VII, Rule 11(d) of C.P.C. and to reject the plaint.

5. Undoubtedly, Order VII, Rule 11(d) of C.P.C. provides that the plaint shall be rejected in case when the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. The object behind the said provision of law is to avoid manifestly vexatious and meritless litigation and to protect the parties being unnecessarily harassed by others. The Clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII of C.P.C. would apply to the cases when it would reveal from the contents of the plaint that the suit is barred. In other words, in order to enable the Court to arrive at the conclusion that the suit filed by plaintiff is barred, the pleadings in the plaint should apparently disclose the facts revealing the bar to the suit instituted by the plaintiff. The conclusion under Clause (d) regarding the bar to the suit cannot be arrived at on the basis of materials extraneous to the pleadings in the plaint. The jurisdiction of the Court to take action under Order VII, Rule 11(d) of C.P.C. can arise only in case where the pleadings in the plaint are sufficient to disclose the bar to the suit, and not otherwise. Of course, the jurisdiction can be exercised at any stage of the suit, however, the decision under Order VII, Rule 11(d) has to be on the basis of the pleadings in the plaint. The law on this point being very clear, it would be necessary to examine the pleadings in the plaint before arriving at any conclusion in the matter in relation to the contentions raised by the petitioner.

6. Perusal of the plaint disclose that the suit has been fil

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